A study of metaphysical disputation illustrated by the Locke-Berkeley dispute about the nature of the external world and by a similar modern dispute by Lake, Beryl L.
A STUDY OF METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATION
ILLUSTRATED BY THE LOCKE-BERKELEY DISPUTE 
ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE EXI’ERNAL WORLD AND 
BY A SIMILAR MODERN DISPUTE
Beryl L# Lake
BIBU




INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10098006
Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
C O N T E N T S
pages
Chapter One......  Introduction. 1 - 14
Chapter Two..... . Berkeley's Attack on Abstract
Ideas #...•••...•o.oft o<i»<i<><v««<îrtcsoo oooi 15 29
Chapter Three Berkeley's Attack on Substance........« 30 - 52
Chapter Four...... The Locke-Berkeley Dispute   53 - 8?
Chapter Five . ... Mexander's Account of the
Material World. «.- «. r. •  88 — 101
Chapter Six. An Account of the Material
World given by Bertrand Russell......  102 - IP
Chapter Seven..... Alexander's and Russell's
'Scientific' Metaphysics. 120 - 138
Chapter Eight..... The Persistence of the Dispute   139 - 177
Chapter Nine...... The Genesis of the Dispute............. 178 - 223
Chapter Ten....... An Explanation of Metaphysical
Disputation    224 - 253
Appendix: Bibliography
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The metaphysical dispute purporting to be about the 
ultimate nature of material things waged by Berkeley against 
Locke has these puzzling features:
1. It is irresolvable5 both conclusions are designed to be 
logically fortified against refutation - by fact, coianonsense 
belief, or ordinary linguistic use. Thus each becomes 
logically necessary.
2. Nevertheless the contestants appeal to plain facts and 
ordinary speech in support of their theories, which thus 
appear to be empirical hypotheses.
3* The Locke-Berkeley dispute, although irresolvable, persists, 
and recurs in some twentieth century disputation about the 
material world and our knowledge of it.
A detailed study of selected metaphysical texts reveals 
these eccentric characteristics. The hypothesis is offered 
that they appear eccentric only if we expect metaphysics 
to be like the natural sciences, philology, or plain description 
of empirical situations. I claim to explain points 1 - 3  
as follows:
lo The dispute is irresolvable, and its conclusions^a priori 
true in terms of the respective systems, because metaphysicians 
do not provide or describe ordinary information about the world 
or about language, but interpret it in accordance with a specific
motive, determined by non-philosophical interest, and in the
service of a general attitude which is expressed in a theory 
about how the world ought to be described. Redefinitions and 
special interpretations give an & priori air to the conclusions, 
but the dispute is basically a clash of attitude©
2* The metaphysical views look empirical because they arise from
matter-of-fact considerations, and present a 'picture* of what 
the material world really is, though neither a description nor 
a scientific explanation.
ABgTRACT OF THESIS CONTINUED
3. The dispute is persistent, because the attitudes involved 
in its expression are common outlooks, which have been 
evident in western philosophy since the Ancient Greek 
Philosophers. It is also persistent because clashes of
attitude can never be conclusively settled.
The nature of a metaphysical view becomes clearer if we
think about it by analogy with a work of art, rather than
by analogy with a scientific hypothesis, a commonsense 
description, or a philological account.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
"As is well known, the metaphysical problem 
about the nature of material things, the 
question, that is to say, as to the ultimate 
constitution and structure of such objects as 
books and pennies and soap bubbles, has given 
rise to different theories none of which has, 
in essentials, turned out to be universally 
acceptable to professional philosophers. It 
has to be pointed out in this connection that 
each theory has its convinced adherents and that 
the arguments for each theory, though not 
convincing to some philosophers, are accepted as 
conclusive by others. This is a bewildering 
state of affairs and we may well wonder what has 
happened to create it:..#"
Morris Lazerowitz, "Substratum", Philosophical Analysis# 
ed. Max Black, Cornell University Press: 1950. p# 17&
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My aim in this thesis is to point out some puzzling 
features of a metaphysical dispute which purports to be about 
the nature of the external world, and then to offer an 
explanation.
For example, 1 shall try to show that although metaphysical 
conclusions are not in any way testable, cannot be conclusively 
confirmed or refuted, neither are they meaningless or pointless© 
And, for example, 1 shall go on to say in what ways they are 
meaningful©
1 do not intend to attack metaphysics in general, nor to 
fight against any specific metaphysical view. My object is 
to understand how a metaphysical dispute functions, and what 
gives rise to it. This could involve any number of different 
kinds of study, so it is important to state at the start exactly 
what 1 do not aim to do, before giving some indication of my 
positive purpose©
First, no attempt will be made to produce a detailed historical 
study, or that sort of textual scholarship designed to elucidate 
ambiguities and to say what the metaphysician really meant.
That is, my primary purpose is not to trace the influence of 
one metaphysician upon another, the extent to which their views 
are explicable in terms of historical setting, or the intellectual 
development revealed from their earliest writings to their 
final systems. Naturally none of these considerations will be 
irrelevant. But this thesis is not mainly concerned with them©
So the expositions given of the metaphysical views for 
illustrative purposes are not meant to be complete or critical.
1 have tried to describe as briefly as possible the central 
parts of views held by Locke, Berkeley, Alexander and Lord 
Russell which claim to give an account of the ultimate nature 
of physical things. It would have been impossible here to 
give full descriptions of all that these philosophers said, let
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alone of Russell's long and adaptable philosophical development©
The purpose has been to pick out some self-sufficient metaphysical 
views which seem to be representative of a persistent British dispute. 
If, in an effort to avoid making the wood invisible for the trees,
I have not discussed all the possible scholarly interpretations of 
what these philosophers asserted, my defence is that the four views 
expounded here do seem to have been held by the four metaphysicians 
to whom they are attributed, and if even this is not agreed, then 
at least it must be admitted that they are views which metaphysicians 
might very well hold. This sufficiently justifies the claim that 
they are appropriate material for a study of metaphysical disputation 
about the nature of the external world.
Secondly, 1 do not plan to judge or evaluate these qjetaphysical 
views. On the contrary my intention is to avoid taking sides in the 
dispute which they represent. It seems that an impartial study of 
metaphysical claims, made as far as possible by forgetting personal 
preferences or prejudices, will yield a more reliable hyppthesis 
to explain them. For example, the weak spot many of us have for 
Berkeley, whose writings appear in many ways more charming than 
Locke's, must not be allowed to develop into a blind spot.
Thirdly, the examination of metaphysical dispute will not be 
made in accordance with a predetermined set of psychological 
hypotheses in mind. The study will not, for example, be psycho­
analytic. It seems to me that such predetermined formulae result 
not in an explanation of metaphysical views, but in descriptions which 
seem to fit any kind of view whatever. Psycho-analytic conclusions 
appear easily adaptable to any subject-matter, and consequently
fail to explain the peculiarities of a given subject. I have in mind
2
Dr. J.O. Wisdom's psycho-analysis of Berkeley's metaphysics , and how
2
* See J.O. Wisdom, The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley’s Philosophy. 
Hogarth: 1953
-3-
it fails not only to explain why Berkeley chose metaphysics, e.g. 
rather than art, to satisfy his unconscious needs, but also why 
he chose to advance the particular metaphysical view he propounded. 
The alleged unconscious need to eliminate Matter from the scheme 
of things might equally well, if we pay close attention to 
metaphysical argumentation itself, apply to Locke's view. There are 
different metaphysical methods of seeming to "banish Matter" from 
the universe, and it could reasonably be argued that esse est percipi 
"got rid of it" no more, and no less, than the doctrine that 
Matter is Unknowable.
It may then be concluded that I hope to make a linguistic analysis
of metaphysical dispute, or what in America would be called a
"semantic analysis". It remains to be said in what sense this is 
true.
English-speaking philosophers, and the Vienna Circle, have 
produced in this century several subtly different but distinguishable 
linguistic analytic methods, and sometimes attendant theories or 
hints about the nature of metaphysics. The clearest and most 
recent account of the history of this development, stemming from 
philosophers like Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, is to be found 
in the Introduction to the collection of articles from Analysis.^
I would not presume to attempt an equally full account here, and 
indeed it would be unnecessary. I shall therefore, in order to
indicate to what extent I plan to follow the line of one sort of
current philosophical analysis, and to avoid the presuppositions 
on which other sorts seem to be based, discuss briefly some of the 
main approaches which can be made to the study of metaphysics in 
linguistic idiom.
Logical postivism, the analytic method of which claimed to show 
that metaphysical assertions are literally meaningless, is no longer 
as fashionable as it was in the period between the wars, and seems 
to have been relinquished by its main British exponent, Professor
See Philosophy and Analysis, edited with an Introduction by 
Margaret Macaonaia, niacKweils 1954* PP* 1-14
Ayer, whose vehement attack on metaphysics. Language. Truth and 
Logic, first excited its readers nearly twenty years ago# However 
I believe that ÿhe disparagement of metaphysics which that doctrine 
encouraged is still expressed, though in less blatant form, and 
for this reason it seems worth stating here why its approach to 
the study of metaphysical assertions seems wrong, and consequently 
why it will not provide a slogan for this thesis.
Like all analytic methods in contemporary philosophy, Wittgensteia
has been named as the putative father og logical positivism.
Whether or not this is so, Wittgenstein in his early work did
give a vivid statement of what was to be its spirit:
"The right method of philosophy would be this. To 
say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions 
of natural science, i.e. something which has nothing to 
do with philosophy: and then always, Tdien someone else
wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to 
him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the 
other - he would not have the feeling that we were 
teaching him philosophy - but it would be the only strictly 
correct method." ^
It now seems evident that the principle of verification in its
original form was wrong. That is, the suggestion that no proposition
has meaning unless its truth value can be determined either - in
the case of empirical assertions - by empirical observation of '
the situation it describes, or - in the case of a priori propositions
by reference to some well-ordered system, is false if 'has meaning*
is to be taken literally. To tell a metaphysician that he had
"given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions" would
quite rightly not satisfy him. If we accused Alexzmder, for
example, of giving no meaning to the phrase "Space-Time", he may
reasonably have asked what we supposed the purpose of his two
volumes had been; for Space,Time and Deity, as I hope to show,
is designed to give a meaning to this and other phrases. Indeed,
A
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Phllosophicus, 
Kegan Paul: 1922. p. 187 & p# 189 (para. no. 53)
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metaphysicians take trouble to tell us what meanings they annex 
to terms, when those terms are not intended to function in 
accordance with ordinary usage. I believe that metaphysical 
assertions should be examined impartially and not with the 
preconception that they must be phoney. It is quite in order 
to admit that metaphysical assertions are untestable either by 
empirical observation or by reference to some well-ordered system 
- like multiplication tables, or the class calculus of formal 
logic - without admitting that they have nothing whatever to say 
about anything. When logical positivists announced that metaphysical 
statements were nonsense, they did not intend to say that they 
were word-jumbles like "twodown cat ties", or semantic confusions 
like "mathematics is pink and square" - or, if they did, what they 
said was patently false. 'Nonsense*, we can suspect, was used 
emotively. Professor Ayer once made it clear that by this term 
he meant "down right nonsense", "plain nonsense", "rubbish".^
The objections to this doctrine are perhaps too familiar to bear 
repetition, although they will be developed where appropriate in 
the course of this study.
In current philosophical analysis there is another less blatantly 
false but equally disparaging view about the nature of a metaphysical 
conclusion, which I shall hope to refute in this thesis. It seems 
to me to misrepresent what metaphysicians do with their words more 
subtly than, but as much as, logical positivism. It is a view held 
by practically all the linguistic philosophers in England today, 
and studies of metaphysics are commonly made in accordance with its 
main assumption, which is that metaphysicians are confused about the 
uses of ordinary language terms and expressions.
See A.J. Ayer, "The Genesis of Metaphysics", Philosophy and 
Analysis, p. 24 & 25* For an account of the suspicion that
logical positivists used 'nonsense* emotively see Morris Lazerowit, 
"The Positivistic Use of 'Nonsense?", Mind, Vol. LV, July 194&* 
pp. 247 — 255 V.
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The claim made by these predominant philosophers is, briefly, 
that philosophical problems, by which they often mean metaphysical 
dispute, are resolved as soon as they have been exhibited for what 
they are - the results of linguistic confusions or mistakes#
"F#P. Ramsey referred to Russell's theory of descriptions 
as 'the paradigm of philosophy*. By it Russell seemed 
to have dispelled a philosophical puzzle about the status 
of fictitious objects by a closer attention to the meanings 
of words and sentences. This idea, with which Moore must 
also be associated, that philosophical problems might be 
solved by a better understanding of the meaning of language, 
was one of those simple, but profound, ideas which modify 
the thought of a whole philosophical age. Transformed 
later by the genius of Wittgenstein, it has been continuously 
fertile. Examples of its effects have always appeared in 
Analysis and now predominate."
By implication, this view claims that a metaphysical theory is 
false and can be refuted once a careful semantic study has 
revealed that it involves a mistaken notion of how terms, phrases 
or sentences would ordinarily be used. The accusation made 
against most, if not all, metaphysical theories is that they are 
the result of misdescribing, misusing, or otherwise abusing 
the plain speech we commonly use over shop counters or at cocktail 
parties.
While I hope to show that metaphysicians do not make mistakes 
about language, do not describe or misdescribe it, and misuse 
it only in the very thin sense of using it differently for specific 
purposes, it must be admitted that the philosophers who have 
devoted their energies to exhibiting how and why metaphysicians do 
not always abide by the rules of common speech have made it possible 
to see that metaphysicians do queer things with language. The 
suggestion which I hope to repudiate is that they do this by mistake, 
and that what they do cannot be justified in terms of their purposes.
Margaret Macdonald, "Introduction", op. cit.. pp. 7 - 8
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For I do not believe that metaphysicians are confused about 
ordinary speech - on the contrary, they are often masters of it©
And I do believe that the tricks they play on ordinary language 
are done for a specific purpose which is not linguistic, not to 
describe or show how ordinary expressions are actually used.
One of my contentions in what follows will be that metaphysical 
systems are not intended to be translatable into plain talk, that 
they lose their point if we try to make this translation, and in 
this respect we should do better to compare them with poetry 
rather than philology. It may be more correct to regard 
metaphysical dispute not as linguistic muddles, but as the result 
of verbal tricks© The thesis which follows is intended, among 
other things, to state the difference©
There is, however, a type of current philosophical analysis 
which seems to me to be very different from the kind which is 
predominant© I refer to the impartial studies of what metaphysicians 
do with words, not made in order to show that metaphysicians 
commit errors, but to show what they might be doing if we do not 
assume that they are making mistakes or talking rubbish© I call 
this approach impartial because it does not seem to involve value 
judgment, it neither praises nor condemns metaphysics, but tries 
to see it for what it is. This too probhbly has its origin in 
Wittgenstein and Moore, but it appears more open-minded and less 
partisan than many of the views about metaphysics which have 
developed from those great contemporary thinkers. Indeed, I do 
not believe that it is accurately described as a philosophical 
view at all, since it tries to see what philosophers are doing 
without entering into any dispute about the relative metits 
of what each does. This is the modern approach which I hope to 
emulate, although I do not enirely agree with some of the hypotheses 
that have resulted from it about the nature of metaphysics©
Professor John Wisdom is perhaps the main exponent of this kind 
of study in England, although he has said some things which may
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suggest that he thinks metaphysicians make mistakes as a
result of verbal confusion, in which case he would more appropriately
be classed with the advocates of ordinary language analyses.
He does make remarks, however, which I have in mind as I embark
upon this study. For example he has said:
"Those who say that discussions which are not to be
settled by experiment and observation are discussions
about words speak wildly - as wildly as one who calls 
a hat the Taj Mahal, So do those scientists, philosophers 
or poets who say one cannot stir a flower without troubling „ 
of a star. What they say is mad but there’s method in it,"
"Philosophers reason for and against their doctrine and 
in doing so show us not new things but old things anew",”
Metaphysiee is mad, but there is method in it; I wish to try to 
answer the question "What method ?", "What is the point of verbal 
manipulation in metaphysics?"
In the works of other modern philosophers, even those who at 
other times suggest that metaphysicians are simply mistaken about 
language, we find illuminating remarks which, if followed up in 
a study of metaphysical texts, may serve to show that the content 
of metaphysical statements is not confused, but different, not 
mistaken, but designed for a special purpose which plain speech 
could not serve. Dr, Macdonald, for example, sometimes makes such 
comments: metaphysicians
"try to operate with ordinary words when they have deprived 
them of their ordinary functions. They recombine known 
words in an unfamiliar way while trading on their familiar 
meanings," ^
"When men take an oath, deliver a verdict, recite a creed, 
utter a curse, or cast a spell, they are using forms of 
speech much older than those of dispassionate narrative or 
scientific discourse. For oaths, curses, judgments,incantations,
7° John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, Blackvirel 1:1953. P« 254 
ibid.. p. l8l
9' Margaret Macdonald, "The Philosopher's Use of Analogy", Logic and 
ipopi.apt., ed. A.G.N. Flew, (1st Series), Blackwell: 1951. P. 82
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and similar utterances are not designed for the disinterested 
statement of fact. They exemplify a use of language 
not as a vehicle of information about nature, but as, 
itself, one of the powers of nature. The invention of 
writing and general literacy disguise from us that words 
are primarily breath, and breath, like steam, can be used 
as well as escape."
Now although the author of these remarks would probably be quick 
to point out that the second quotation is taken from a discussion 
of moral judgments, and not of metaphysics, it may well be that 
delivering verdicts, reciting creeds, and casting spells are 
verbal activities more analogous to metaphysical utterances than 
the language of natural science, dispassionate description, or 
descriptive philology. It is the recognition that not all 
language is designed to convey information, to which philosophers 
often pày lip service but which few take seriously when they 
discuss metaphysics, that I believe is particularly important 
for any meta-metaphysical study©
Professor Morris Lazerowitz has advanced a detailed theory
about the nature of metaphysics, which exhibits the kind of approach
for which I vote. In brief, the theory is that metaphysicians
advocate linguistic changes not for the practical purposes of
ordinary speech, but in order to put forward, by ’verbal magic *,
certain irrefutable, non-descriptive conclusions which look as
if they are about the nature of the world, but turn out to be illusions
or word-dreamso
"The illusion that things are unknowable in themselves has 
its source in a linguistic creation".
A metaphysical view presents an illusion, but is neither true nor
false. I am not sure that ’illusion* is quite right here, and I
am not sure that metaphysical views are simply or even primarily the
Margaret Macdonald, "Ethics and the Ceremonial Use of Language", 
Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max Black, Cornell University Press:
1950. p. 211
Morris Lazerowitz, "Substratum", loc. cit., p. I89
1
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result of word-juggling. It seems that there must be a motive
for the verbal manipulation, and I do not believe, as I understand
12that Professor Lazerowitz does, that it is an unconscious motive©
If more attention is paid to the explicit motives of metaphysicians, 
with which they nearly always begin their books, it may be that 
the interesting work which has been done on the nature of metaphysical 
'verbal magic* can be strengthened by a more plausible answer to 
the question: "Why do metaphysicians play tricks with words, and 
how does this relate to the facts which must surely provide the 
basic material for their views, and to the final effects which they 
produce ?" And, as I said before, I believe a more plausible, 
and perhaps also a more pedestrian answer can be given if we do not 
look at metaphysical texts wearing psycho-analytic blinkers.
There is a difficulty sometimes imputed to meta-philosophy©
When one of the subjects studied by philosophy is philosophy itself, 
it may be said that a philosopher who states that philosophy is 
X is himself indulging in X while he makes his statement. It then 
seems as if qnything a philosopher says about the nature of philosophy 
is also applicable to what he says about it. The suggestion is that 
the meta-philosopher is trapped in a vicious circle. For example, 
when logical positivists said that philosophical statements are 
nonsense unless they are verifiable, it is suggested that this 
statement itself is nonsense on their own terms; the principle 
of verification is not itself verifiable.
I have tried to avoid this imputation by confining my subject- 
matter to a few metaphysical theories of the material world. My 
interest has been to try to understand certain features which they 
have, and the relation of these features to each other. The main 
characteristic, I shall argue, is irrefutability by fact or logic, 
although facts provide some arguments, and logical devices clinch 
the conclusions which themselves cannot be tested. I do not believe 
that I have read these features into the views; I think they can
12* Chiefly from conversations
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be observed by anyone who reads the texts with an open mind.
I regard my explanation as a possible answer, and not at all as 
the only possible answer, or even as certainly the right answer, 
although at the moment I believe it may be right. The claim is 
that the explanation appears to fit the main characteristics of 
the Locke-Berkeley dispute, and the dispute inherent in the conflictig 
views of Alexander and Russell, although I suspect that it may also 
fit other metaphysical disputes, since metaphysics does have 
recurring patterns of argumentation. But the study to be made is 
empirical, and so, of course, may be quite false. It would be 
false if, for example, the characteristics of metaphysical dispute 
are not idiat I describe them to be. On these grounds, the hope 
and belief is that this thesis is not a metaphysic of metaphysics, 
but a factual hypothesis designed to explain metaphysics. The 
data are the texts chosen, and the method is observation, analogy, 
linguistic analysis conducted without the guidance of pre-determined 
criteria, and some commonsense guesses.
Many English-speaking philosophers since the early part of this 
century have been well aware of a striking contrast between 
philosophical and scientific progress, which becomes more and more 
apparent as the latter develops and the former continues to involve 
rediscussions of problems as old as Plato. Philosophers have been 
forced to compare the methods of science, which seem so successful, 
with t|ic methods of metaphysics which seem, at least in terms of 
discovering new things about the world, so unsuccessful. This kind 
of comparison is perhaps the most responsible for the fact that 
in current philosophy ’metaphysical* is almost a term of abuse.
Although it is I think true that the methods and results of 
metaphysics are very different from those of science, as I shall try 
to show, it may be that it is absurd to make the comparison at all, 
as it would be to compare Milton’s Paradise Lost with historical acconts. 
To this extent perhaps the following study is a vindication of 
metaphysics, and to this extent perhaps I am not impartial. Yet
—12-
while admitting that I feel metaphysics must have as much right 
to exist as science, for very different reasons, I would not 
presume to sing the praises of metaphysics; I wish only to 
understand the appeal it still has for many intelligent people, 
and why and how it produces the effects it does*
It is well to explain here some liberties which will be taken 
in subsequent chapters:
(i) I have used the words ’metaphysics* and *philosophy’ 
almost interchangeably, and also the words ’metaphysician* and 
*philosopher*o While I realise that all metaphysicians are 
philosophers but not all philosophers are metaphysicians, for the 
sake of stylistic variety metaphysicians will sometimes be called 
* philosophers * «
While no one, presumably, would take exception to calling 
Alexander a metaphysician, many, including himself, may object 
to calling Russell one* %  defence is that the psirticular theory 
of Russell*s studied here does seem to be a metaphysical theory. 
Surely if it is permissable to call Berkeley*s view that material 
things are really groups of *ideas* metaphysical, it is also 
permissable to apply this label to Russell*s view that material 
things are really series of ’sense-data*• Russell constantly 
insists that he is not a metaphysician* Berkeley would probably 
have done the same had he lived in this age when ’metaphysician’ 
is almost a rude word© I do not use this term emotively© Any 
philosopher who has put forward a view which purports to describe 
the ultimate or basic constitution of material things will be called, 
in so far as he does this, a metaphysician, and in no way should 
this be considered reproachful.
(ii) The word ’dispute* is not used strictly, e.g® by "Locke 
and Berkeley disputed" I do not mean, of course, that they actually 
did quarrel with each other, but that they undoubtedly would have 
done, had chronology made it physically possible© The Locke-
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Berkeley dispute is presented as an attack by Berkeley on 
views put forward by Locke, which indeed it was, and calling 
it a 'dispute* is intended only to draw attention to the fact 
that their two theories are, in some sense, incompatible with 
each other, yet urged with equal determination. Similarly, I 
go on to talk about "the dispute between Alexander and Russell", 
although, as far as I have been able to find out, there was no 
actual dispute which took place between them either. Indeed, 
Russell once remarked that he hoped and believed his position 
was not remote from Professor Alexander's.^^ His reference, 
however, was to one of Alexander's "less metaphysical" articles, 
and not to Space.Time and Deity, which, I may be forgiven for 
suspecting, Russell probably never read. Alexander, for his part, 
plainly believed that his position was opposed to Russell*s.
By calling the two views taken together a 'dispute*, all I mean 
again is that they are, in a sense to be determined, incompatible, 
and it is not unreasonable to suppose that, given occasion, 
their respective authors would have disputed.
(iii) I may be accused of having assumed in this thesis that 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Russell’s Our 
Knowledge of the External World, in spite of their titles, produce 
theories about the nature of the external world and not purely 
epistemological theories. defence here is that although these
books are originally concerned with describing our sense-knowledge, 
their final contributions do propose theories that the world is
See Bertrand Russell, "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter",
Mysticism and Logic, Pelican Books: 1953. p© 120
His reference is to Alexander’s "The Basis of Realism"
See Samuel Alexander, Space,Time and Deity, Macmillan: 1920.
Vol. II, p. 196:
"The real thing is not the 'class of perspectives* in the language 
of Mr. Russell .." etc.
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really unknown substance, or really logically constructed from 
our sense-data, respectively* This point will be exhibited, I 
hope, in the relevant expositions*
The following procedure will be adopted© First, I shall 
discuss the Locke-Berkeley dispute about abstract ideas, and the 
dispute about the ultimate nature of the material world with which 
it is so closely bound up. In Chapter Four I shall state what 
seem to be its puzzling features, and offer a preliminary and 
tentative suggestion to make these characteristics explicable.
Next, a study will be made of specific views held by Alexander 
and Russell about the ultimate nature of the external world, and 
again some features which seem to demand explanation will be 
highlighted. Both these philosophers claim that their methods 
are ’scientific*, and the significance of this will be discussed 
in Chapter Seven. I shall then go on to examine the suspicion 
that the Locke-Berkeley dispute is persistent, and that the issues 
which were at stake between them can still be detected in twentieth- 
century disputation. This involves a comparison of the Locke- 
Berkeley dispute with the views of Alexander and Russell, and a 
study of some contemporary forms of phenomenalism© Finally, the 
last two chapters of the thesis will be devoted to offering in some 
detail a few suggestions about how the characteristics of metaphysical 
disputation, noted during the course of the study, might be 
plausibly explained.
CHAPTER TWO
BERKELEY’S ATTACK ON ABSTRACT IDEAS
"I readily agree with this learned author, 
that the faculties of brutes can by no means 
attain to abstraction. But then if this be 
made the distinguishing property of that sort 
of animals, I fear a great many of those that 
pass for men must be reckoned into their number."
The Works of George Berkeley, ed. Luce & Jessop, Nelson: 1948 
Vol. II, pp. 30-31 (PRINCIPLES, para. 11)
15-
Locke commented that although every thing which exists is
a particular thing, general words far outnumber particular words
in the language which we use to speak about what exists. This,
he believed, is a matter of convenience, for "it is beyond the
power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all
2
the particular things we meet with." It would be impossible
to communicate in the way we do without the aid of those words
which do not directly stand for particular things. Words like
’triangularity’, Locke recognised, are indispensable. He went
on to ask, how do we come to use general terms, vdien every thing
which we experience is particular ? His answer provides the
doctrine of abstract ideas:
"Words become general by being made the signs of general 
ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them 
the circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas 
that may determine them to this or that particular 
existence."3
It sounds as if Locke is investing our minds with a new kind
of entity, a sort of general image, an entity which is neither
a particular thought nor a sense-impression. It almost sounds
as if he is saying that some such general mental entity exists,
like an after-image, for us to study and observe. This impression
he dispels when he adds these two comments:
"And he that thinks ’general natures’ or ’notions’ are 
anything else but such abstract and partial ideas of 
more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, 
will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them," 4
"It is plain .. that ’general’ and ’universal’ belong not 
to the real existence of things; but are the inventions 
and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its 
use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words
2.
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.C. Eraser, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford: I894. Vol. II, p. 14 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 3) 
ibid.. pp. 16-17 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 3)
ibid.. p. 18 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 3)
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are general •• when used for signs of general ideas, 
and so are applicable indifferently to many particular 
things; and ideas are general when they are set up 
as representatives of many particular things." 5
These two quotations do, I think, make it clear that Locke
did not intend by "general abstract idea" any particular
existent, comparable to a mental image, not even a sort of
composite or generic image like the confused result of taking
several photographs on the same film. For example, the idea
of triangularity would be representative of, and abstracted from,
particular ideas of triangles. To think about triangularity,
rather than about this particular triangle, would be to "have
a general abstract idea". It is evident that we can have images
of particular triangles, but not of triangularity. Yet we can
think about triangularity, and this does not entail that we must
have an image of it. On Locke's view the idea of triangularity
is representative of particular triangles, and the word 'triangularity*
which stands for the "abstract idea" is so indirectly applicable
to particular triangles. Locke does not suggest in these passages
that an abstract idea is anything like a particular idea, or a
sense-datum. On the contrary, while particular ideas are "given"
in experience, abstract ideas are "creatures of the understanding",
devices invented for our own purposes of communication©
Berkeley, however, is aroused by this doctrine into strong 
opposition. It is, he thinks, a linguistic abuse to hold the 
opinion "that the mind hath the power of framing 'abstract ideas' 
or notions of things."  ^ This opinion, he tells us, rests on 
a linguistic misunderstanding about the function of general words; 
yet his first arguments against Locke's view appeal to psychological 
fact. The reader has the impression that Berkeley attacks
ibid.. p. 21 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 3 )
Berkeley, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 27 (PRINCIPLES,para. 6 )
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Locke's doctrine on the grounds that it misdescribes the mental
processes involved in abstract thinking. He points out, for
example, the ways in which he finds himself able to abstract and
the ways in which he does not:
"I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself 
abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then 
whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular 
shape and colour ... And there are grounds to think most 
men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case." 7
The thought comes to mind that Locke would have agreed with 
Berkeley that it is impossible to imagine a hand or an eye with no
particular shape or colour. Yet by agreeing, Locke would not have
renounced his own view. For, of course, he could, and probably would, 
have said that when we think of hands or eyes in general, we do 
not think of all the particular shapes and shades they have, but 
neither do we imagine something which has no shape or colour© In 
order to hold his view about abstract ideas, Locke need only assert, 
for example, that when anatomy students think about 'the hand' or 
'the eye' they are abstracting, not thinking about any particular 
hands or eyes. This does not entail that the anatomy student 
has a peculiar general image in his mind, but it would entail for 
Locke that he had formed an "abstract idea". Similarly, when I say 
"Hands are a guide to character", Locke could on his own terms claim
that I was having abstract ideas, but not mental images©
Berkeley, however, does not consider this possible and apparently 
legitimate interpretation of Locke's view. It is quite clear as soon 
as he talks about imagining a hand with no particular shape or colour 
that he intends to infer that Locke claimed that abstract ideas were 
a peculiar, esoteric species of particular ideas. His excuse for 
this interpretation lies in Locke's very confused passage about the 
abstract idea of Triangle. He seizes upon this description and exploits 
it tb the detriment of Locke's clearer statements, e.g. those quoted
ibid.. pp. 29 - 30 (PRINCIPLES, para. 10 )
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above. The entry he made in his notebook leaves no doubt about 
his intentions:
"Mem: to bring the killing blow at the last v.g© in
the matter of Abstraction to bring Locke's general 
triangle at the last." °
He delivers the killing blow this way:
"All I desire is, that the reader would fully and 
certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea 
or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for 
anyone to perform. % a t  more easy than for any one 
to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try 
whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea which 
shall correspond with the description that is here 
given of the general idea of a triangle, which is,
’neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural, 
nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once' ? "  9
There is no doubt that taken out of context the description of
the abstract idea of a triangle which Berkeley quotes from Locke
suggests that it is meant to be something which possesses, but
also does not possess, all the mutually incompatible qualities
of all actual and possible triangles. Yet Locke's other comment,
that abstract ideas are set up as representativesodf peirticular
things, suggests that he thought of an abstract idea as a sort of
shorthand symbol and not as a mental entity with inconsistent
properties.
Now Berkeley asked us to introspect, to conduct a psychological 
experiment, in order to discover whether we have, or can conjure 
up, an idea which will correspond with Locke's description of the 
abstract idea of Triangle. This request is not intended to amount 
to anything as pedestrian as "See if you know what ' triangularity’ 
means." It would not be considered a successful report on the 
results of the introspective experiment to say: "Yes, I ^  have
Berkeley, op© cit., Vol. I, p© 84 (Entry 68?:"Philosophical 
Commentaries")
ibid.. Vol. II, p. 33 (PRINCIPLES, para. 13 )
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an abstract idea of triangularity. I can deduce conclusions 
about any triangle whatever without reference to any particular 
example of a triangle. I can think about three-sided plane 
figures in general without observing any instances of them©'*
This answer would not be accepted by Berkeley since he himself 
admits:
"a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without 
attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or 
the relations of the sides ••• So far he may abstract: 
but this will never prove, that he can frame an abstract 
general inconsistent idea of a triangle." 10
It seems that the strength of Berkeley’s attack lies in this
phrase - "inconsistent idea of a triangle". He has asked us
to introspect in order to look for something which it is logically
impossible we should find. It is not merely difficult to conjure
up the abstract idea which Berkeley asks us to attempt to form,
as, for example, it would be difficult to conjure up an image of
a hectagon. When Berkeley says that the attempt to picture a
general triangle is no hard task for anyone to perform, it is no
hard task in the sense that we need not even trouble to conduct the
experiment in order to conclude that we never could have such a
mental image. Berkeley’s instructions turn out to be like
"Introspect and see if you can picture a round square." Introspection ,
of course, is completely unnecessary in order to know that no
possible image will be found to correspond to the phrase "round
square".
On Berkeley’s interpretation of Locke’s view, then, "an anstract 
idea exists" appears not merely false, but self-contradictory© "Abstract 
idea" is taken to denote something inconsistent. Berkeley is 
able to say:
10. ibid.. Vol. II, p. 35 (PRINCIPLES, para. l6 )
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"Is it not a hard thing to imagine, that a couple 
of children cannot prate together, of their sugar- 
pluthbs and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, 
till they have first tacked together numberless 
inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds abstract 
general ideas ?" H
In short, "abstract idea" is taken to mean "mental image of 
something self-contradictory"©
An odd feature of the Locke-Berkeley disagreement about abstract
ideas has been brought out by Professor Mace:
"It is clear, of course, that the issue does not turn 
on any differences in the constitutions of Locke and 
Berkeley, or on any differences in what was open to 
their observation when they considered what happened to 
them when they thought of a man or a triangle. Berkeley 
obviously had his tongue in his cheek when he pretended 
that Locke might have some peculiar faculty which he 
himself lacked. He was in fact quite sure that Locke 
could not think of the nondescript triangle any more than 
he could5 and what Locke thought he could think of he had 
every reason for supposing that Berkeley could too©" 1^
It is all perhaps even more odd than Professor Mace suggests© Both
Locke and Berkeley agree that general words have functions which
are dissimilar from the functions of particular terms© Both agree
that general words are used to talk about particular things in a
general way. Both recognise and state the fact that we can and do
think of triangularity or mankind without bearing in mind particular
instances. Both agree that we have sense-experience of particular
things, and also abstract from it. I shall try to show this in
more detail©
It is not clear that Berkeley’s account of the function of general
words in our language differs from Locke’s. Locke said:
"words are general .. when used for signs of general ideas, 
and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things: 
and ideas are general when they are set up as representatives 
of many particular things."
ibid.. Vol. II, p. 33 (PRINCIPLES, para. 14)
12.
13
CoA. Mace, "Introspection and Analysis", Philosophical Analysis, 
ed. Max Black, Cornell University Press: 1950. p© 237
Locke, op. cit., p© 21 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 3 )
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Berkeley rejects this as linguistic misunderstanding, and 
substitutes:
"But it seems a word becomes general by being made the 
sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several 
particular ideas, any of which it indifferently suggests 
to the mind." 14
On Locke’s account general words stand for abstract ideas which
in tnnn stand for particular ideas; Berkeley retorts that general
words stand for particular ideas. This is not so different as it
sounds. For Locke admits that general ideas represent particular
ideas, and Berkeley admits that general words, although he insists
they do not stand for abstract ideas, have connotations as well as
denotations, e.g. that we can prove theorems about triangles without
proving their applicability to some particular triangle©
The disagreement between Locke and Berkeley is not a disagreement 
about the way in which general words function. They both admit 
that general words both denote (particular ideas) and connote (have 
single definitions). Nor is it a dispute about the psychology of 
the matter, for, as Professor Mace said, the psychological facts are 
the same for both philosophers, and Locke clearly did not claim that 
he could form a general image, any more than Berkeley did. The 
disagreement between them is in Berkeley’s rejection of Locke’s 
intermediary, the abstract idea for which a general word is said to 
stand, which in turn stands for particular things, but for which 
Berkeley insists the general word itself stands.
The explanation of this disagreement is clear if we pay attention 
to the different uses given to the term ’idea’ by Locke and Berkeley© 
Locke meant by ’idea’ "Whatsoever is the object of the understanding 
when a man thinks." There is some ambiguity in Berkeley’s
stated use of the term, but his subsequent arguments, his previous 
discussion of abstract ideas, and the reliable opinion of Professor
Berkeley, op. cit©. Vol. II, p© 31 (PRINCIPLES, para© 11) 
^5" Locke, OP. cit.. Vol. I, p. 32 (introduction)
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Jessop make it clear that "Berkeley always means by ’idea* a sensory 
object". Locke, of course, did not always mean by ’idea’ some
sensory object, he used it for any object of thonght whatever, sensory 
or non-sensory.
With this difference of philosophical usage in mind, I believe 
we can begin to make sense of the abstract ideas dispute. As a 
result of Berkeley’s redefinition of ’idea’, anything which is an 
idea is either a percept or an image. On his terms ’idea’ is 
inapplicable to anything which is neither of these. So with regard 
to Locke’s phrase ’abstract idea’, it is easy for him to declare 
that it is self-contradictory - a contradiction in terms - for 
percepts and images are not abstract, and ideas must be one of the 
two.
I think it is quite evident that Berkeley ignores Locke’s
philosophical usage and insists upon his own. Consider his remrk:
"’Tis one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same 
definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the 
same idea: the one is necessary, the other useless and
impracticable." 17
Now the way Locke uses the word ’idea’ does not exclude the possibility
of saying that a definition of a general word stands for an abstract
idea. But the way Berkeley uses it does of course result in this being
nonsense. W&en Berkeley comments that it would be "useless and
impracticable" to make a name stand everywhere for the same idea,
he is making it clear that he will not count a general definition
as referring to an ’idea’.
Berkeley considered it to be an argument against Locke’s view 
that we cannot imagine a hand without also imagining a hand of some 
specific shape and colour. It would be an argument only if Locke 
intended to affirm that an abstract idea is the sort of thing we can 
picture. Locke’s use of idea does not suggest that an abstract idea
T.E. Jessop, in a footnote. The Works of George Berkeley, Vol. II, 
p. 41
Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 3^ (PRINCIPLES, para. iB)
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is like an image, but Berkeley’s use suggests that it must be.
Berkeley’s statement that he has shown the impossibility 
of abstract ideas is in a sense quite true. He has shown
that the phrase ’abstract idea’ is a contradiction-in-terms
according to his o\m redefinition of the term ’idea’. But of
course this does not mean to say that he has refuted Locke, in
whose system ’idea’ is not given the narrow sense by which
’abstract idea’ is rendered self-contradictory.
However, Berkeley himself claimed that he had shown that
Locke’s view rested on a linguistic mistake, and it is common
19in modern philosophy to shares his opinion. So more needs to
be said in an attempt to show that no linguistic mistake is 
involved in either theory. Locke would claim that in tjie 
sentence "Mankind is mortal", the word ’Mankind’ stands for an 
abstract idea of mankind, which represents all men, dead, alive, 
or to be born. It may not be illuminating to say that ’Mankind’ 
stands for mankind, but it is true if trivial. It is no more 
illuminating, but equally true, to say that ’Mankind’ stands for 
an abstraction, i.e. mankind. How can these statements, which are 
all that Locke’s theory claims in the way of linguistic facts, i.e. 
that general words have connotations, be linguistic mistakes ?
The answer frequently urged is that the mistake consists in supposing 
that general words are names, that words like ’Mankind’ stand for 
entities just as ’John’ stands for a specific person, I have never 
been able to see how Locke can be accused of saying that general 
words function in relation to abstract ideas as proper names function 
in relation to individual people. Locke made it very clear that 
while general words stand for abstract ideas, those abstract ideas 
relate to particular ideas; this surely is not to treat general 
words as if they were the names of specific things.
See ibid., Vol. II, p, 38 (PRINCIPLES, para. 21)
See, for example, G.J. Warnock, Berkeley, Pelican Books: 1953. 
pp, 83 seq.
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This is not the only point which seems to tell against 
the philosophers who urge with distressing frequency that the 
doctrine of abstract ideas, or the theory of universals, results 
from a simple linguistic slip of supposing that words like 
’democracy* or ’triangularity’ have the same function as words like 
’Peter’ or ’Piccadilly’. Both Locke and Berkeley realised 
equally well that general words function differently from particular 
words. Both realised that words like ’triangularity® etc. connote 
e.go the property possessed by any three-sided plane figure and 
denote e.g. any particular drawing of a triangle. If Locke 
emphasised the similarity of general words to particular words, 
while realising how in fact they differ, and Berkeley emphasised the 
dissimilarity of the two kinds of term, ivhile realising how they 
are similar, what grounds could we have for choosing between their
views ? The linguistic grounds we might have had, e.g. that general
words do in the final analysis refer to any of a group of particular 
things, are neither ignored nor denied by either theory.
Whichever view we choose - "General words refer to abstract 
ideas" or "General words refer indirectly to any of a group of 
particular things" - will not affect the way in which we normally 
use words. Neither view is incompatible with ordinary usage. 
’Triangularity’ will mean the same, be used correctly on the same 
occasions, whether we believe it connotes and abstract idea or denotes 
many particular ones. For the truth is that it does both, as far as 
we can judge from the linguistic facts thegiselvesg In this way
the theories have nothing to do with correct speech. Both Locke and
Berkeley use the word ’triangle’ correctly, to refer to a three-sided 
plane figure, and neither of them suggests a new usage for it, e.g. 
to refer to some other sort of figure.
Y^hen Berkeley refuses to accept Locke’s definition of ’idea’, 
and substitutes his own restricted sense of the word, he does not 
offend against ordinary language. For it cannot be stressed too often 
that ’idea’ is a technical philosophical term, invented for 
metaphysical purposes, and not a word given a dictionary sense.
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Berkeley changes not ordinary but philosophical language in order 
to be able to state that abstract ideas are logically impossible©
His recommendations are not concerned with how we daily talk, but 
with the way in which we interpret the philosophical import of our 
normal use. So it is not the actual use of general words which 
is disputed, but what that use implies.
In other words, Berkeley’s attempt to persuade us that "abstract 
ideas" are self—contradictory, fictions resulting from linguistic 
misunderstanding, has no bearing on our ordinary speech. Nor, of 
course, has Locke’s reification of connotations into abstract ideas. 
Nevertheless, both metaphysicians sincerely believe that they are 
describing the actual function of general words in our language.
To a certain extent they are: neither denies anything about our
ordinary use of these words, and both emphasise a certain aspect of 
it. Locke emphasises that general terms refer to the common meaning 
of those particular terms with which they are connected, while B e r k e l g r  
emphasises that they refer to those particular terms themselves. But 
this is only half the story©
It would be wrong to say that Berkeley’s attack on abstract ideas 
is simply a change of linguistic emphasis, an underlining of a point 
about general words which Locke did not stress. There is much more 
to it. Berkeley is concerned to show that Locke’s view is not 
merely a linguistic mistake, a failure to note a point of logical 
grammar, but a piece of self-contradictory nonsense.
For the sake of fresh illustration, let us suppose that someone 
says that negative facts exist, e.g. that the fact that this pencil 
is not blue exists just as much as the fact that it is red exists.
A routine objection would be that "This pencil is not blue" does 
not describe a funny sort of fact - a negative one - but indirectly 
points out a positive fact, namely that the pencil is red. A dispute 
is then generated, with a typical pattern. One person emphasises 
that we can know the truth of "This pencil is not blue" without 
knowing that it is red - e.g© in the dark when we know that no blue 
pencil is in the room, but cannot remember what colour the pencils
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in the room are. To him this emphasis seems to suggest that it 
is right to say that negative facts exist, since they can be known 
when the corresponding positive fact is unknown. To another person 
talk about "negative facts" will sound extravagent, "metaphysical" 
in the disparaging sense, and absurd. He will point out that 
experience does not contain situations of not—blueness, only of 
red, or that "This pencil is not blue" does not describe a state of 
affairs, but rather the absence of a state of affairs, that it does 
not assert a fact, but denies a fact, etc. Now suppose the person who
feels that the way in which we make negative statements does not
suggest that there are negative facts goes on to claim that it is 
self-contradictonp or nonsense, to speak of negative facts. This would 
surely be a sign that the dispute had ceased to be a question of making 
different emphases, and had become one couched in a priori terms, 
not properly disputable by talking about facts at all.
By asserting that the doctrine of abstract ideas is not merely 
false, not merely a linguistic confusion, but self-contradictory^ 
Berkeley’s line of argument becomes logically fortified against any
argument from the facts, or from interpretations of the facts. Berkeley
builds an impregnable fortressed position against complaints. It is 
impregnable because his own definition of the word ’idea’ renders 
Lockets theory without doubt self-contradictory. We can, of course, 
refuse to accept his definition, and then Locke’s view is not self­
contradictory. But since Berkeley does not deny any common linguistic 
fact about general words, by refusing to accept his definition we have 
not refuted his view, his own position remains unassailed. So, of course, 
does Locke’s. We can refuse to agree with Locke that the fact general 
terms have connotations implies that there are abstract ideas. But if 
we do this, there is no fact about ordinary language which will serve 
to back us up, no truth which Locke has denied, and no way of refuting 
him by reference to a commonly accepted principle of language or 
psychology. For there is no established linguistic or psychological 
fact, and no common assumption, which Locke denies by advancing his 
theory about abstract ideas.
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It may sound, if this is right, as if Locke and Berkeley were 
simply talking at cross purposes, using the same word but giving it 
different meanings, like the people who argue whether a bank is 
grassy, where one has the rustic and the other the monetary sense 
of the word in mind. But this is not what the Locke-Berkeley dispute 
IS like, because we cannot reasonably imagine that Berkeley was 
unaware of Locke’s definition of ’idea’. Berkeley does not, it 
seems, misunderstand Locke when he discusses the abstract ideas theory 
by redefining Locke’s word ’idea’. It is more probable that Berkeley’s 
redefinition is deliberate. This is plausible in view of Berkeley’s 
motive for his attack on abstract ideas, which is to prepare the 
ground for an attack on Substance© By restricting the wider use 
of the word ’idea’, and substituting his own confined use, Berkeley 
manages to argue convincingly not only that abstract ideas are 
logically impossible, but by implication that nothing exists in the 
material world which is not sensory. Indeed, the restriction on 
the applicability of ’idea’ is Berkeley’s sharpest tool for carving 
his own metaphysical system. His re-reading of Locke’s intentions 
is quite natural; his interest was not to edit or evaluate Locke’s 
view, but to dispel it, disprove it, banish it from consideration, 
so that he could express his own metaphysical attitude in his own 
system.
This seems evident in view of the fact that Berkeley’s own analysis 
of the function of general words is not as thorough-going as we 
would expect from his pronouncements in the Introduction to the 
Principles. It seems that the assertion which claimed that all 
general words are the signs of several particular ideas is intended 
to apply only to those general words which have a sensory connotation, 
e©g. ®motion} ’colour’, ’trsingularity’, ’man’, etc. General words 
like ’force’, ’grace’, ’spirits’, and all those things of which 
Berkeley decà&res we have notions rather than ideas are not accounted 
for in the same manner?^ The view about the function of general woxte
20. See, for example, Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. Ill, pp. 289-293
("Seventh Dialogue", Alciphron or The Minute Philosopher). Especially 
p. 292: "..words may be significant,although they do not stand for 
ideas."
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put forward in the Introduction to the Principles, then, seems to 
be primarily a preliminary attack on Locke’s doctrine of Substance, 
which of course depends on Locke’s other doctrine that general 
words for sensory things are signs for abstract ideas developed 
from experience, and not signs directly signifying items of 
experience.
To say that Berkeley attacks Locke’s view about abstract ideas 
in order to prepare the way for his own metaphysics is not intended 
to suggest that he was insincere, or sinning against any canons
of intellectual honesty. Obviously Berkeley believed that abstract
ideas are logically impossible, and was not directly ware that 
they are so only as a result of his redefinition of ’idea’. Obviously 
he also believed, in spite of his proof that they are self-contradictqry,
that there were arguments from introspection and from ordinary
usage which established that they do not as a matter of fact exist.
He did not distinguish between the falsity of a statement and its 
inconsistency. It did not seem odd to him, as it does to most 
modern philosophers, to disprove by a logical device that X can 
exist, and then go on to show that as a matter of empirical fact 
X does not exist.
These remarks, I hope, will give some notion of the features 
of the metaphysical dispute which I believe call for explanation©
In mathematics it would be most eccentric to appeal to the nature 
of particular examples of triangles in order to show that they 
cannot have four sides. In metaphysics it is common to exhibit a 
statement as inconsistent before appealing to matter of fact to 
establish that what it claims does not happen to exist. Also, it 
seems that the rival views about abstract ideas are equally 
untestable, their conclusions a priori true in the sense that no 
conceivable appeal to any fact or common belief, about what we can 
conjure up in our minds or about our use of general terms, will 
Qçrve to provide a conclusive refutation. Finally, Berkeley s 
attack on Locke rests upon his redefinition of the central term of
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their dispute, and cannot plausibly be called an impartial 
criticism of the doctrine of abstract ideas. All these 
points call for further explanation.
Before offering an explanation in any detail, I shall try 
to see whether the s@me features are evident in the main 
dispute of which this is a preliminary skirmish; namely in 
the Locke-Berkeley dispute about Substance.
A further consideration of the abstract ideas dispute 
will be made in Chapter Ten of this thesis, when more material 
has been studied, and it can be seen as an integral part of 
the two metaphysical systems.
CHAPTER THREE
BERKELEY’S ATTACK ON SUBSTANCE
"I may cut into a Christmas pudding 
and may chance to find a sixpence, 
but I shall not find Matter." 1
A.A. Luce, Berkeley’s Immaterialism. Nelson: 1945* 
p. 44
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Since the idea of Substance is an example of what Locke meant 
by an abstract idea, Berkeley, who began his attack on Locke by 
establishing the impossibility of abstract ideas, might well have 
been satisfied that he had i^so facto established the impossibility 
of Substance. However, it is by devoting detailed argument 
specifically to ’disproving* the existence and possibility of 
Substance that he creates his own account of the nature of the
external world. It is an account which has never ceased to excite 
philosophers.
This Chapter will be sub—divided into an exposition of Locke’s 
account of Substance, a description of Berkeley’s attack on it, and 
an imaginary dialogue designed to bring out a point about their 
dispute which puzzles me - its irresolvability. Finally, in the 
following Chapter, some preliminary suggestions for explaining the 
puzzle will be made.
Locke’s Account
Locke states in his preface to the Essay that he intends to map
out the limits of certain and probable knowledge. In this way he
aims to banish from consideration those problems which arise when
the human mind grapples with matters beyond its comprehension. If
we can clearly distinguish between soluble and insoluble problems,
Locke hopes, "we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable
2
by us in this state". It is, I think, evident from the beginning 
of Locke’s work that his conclusion will assert that there are some
unknowable things in the world.
Locke’s first step in describing our knowledge of the external 
world is to declare that an ’idea’, or "whatsoever is the object of
the understanding when a man thinks", originates either from
observations of "external sensible objects", or from observation of 
"the internal operations of our mind".^ An idea does not, and cannot.
Locke, OP. cit.. Vol. I, p. 29 (introduction)
ibid., p. 32 (Introduction)
4. ibid., p. 122 (Bk. IIi Ch. l)
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originate in any other way.
Locke describes the mind as originally ’eypty’, and its first 
tenants as "simple ideas of sensation" conveyed in by the five 
senses. Among these simple ideas of sense we come to notice certain 
recurring patterns, certain groups of ideas frequently co-exist, 
and to these groups we give single physical-object names.^ For 
example, simple ideas of redness, shininess, roundness, sweetness, 
juiciness, etc., recur in ordered patterns to which we give the 
name * apple’.
So far, Berkeley would not disagree. Locke, however, goes on to
ask what keeps these discrete simple ideas of sensation together,
and why they occur in patterns and not at haphazard random. The mind,
says Locke, cannot make any sense of the groupings of its simple ideas
of sense unless it assumes that something holds them together and
causes them to occur in the way they do.
".• not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by 
themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some 
substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they 
do result, which therefore we call substance." ^
That we do in fact suppose that "some substratum" must account
for the pattern of our sense-experience, Locke claims, is made
evident by the way in which we habitually assert propositions in
subject-predicate form. We say, for example, "This is white",
and ’this* seems to refer to something other than the predicates
we ascribe to it. The thought is, there must be something which
is both snow and white, if we are to analyse "The snow is white".
It leads Locke to conclude that the subject-terms of statements about
material things must refer to something which underlies the sensory
qualities of those things:
"These, eind the like fashions of speaking, intimate that 
the substance is supposed always something besides the 
extension, figure, solidity .. or other observable ideas, 
though we know not what it is." 7
5. See ibid,. p. 390 (Bk. II, Ch. 23)
6. ibid..pp. 390-391 (Bk. II, Ch. 23)
7. ibid.. p. 394 (Bk. II, Ch. 23)
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So far, whatever we think of it, Locke’s view is clear. Now 
ambiguities and complications follow. In this thesis it would be 
out of place to indulge in a lengthy discussion of "what Locke really 
meant". But it is necessary to note the main complications of his 
system in so far as they affect the doctrine of Substance.
Substance is not simply the support and cause which we assume
holds together and produces our simple sense-data, although we know
not what it is. Somehow ’in it’ are primary qualities. Locke held
that while secondary qualities, (colours, temperatures, textures, etc),
are merely ’ideas in the mind’, they have external counterparts
which are mind-independent primary qualities, (extensions, motions,
amounts, etc.) These primary qualities are given a status in the
material world which is denied to secondary qualities:
"The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the 
parts of fire or snow are really in them, - whether anyone’s 
senses perceive them or no." °
Did Locke mean that the primary qualities which we experience are
’really in’ external objects, or did he mean that external objects
really have a shape, a size, etc., rather than those specific shapes
and sizes we see they have ? Did Locke mean that the window frame
really has some shape or other, while it is not really coloured, or
did he mean that the window frame really is square, while it is not
really brown ? There is no pressing need to reach a conclusion here.
It is sufficient to note that Berkeley pointed out that the arguments
used by Locke to show that secondary qualities are mind-dependent ideas
can also be used to show that primary qualities are. This suggests
that Berkeley thought Locke was claiming that those primary qualities
we see and touch are really in external objects. On the other hand,
if someone wishes to argue, as many do, that Locke meant to say that
the externally real primary qualities are not identical with those we
se
ibid.. p. 174 (Bk. II, Ch. 8 )
9® R.I. Aaron, John Locke, Clarendon Press,Oxford;1955 (2nd Edition),
pp. 126-127: for a discussion of the ambiguity, i.e. whether 
Locke meant the primary qualities in substance to be determinates 
or determinables.
9
e and touch, Berkeley has another argument to bring against him.
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namely that a size of no particular size, etc., has all the faults 
which he attributes to the doctrine of abstract ideas.
Another complication of Locke’s account is his view that the
combination of primary qualities as they exist in Substance generates
’powers’ which cause our sense-data. This makes it clear that
Substance is intended to be not only a logical explanation of accidents,
suggested by the subject-predicate form of propositions, but also a
physical causal agent, suggested by the notions of contemporary physics.
"The idea of heat or light, which we perceive by our eyes, 
or touch, from the sun, are commonly thought real qualities 
in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But 
when we consider the sun in reference to wax, which it melts 
or blanches, we look on the whiteness or softness produced 
in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced 
by powers in it .. these qualities of light and warmth, which 
are perceptions in me .. are no otherwise in the sun than the 
changes made in the wax ... They are all of them equally 
powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities.."
"Powers therefore justly make a great part of our complex 
ideas of substances".
I
In the previous chapter I pointed out Berkeley’s habit of mixing
an empirical with an a priori style when he attacked Locke’s doctrine
of abstract ideas. This mixed style, which gives to the view it
expresses an apparent relevance to familiar fact together with an
apparent logical certainty, is also typical of Locke’s account of
Substance. It seems from his text that Locke means to conclude both
that the unperceived substance is unknowable, beyond the range of
human cognition, and also as a matter of fact unknown, might become
known if stronger perceptual equipment were available. For Locke
says, on one hand:
".. it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we receive 
from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our 
thoughts, beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would 
make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any 
discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden 
causes of those ideas." H
lOo
11.
Locke, op. cit., ÿel. I, p. 400 (Bk. II, Ch. 23) 
ibid., p. 415 (Bk. II, Ch. 23)
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But Locke also says:
"Had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles 
of bodies, and the real constitution on which their sensible 
qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite 
different ideas in us: and that which is now the yellow
colour of gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we
should see an admirable texture of parts, of a certain size 
figure." 12
Locke speaks with two vèices. One is in the grand metaphysical
manner, putting forward a priori that Substance is a Secret Entity
11behind the sensory scene which no amount of prying can reveal.
The other is in the scientific manner, suggesting, with some exciteiient, 
that the scientist with his "microscopical eyes"^^ might one day 
detect the hidden features of gold, or at least of its primary 
qualities.
But a difficulty arises if we take Locke’s scientific tones 
too seriously. It is a difficulty which Berkeley seized upon to his
own advantage. If Substance is merely as a matter of fact unknown,
and could within the realm of logical possibility become known, 
this entails that it might be possible for us to know it by looking, 
by having simple ideas of sense, even if we have them as a result of 
looking through some powerful instrument or at some electronic screen* 
Then, of course, Substance would turn out to be just another group 
of simple ideas, since, by Locke’s definition, whatever we see is 
a group of simple ideas. This definition makes it logically impossible 
to know Substance by any form of sense-experience, since whatever 
is sense-experienced has an underlying substratum* If we claim to 
perceive Substance, we need to postulate another Substance to accouit 
for what we perceive, and so on ad infinitum* Locke’s scientific 
excitement, on these grounds, is not really scientific, and if he 
were a p&ysicist instead of a metaphysician, we should be tempted 
to call it phoney©
12. ibid.. p. 401 (Bk. II, Ch. J3)
13. see ibid., p.,403, (Bk. II, Ch. 23), where he speaks of the 'secret’ 
nature of Substance
14# see ibid*, p© 403 (Bk* II, Ch* 23)
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\Vhen the Bishop of Worcester in his famous letter accused 
Locke of "almost discarding Substance out of the reasonable part 
of the world", (Berkeley’s accusation made more charitable), Locke 
referred him to the passage in which he had said that while he 
possessed no clear notion of what Substance is» he did know 
(roughly) what it does. T h i s  indicates that Locke considered 
the importance of his postulation of Substance was that it somehow 
accounted for the co-occurrence and ordered pattern of simple 
ideas of sensation. Starting from the premiss that knowledge of 
the external world consists basically of discrete sense-data,
Locke felt it necessary to explain why the world we know is one 
of material objects, and not of haphazard sensory items. He 
felt it was so necessary to accommodate the commonsense belief 
that we live among physical objects, without giving up his view 
that knowledge of the external world consists of discrete experiences, 
that he asserted with astonishing confidence: ^
and it is past doubt, there must be some real 
constitution, on which any collection of simple 
ideas co-existing must depend." ^
Berkeley’s Attack
In general, Berkeley’s attack on Locke’s theory of Substance 
is a revolt against the distinction between appearance and reality 
made by Locke. He was out to prove that real things in the 
external world fall completely within the purview of the senses, 
that the material world and our experience of the material world 
are one and the same. Just as he retorted that abstract words
like ’triangularity’ do not refer to anything other than concrete
particular triangles, so he retorts that ’the real world’ does 
not refer to anything other than concrete particular sense-experiences.
15# See Locke, op. cit.,Vol. I, p. 230 (the passage referred to 
is Bk. II, Ch. 13, para. 19)
l6. ibid.$ Vol. II, p. 26 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 3) Further discussion
of the assumption that the world consists of discrete sense-
iterns will be undertaken in Chapter Four of this thesis.
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This is the overt crux of the Locke-Berkeley dispute about the 
external world. Overtly, it is a disagreement about the nature 
of things like cherries and trees, Locke contending that the real 
cherry is the unknown cause of the cherry we know from experience, 
Berkeley retorting that the real cherry is no more than the sum 
of its sensory characteristics. But this is oversimplification, 
as I shall try to show©
Berkeley arrives at his conclusion, apparently at least, and 
in his own terms, by exhibiting Locke’s theory as an untenable 
piece of rubbish. This he seems to do by establishing a priori 
that nothing can exist in the material world which is not perceived.
In the first few paragraphs of his Principles, as I noted in the 
last chapter, Berkeley makes sure what his reader is to mean by 
the contemporary philosophical term ’idea*. The word will be used 
to refer, he insists, only to sensory objects, to percepts and 
images. It is interesting that Berkeley should explain his use 
of the term after his attack on abstract ideas. If he had done this 
in his Introduction, instead of at the beginning of Part I, I believe 
it would have been immediately clear that in attacking the doctrine 
of abstract ideas he was substituting a restricted use of the word 
’idea*, and reserving the word ’notion* to cover much of what 
Locke meant by ’idea’.
Berkeley states, at the start of his attack on Substance, that
17"the existence of an idea consists in its being perceived"© It
follows that sense-data, or ’ideas’, "however blended or combined 
together", "cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.^’^  
Anyone who will consider the meaning of the word ’exists’ applied 
to "sensible things" will know intuitively, we are told, that the 
nature of a sensible thing, or an idea, is that it is perceived.
"The table exists" means "I see it and feel it etc." Berkeley
19says: "This is all I can understand by these and the like expressions".^
17© Berkeley, op. cit., Vol. II, p. (PRINCIPLES, para. 2)
18© ibid., p© 42 (PRINCIPLES, para. 3)
19. ibid., p. 42 (PRINCIPLES, para. 3)
-37-
I believe it is quite clear that Berkeley’s first arguments
establish a special terminology without which he could not have
invested his conclusions with their air of unassailable certainty.
In Berkeley’s metaphysical language ’perceiving’ will always
mean ’having ideas’; ’idea’ will mean sensible thing, which will
be used in such a way that ’’a sensible thing is not perceived’’
is self-contradictory, since a sensible thing is defined as something
perceived. The term ’exists’ when applied to sensible things
can only mean that they are perceived or perceptible. This is
the linguistic groundwork. Then Berkeley comments:
’’It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing among men, 
that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible 
Objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from 
their being perceived by the understanding. But with how 
great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle 
may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find it 
in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, 
perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. ’’ 20
Now while no one would have difficulty in admitting that toothaches
and smells, even colours and shapes, are ’’sensible things’’, or, in
the technical language of the time, ’’ideas of sensation’’, it was
not at first apparent that Berkeley would make ’’sensible things’’
applicable to objects like mountains and houses. He slips in his
extension of the term with an air of utter innocence, but of course
it comes to the reader as something of a shock. Berkeley’s main
living admirer has said:
’’It is a nice little piece of controversial finesse, because 
the reader, in Berkeley’s day and today, would find no 
difficulty in admitting that the existence of an idea consists 
in being perceived; the shoe pinches only when one is asked 
to extend that principle to mountains, rivers, etc.’’ 21
IVhether or not we judge Berkeley’s trick as nice finesse, his equation
20. ibid., p. 42 (PRINCIPLES, para. 4) My italics 
21^ Luce, op. cit., p. 54
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of physical things with sensible things permits him to find a
contradiction in Locke’s view almost immediately. It is impossible,
he says, to separate, even in imagination, the "being of a sensible
22thing from its being perceived". It is impossible to conceive
of any sensible object "distinct from the sensation or perception 
23
of it." Thus "something exists unperceived" is a contradiction,
translatable into "a percept (or an image) is unperceived (or 
unsensed)", or into, quite simply, "a sensation exists unsensed".
"Some physical thing" Berkeley equates with "some sensory thing", 
and at times with "some sensed thing". Clearly "some sensed thing 
exists unsensed", or "something which is sensed is not sensed", is 
self-contradictory. On this model, by redefinition, Berkeley 
finds a "manifest contradiction" in the statement that a physical 
thing exists unperceived.
Berkeley goes on to elaborate his view that "something exists
unperceived" is self-contradictory. Such a statement, he claims,
involves asserting that an essentially unperceiving thing, like
a mountain, perceives, for example feels cold or craggy. This curious
argument depends on the assumption that colours, textures, temperatures
etc. are ’ideas’ like images or toothaches.
"Now for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a 
manifest contradiction; for to have an idea is all one 
as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and 
the like qualities exist, must perceive them; hence it is 
clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum 
of those ideas." 24
At this stage a defender of Locke’s view might object that although
Substance is only known to exist by an inference from sense-experience ,
the whole point of postulating it is that it is something which does
not consist of ideas in Berkeley’s sense, but which is the cause
of what Berkeley calls ideas. Further, while it is perfectly obvipus
22. Berkeley, op. cit., p. 43 (PRINCIPLES, para. 6)
23# ibid., p. 43 (PRINCIPLES, para. 5)
24# ibid.« p# 44 (PRINCIPLES, para. 7)
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that sensations, for example, cannot exist independently of a 
percipient, and even suppose that we agree with Locke that 
sensory qualities are mind-dependent too, this is not to say that 
something does not exist unperceived in the material world.
Berkeley is, of course, prepared for this objection. He asks, 
what is the something ? If it is an imperceptible substance of 
which sensory ideas are the perceptible copies, Berkeley argues 
that a sensory idea can be like nothing but another sensory idea.
For example, a colour cannot be said to be like anything but another 
colour. Hence ideas cannot have insensible counterparts. If the 
external things are not intended to be things of which our ideas 
are copies, but things of which they are results, then they must 
be either perceptible or imperceptible. If they are perceptible, 
Berkeley gains his point. If they are imperceptible, Berkeley 
appeals to the reader to ask whether it makes sense to say that, 
for example, a real sound is inaudible, a real colour invisible,
etc.^5
!
These arguments, (which have been utilised by modern philosophers 
faced with interpreting the import of theories of physics and 
neurology), lead directly to Berkeley’s attack on Locke’s distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities. The argumentation is 
expanded in the Three Dialogues, but the meat of it, though 
perhaps the sauce is missed, is in the Principles.
If by "matter" or "substance" we are to understand an inert 
substratum in which figure, extension, and motion etc. really 
exist, then, says Berkeley, we are to understand by it an unperceiving 
thing which has ideas -a self-contradiction. This argument, as I 
said before, only holds if qualities of shape, size, etc. are 
interpreted as being ideas in Berkeley’s sense, as being, for example.
25. See ibid., pp. 182 - I83 (First Dialogue Between Hylas 
and I^ilonous )
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sensations akin to toothaches and twinges. Berkeley seems satisfied 
that contemporary thought about secondary qualities is already on 
his side, that all philosophers will admit that secondary qualities 
are ’sensory objects’, but he devotes special argument to showing 
that primary qualities are too. This consists of two main points:
a) Primary and secondary qualities are logically inseparable.
It is impossible that a thing should have primary qualities but no 
secondary ones. Berkeley’s characteristic exclamation is: "How hard 
to imagine or conceive of a colourless shape i " "Colourless shape" 
is an inconsistent expression.
b) Locke used relativity arguments to show that secondary qualities 
are mind-dependent. Berkeley uses these with equal success to show 
that primary qualities are mind-dependent too. For example, the mite 
must see his oto foot to be of considerable dimensions, whereas to
us it is scarcely discernable. A creature smaller than a mite, on 
the other hhnd, would see a mite’s foot as we see an elephant’s.
The size of an object is as relative to its beholder as its colour
4- + 26 or texture.
These arguments assume that Locke meant to assert that primary 
qualities as we know them really exist in external bodies. The 
primary qualities which Berkeley calls inseparable from secondary 
qualities are those which we perceive, and the primary qualities which 
are relative to the beholder are also perceived ones. Berkeley adds 
an argument, with characteristic thoroughness, against the other 
possible interpretation of Locke’s theory of primary qualities in 
Substance %
"The extension therefore which exists without the mind is 
neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, 
that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are 
extension in general, and motion in general: thus we see
how much the tenet of extended, moveable substances existing 
without the mind, depends on that strange doctrine of 
abstract ideas. " 27
26. See ibid.. pp. l88 -I89 (First Dialogue)
27. ibid.. pp. 45-46 (PRINCIPLES, para, ll)
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A1though he has already shown abstract ideas, on his own terms, to 
be logically impossible, Berkeley goes on to urge us to make an 
introspective experiment once again, so that we might be quite 
convinced that primary qualities cannot be independent of mind.
He tells us to try to imagine extension in general, and promises 
that if we find we can, he will concede the point. Since in order 
to say that we could imagine any such thing we should also have to 
say that we had an idea of it in Berkeley’s terminology, it is not 
surprising that Berkeley should be so confident that the experimental 
result will favour his view. Whatever we imagine when we think 
about extension in general must be an idea or ideas; so what we 
imagine must be some particular extension, and not extension in 
general at all.
Berkeley now attacks Locke’s doctrine of Substance on the 
grounds that no account can be given of the relation between the 
substratum and the accidents which it is said to support. It is 
evident that ’support’ cannot be taken in its literal meaning, as 
when a pillar is said to support a building, yet, he complains, there 
is no other sense in which we are instructed to take it. Locke 
must have been led either by his senses or his reason to suppose
i
an imperceptible substance exists. It cannot have been his senses
which provided evidence, since he defines Substance as something
beyond the reach of sense-experience.
"But what reason can induce us to believe the existence 
of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since 
the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend there 
is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas ?’’ ^
This rhetorical question is of course unfair to the "patrons of
matter". Locke did think there was a necessary connection between
substratum and our simple ideas of sensation, at least he clearly
thought that it was necessary to postulate a substance as the cause
of those ideas. Berkeley, however, goes on to deal with the contention
280 ibid.. p. 47 (PRINCIPLES, para. 1^)
29. ibid.. p. 48 (PRINCIPLES, para. l8)
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that it is necessary to postulate Substance in order to explain 
the pattern observed among our simple ideas of sensation* He 
deals with it by commenting that it is quite feasible that we should 
observe exactly the same patterns we now observe among our ideas 
without the supposed existence of material b o d i e s . I n  other 
words, some ordered ideas are not explicable in terms of external 
substance, so why should we suppose others are ? Later Berkeley 
himself has to take account of the ordinary belief that there is 
a difference between what we see in dreams and what we see in waking 
life. For the moment he uses it to urge that there is no point 
in postulating material substance in order to take account of it.
Berkeley makes an interesting comment which tells against the
verifiability of his theory as much as it does against that of
Locke’s, although he did not seem to be aware of this. He says
that our sense-experience can provide no evidence for the existence
of Substance, since it is quite possible to imagine a mind which had
the same pattern of experience without the help of outside bodies,
supposing for the sake of argument they could exist.
"In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible 
we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we 
might have the very same reasons to think there were that 
we now have." 31
This insight into the unverifiability df Locke’s view can be extended 
to cover Berkeley’s own view that the pattern of our sense-experience 
is accounted for by the existence of a percipient Deity, which he 
postulates after disposing of the substratum theory.
I shall now attempt to summarise what seem to me the main points
in Berkeley’s attack on the doctrine of Substance:
a) An ’idea’ is a ’sensible thing’ - i.e. a sensation, a sensory
quality, an image.
b) "A physical thing exists" is equivalent to "A sensible thing 
exists", hence to "Someone has or will have certain ideas".
30. ibid.. p. 49 (PRINCIHES, para. 19 & 20 )
31. ibid.. p. 49 (PRINCIHJES, para. 20 )
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c) It is logically impossible to imagine («perceive) a 
physical object («a sensible object) existing unperceived 
(« unsensed)
d) A physical object is no more than a collection of ideas
e) An unperceiving thing, e.g. Locke's substratum or the plain 
man'8 table, cannot 'have ideas' (= sensations) and so cannot 
'be brown' or 'be square' (» cannot 'have ideas')
f) "Something exists unperceived" (« "Sensations exist unsensed") 
is a "manifest contradiction".
These points, with reminders of Berkeley'ë philosophical usage, 
indicate that his attack on the doctrine of Substance depends on 
a special use he makes of the tautology "A sensible thing is something 
sensible", by classifying under "sensible things" physical objects 
as well as sense-data and images. Thus "A physical thing is something 
perceived" takes on the essentialist character of "A sensible thing 
is something sensible"©
The Dispute Between Locke and Berkeley
Did Berkeley refute Locke's theory of Substance ? On the surface, 
and setting aside as far as possible for the moment the sophistication; 
of modern philosophy, one would think that either Locke or Berkeley 
is right, or that both are wrong. One would imagine that a dispute 
about the nature of the external world could be settled in some way 
satisfactory to both parties. One would think, with Professor 
Luce, that:
"Material substance, like the sea serpent, either is or is 
not; there are no two ways about it." 32
Consequently, 1 wish to see whether there is an obviously possible 
way in which the dispute between Locke and Berkeley about the 
ultimate nature of the material world might be resolved; that is, 
whether there is some fact, statement or ordinary belief, or some 
appeal to the generally accepted laws of logic, which could serve to 
show conclusively whether Locke is right, Berkeley is right, or both
32© Lucef op© cit., p. 15^
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are wrong.
Berkeley's Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous were 
constructed to show that any argument against the doctrine of 
"immaterialism" could be met by an answer which looked conclusive© 
Below I will attempt to produce an imaginary dialogue between Locke 
and Berkeley which will differ from Berkeley's not only in its 
considerably inferior style and skill, but in its design, which 
will be to bring out[that an opponent of Berkeley's need not be as 
easily shaken by his arguments as Hylas was© I wish to see whether, 
supposing Locke and Berkeley were to dispute about their views 
without having undergone a change of outlook, it seems at all 
likely that they could find factual or logical grpunds for agreement, 
and if so, what sort of grounds they would be© The imaginary 
dialogue is also intended to pinpoint the main issues of their 
dispute, and to be a way of showing how Berkeley's view about a 
divine percipient is parallel to Locke's about an imperceptible 
substance.
Let us smppose jrhat Locke and Berkeley meet and have a genuine 
wish to resolve their metaphysical differences, although each still 
has his same motive and attitude. We can imagine two scientists 
trying to reach agreement about two rival hypotheses; the question 
is whether the Locke-Berkeley dispute is comparable with such a 
case.
Locke: We agree that the mind is first made aware of the
external physical world by receiving simple ideas of 
sensation. We also agree that the mind, noticing a 
certain pattern among those ideas, assigns single names 
to those which recur in well-ordered groups.
Berkeley: Yes, as you have said, the mind becomes aware of a lily
by having discrete simple ideas which are constantly 
grouped together, and these we call 'lily' as if they
were one thing. You would also agree that we cannot
become aware of the material world except through the 








directly aware of it, no. But the mind does become 
aware that there must be something material which supports 
and is responsible for those recurring groups of simple 
ideas. Why otherwise should we consider them to be single 
things, rather than collections of many diverse and 
scattered impressions ?
You still deny that a cherry cannot be anything but what 
we see, taste, feel, and smell ? You admitted, surely, 
that we know a cherry by these simple ideas of sensation©
Are you now falling back on the view that we never do, 
after all, know a cherry, since it is not what we see, toUoch, 
taste and smell ?
Of cpurse I agree that the only way to recognise a cherry 
is to see, taste, smell or touch it. We only know that 
there are material things because we have ideas of colour, 
temperature, texture, size, solidity, and all those others 
we both talk about. But because I admit that I know or 
recognise a cherry by the simple ideas I have of it, I 
do not also have to admit what seems to be obviously 
false, that the cherry is no more than a collection of 
those simple ideas. I reiterate, how do you suppose those 
ideas hang together, and how do you suppose we come to 
have them at all, unless some substratum unites and causes 
them?
Since we have agreed to attempt agreement, let me point 
out your mistake in another way, and bite back the 
exclamations which are on the tip of my tongue. You 
will not wish to go on maintaining a view that is self­
contradictory?
No one would©
Then consider what it is you assert. It is a self- 
contradiction to say that ideas exist unperceived. How 
can a perception exist independently of a percipient, and 
what would it be to say there was a thought but no thinker ?
— .46—  "
Only clowns or lunatics would say that inanimate objects 
have ideas* How is it possible to perceive if you are 
not a percipient ? Ideas can only exist in the mind.
Yet you say that material things are imperceptible and 
inanimate. You imply ideas are not perceptible, or that 
inanimate things have ideas. You might as well advance 
the view that squares must have six sides©
Locke: Of course it is necessarily true that a sensible thing
is perceptible, and I agree that stones cannot feel 
cold© I also agree that a sensible thing cannot exist 
apart from a percipient, and that is why I argued that 
the colour and the heat is not in the fire, but in me©
Of course the fire cannot perceive colour and heat;
"The fire is hot" means that I, not.the fire, feels hot©
But I cannot affirm too strongly that real primary
33qualities and Substance are not sensory things. I have 
said many times that we cannot have a particular sensory 
idea of Substance and its powers, and in your sense of 
'idea' these things are not ideas at all, hot sensory 
objects, but rather, perhaps, what you would call 'notions®© 
When I talk about the idea of Substance you must 
remember what I mean by 'idea', not necessarily a sensory
I
object of thought. },!any objects of thought are hazy and 
not a bit like sensations, percepts or precise images.
But since we are trying to resolve our dispute, and not 
to prolong it, I shall not use this word 'idea' which 
raises a verbal dust between us. Observe our percepts, 
and consider for a moment how we speak about them. Now 
how do you suppose this book, which I recognise as a 
group of sensory qualities, is a single thing, and not 
some other thing, like the group of sensory qualities I
33. I am aware that Locke might be interpreted differently re 
primary qualities. See Chapter Two of this thesis.
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call 'the table', unless there is an underlying causal 
substance? The book involves different causal powers 
from the table, or I should not be able to distinguish 
between the two. As you rightly said, these causal 
powers cannot be my ideas, which are passive, and so 
incapable of causing other ideas, except perhaps images. 
There must surely be some unifying power which explains 
these material things, while our only knowledge of them 
consists of discrete sense-experiences.
Berkeley: You have asked, among many other things, why we should
group our ideas together in one way rather than another. 
They are grouped in the patterns they are not by us, but 
by God, who has arranged the world he created for 
commodious living and beauty. To me the visible beauty 
of the creation, the regular patterns among our simple 
ideas of sensation, are direct evidence of a divine 
percipient. I do not see how your postulation of an 
inert and featureless somewhat can explain the pattern 
of ayr experiences . They might well be what they are 
whether or not any such thing as you call substance 
exists.
Locke: I do not agree. It seems to me obvious that the "visible
beauty of the creation", as you call it, (although, of 
course, created by God), is the result of the action upon 
our senses of secret powers hidden in its substance, and 
you have not convinced me that I am wrong. You say 
I cannot tell from my experience that material substance 
exists. I say that you cannot tell from yours that God 
is a percipient.
But that dispute is a cul-de-sac. Let me ask you now, 
how you account for the differences between what we
perceive in dreams and fits of madness, and what we perceive 
when we are awake and sane ? Or between those ideas 
we conjure up for ourselves at will, and those which we 
cannot help having if we are awake and in possession of
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our faculties ? You surely do not wish to deny that
the memory picture I now create in my mind of the
Earl of Shaftesbury is different from the ideas I 
had of him when, from time to time, I was in his 
service directly observing the man ? It seems obvious 
that some ideas are caused by something outside ourselves, 
and others by our o\m imaginations© Is it not equally 
obvious that the ideas not caused by ourselves must be 
caused by things in themselves, by substances capable
of acting on our senses ?
Berkeley: I do agree that there is a difference in our ideas,
some can be conjured up at will, others are the result 
of some agency not our own. But since the nature of 
an idea consists in its being perceived, no idea can 
exist unless it is perceived. Consequently the true 
answer to your question is that some ideas, in dreams 
and imagination and the like, are created by our own 
minds, and others, all those which make up the external 
world, are created by a divine mind.
Locke: Let me put another poitt, then, about why 1 cannot
honestly feel converted to your view. Your esse est 
fiercipi principle seems to take away the reality from 
things. I was never satisfied with the consequence of 
your view that a spirit and not the fire heats me when 
I stand before the fireplace. Indeed, this objection 
is not irreligious, since a recent defender of yours 
has admitted that it is difficult to adjust to the notion 
that the divine power which forgives sins also boils 
the breakfast egg.^^ I can see no reason for your 
opinion that my view is not more plausible, namely that 
it is the real fire which heats us, and not a divine
34. See Luce, op. cit., p© l6l: he admits the difficulty while
not admitting that it is insuperable
-49-
Locke:
spirit - although, of course, a divine spirit 
created these causal powers in substance.
Berkeley: I cannot understand why you should seek to explain
the simple and familiar - the warmth of the fire or 
the crimson of the sunset - in terms of some unknown 
ghostly power which works inscrutably in an unseen 
world of quite indescribable extensions and motions, 
whatever they may be. The real grass, coramonsense 
avows, is the grass I smell and walk upon in the garden.
It is not something I can never see, nor smell, nor 
feel beneath my feet.
We must make fresh starts in an effort to reach agreement.
We say the grass is green, or brown, long, or short, 
fine, tough, dry, or wet, and so on. What do you 
suppose we are saying, if we are not saying something 
about the grass ?
Certainly if we said these things, we would be talking 
about the grass.
Then if we are saying something about the grass, we are 
not making some such statement as "greenness, dampness, 
fineness, etc. is green, damp, fine etc.", for this 
would be a trivial proposition, and the assertion 
"The grass is green, damp, etc." is not a trifling 
proposition of that nature. So we must be saying something, 
as you confessed, about the grass, and not about the 
collection of simple ideas by which we recognise the 
grass. And this demonstrates that the grass is something 
other than its sensory attributes. So I must say again, 
there must be some unknown ...
Berkeley: There is no need to repeat it, I know that you think
this argument shows there must be some unknoim substance 
which is the real grass. But I must ask again, what 





colour, shape, smell, etc*? What reason is there to 
imagine that real grass is something we never know about?
Is it not, in all honesty, a little absurd to say that 
the grass which cows eat, scythes cut, that covers the 
fields and grows for all to see, is really an unknowable 
somewhat, a something you cannot say what ?
Have patience, for I do not find it absurd. The fact that 
we have most imperfect knowledge of what substance is 
like is no argument against its existence. It seems to me 
that these very experiences you mention, cutting, seeing 
and walking upon grass, show that there must be something 
which makes them different from other kinds of experiences, 
remembering grass or dreaming about it. Now you say that 
the real things are ideas in God's mind, while the illusory 
ones or those which we deliberately conjure up in our minds 
are not. The dispute between us seems to resolve into one 
about whether it is correct to postulate an unknowable 
material substance or an omnipresent, omnipercipient God 
as the ultimate subject of our ideas. You interpret 
'seeing all things in God' too literally, without due 
regard for physical causation. ^Vhether that is so or not, 
of one point I am convinced, that you talk about ideas 
in God's mind for those same reasons that make me say 
they are sometimes caused by an imperceptible substance.
Berkeley: Yes, to account for the validity of groups of ideas which
are real things in contrast to illusory or imaginative 
ideas. Also, to account for the continued existence of 
material things when no one is perceiving them. And there 
is more which you have not mentioned to which you would 
agree. We both need to account for what one of my successors 
would call the relation of the apparent elliptical penny to 
the real shape of the penny, which is round. Nevertheless,
I cannot agree j^ hat any explanation of all this is true 
unless it is in terras of God's eternal vigilance, and not 
of an inexplicable mystery of the sort you call substance.
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Locke. I have tried to steer our conversation into concord.
It seemed as if we might be pronouncing the same truths 
in different ways, since we both seemed to be taking 
account of the same points. But now I see that in order 
to agree with you I should have to believe that it is 
absurd to speak of material things existing unperceived 
by human minds, unless I meant by this that they existed 
in God's mind. Then I should have to agree that material 
things are merely, and not only nominally, groups of 
sensory ideas. For reasons which I could only repeat, 
since I still urge them, I cannot agree to any of these 
conclusions of yours.
Berkeley: And I see no reason why I should cease to believe them,
since the alternative you offer seems to me no more 
than patent and impious nonsense.
The feature which most strikes the attention as a result of 
wondering how Locke and Berkeley might have resolved their dispute, 
is that facts about experience, and commonsense beliefs about 
material objects, which we would expect to be the very considerations 
which would serve to resolve it, are not denied by either theory.
Locke states: "Something exists which is imperceptible". Berkeley 
retorts: "Nothing in the material world c ^  exist unperceived, 
unless it is a Spirit". We feel: "Let's find out which of them 
is right". Yet it begins to look as if there is no way of finding 
this out. If we try to do so by studying our experience, we plunge 
into logical absurdity, for we are looking for something which 
by definition we can never find - we are hoping to perceive something 
imperceptible. There is no possible sense-evidence which could 
be produced to establish either that there is or is not imperceptibè* 
substance. As Berkeley reiterated, for a different purpose, 
we cannot perceive the imperceptible, so we cannot decide by sense-
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evidence whether or not the imperceptible exists in the material 
world.
"When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of 
external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating 
our own ideas". 35
Sense-experience is irrelevant to the truth-value of Locke's view
and Berkeley's attack on it, since they both refer, one in a
spirit of sympathy and the other in a spirit of rejection,
to something which by definition cannot be contained in any
logically possible experience©
The dispute is, like the abstract ideas dispute, irresolvable 
by reference to fact. This is the point to be developed, together 
with others which arise from it, in the following chapter.
35. Berkeley, o p - cit.. Vol. II, p. 50 (PRINCIPLES, para. 23)
CHAPTER FOUR
THE LOCKE-BERKELEY DISPUTE
"But everything does not hit alike 
upon every man's imagination. We have 
our understandings no less different 
than our palates; and he that thinks 
the same truth shall be equally 
relashed by every one in the same dress, 
may as well hope to feast every one 
with the same sort of cookery." 1
Locke, OP. cit., Vol. I, p. 12 (The Epistle 
to the Reader)
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The question has been raised, how can we be sure whether Locke
or Berkeley is right, or both wrong, or which theory is true, or
are both false ? An attempt to answer these questions impartially
is quickly foiled by the discovery that it is far from plain what
a reliable procedure for determining the truth of the theories would 
be.
The following are the obvious ways in which a metaphysical view 
might be tested:
a) By appealing to the relevant factsy and to commonsense beliefs;
in this case to facts about perception and common beliefs about
physical things.
b) By appealing to "ordinary language"; in this case, some philosophers 
would test the views by asking whether they are the results
of confusion about ordinary language, or whether they give a 
'correct analysis' of material-object statements.
c) By asking whether the views are internally consistent.
d) By considering whether the views "give insight" into classical 
philosophical problems.
Metaphysicians themselves lay stress on a) and c), anti-metaphysicians 
on b), and neutrals on d). It is evident that if and when we 
conclude that Locke's theory is true, or that Berkeley's is, our 
conclusions will have different implications according to the criterion 
we have used to test the theories. For example, we may mean by calling 
a view 'true' that it contains no contradictions, or that it describes 
the facts correctly, or that it contains insight, or simply that it 
commits no gross sin against "ordinary language". I am going to 
consider these criteria in turn, and ask what relevance they have, if 
any, for determining the truth or falsity of the views put forward by 
Locke and Berkeley.
a) The Appeal to Facts and Commonsense Beliefs
I tried to show, what indeed seems obvious, that "Real things 
are imperceptible", "Or real things are without exception perceived", 
are statements which it is logically impossible to verify by an 
examination of perceptual experience. This is the case simply because 
it is a necessary truth that one cannot perceive the imperceptible, 
while this logical impossibility is what we should have to achieve
—54—
in order to find sense-evidence for or against the substratum 
theory. Nevertheless, the view that the Locke-Berkeley dispute 
about the external world could be verified by appealing to the 
facts of the case must be taken seriously, because both these 
metaphysicians certainly thought that they were giving true accounts 
of what the material world is like, that they were doing a kind 
of super-physics, ^any of their arguments appeal to facts. The 
possibility that they were indeed trying to give straightforward 
descriptions of the world must be given a fair trial.
Berkeley often gave as a reason for saying that physical things 
are no more than 'collections of ideas' the fact that when I 
perceive a physical thing, I always have ideas. It sounds, the way 
he puts it, as if this is something like saying "Whenever I smell 
a train I always have a headache". It sounds as if it so happens 
that when I perceive a physical thing I also have ideas, as it so 
happens that whenever I smell a train I get a headache. But of 
course while it is logically possible to refute the claim that 
there is a connection between smelling trains and getting headaches, 
it is not logically possible to refute, for example, "%enever I 
see a physical thing I have visual sensations". This statement 
does not describe a fact, it exhibits a tautology. Part of the 
meaning of "see a physical thing" is "have visual sensations", and 
it is a genuine self-contradiction to assert that I see a physical 
thing but have no visual sensations. So one kind of fact to which 
Berkeley appeals is not genuine fact, but definition and resultant 
tautology dressed up to look like fact.
Nevertheless Locke and Berkeley do talk about physical things, 
about cherries and lilies, mountains and wax, and their arguments 
draw constantly upon our ordinary experience of these familiar 
things. But at the level of common experience, there is no 
disagreement between them, and no metaphysical speculation. Neither 
Locke nor Berkeley ever deny that we see and touch chairs and tables, 
hear horses' hooves and bird songs, etc. The disagreement starts
-55-
when Locke denies that these things are ultimately real and 
Berkeley insists that they are. Is this a question which can be 
decided by paying attention to tables, lilies, and bird songs ?
No one, in his right mind, upon being asked whether fhe apple he 
is eating is regally a group of sense-data or reallyean unknowable 
substance, examines the apple more closely to find out.
The perceptual facts - that we see and touch and smell many 
objects, hear many noises and taste many flavours - are not denied, 
but used in the views of Locke and Berkeley. Suppose then we try 
to test these views by appeal to commonsense beliefs - e.g. the 
belief that my desk is still in the room when I am not, that lilies 
and mountains exist in their own right in the world, and are not 
dependent upon my presence. These too Locke and Berkeley accommodate 
rather than deny. Berkeley's percipient God and Locke's imperceptible 
substratum are put forward as ways of taking account of these common 
beliefs in the persistence and independence of material objects.
The metaphysical views sponsor the common faith in the reliability 
and comparative permanence of physical objects compared with the 
flux of personal sense-impressions.
There is, however, one part of both views which might be said 
to conflict with commonsense, and that is the metaphysical assumption 
that our knowledge of the external world consists basically in 
having discrete sensa. But, as I shall try to show at some length 
later in this thesis, it is not quite right to say that this 
assumption conflicts with commonsense, since the way of looking at 
the world which it involves is one completely alien to non-metaphysicd 
thought, which neither suggests it nor fails to suggest it. The 
mere fact that commonsense does not deal with questions about the 
ultimate analysis of sense-experience fails to show that these views 
can be refuted by appeal to it. If we said it did, it v/ould be too 
much like saying that the fact the Kikuyu tribe do not consider 
problems of psycho-analysis indicates that Freudian hypotheses can
be refuted by quoting them.
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The Appeal to Ordinary Language
To begin with, there is a useful sense in which we can say 
that these metaphysicians use technical terms, there central 
words are in many cases those which would not be used in the same 
way in common speech. We do not normally use the word 'idea' 
either in Locke's or Berkeley's sense. "He is full of ideas", 
seldom means "He is having a great many sense—experiences" for 
example. . This is not because 'idea' is an obsolete term. It is 
because it is a philosophical term, like its successors - "sense-data", 
"sensa", "sense-contents", etc. The technical philosophical 
vocabulary which we call the phenomenal is t language, (recognising 
that it is a different language from ordinary English only in 
the sense that American, but not French, is a 'different' language 
from it), is a very queer one, but also so philosophically familiar 
that its queerness is apt to be overlooked.
If the phenomenal 1st language can be said to "go against" 
ordinary language at all, it does so because it creates a 
philosophical picture of the world which is certainly not found 
in non-philosophical thought. This language or picture was already 
in vogue when Locke wrote. It gives the impression that an orange, 
or a cherry, is made of bits - not bits of peel, pulp and pip, 
but bits of colour, shape, smell, texture, size, etc, Berkeley 
said:
"Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, 
tartness, and you take away the cherry." ^
The commonsense thought is: "Eat the skin, the pulp, and throw
away the stone, and you lose the cherry." Berkeley's notion is
modelled on the commonsense notion of what it is to make a cherry
vanish; but it also transforms that notion. It is as though a
physical thing were made of discrete sensa just as a building is
made of bricks. As Dr. Macdonald has said:
2o Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 249 (Third Dialogue Betwem .  
Hylas and Philonous)
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"The metaphor suggests and was undoubtedly intended 
to suggest that by abstraction an intellectual analysis 
of objects was performed which showed their composition 
in a way Malogous to that in which a chemical analysis 
reveals their chemical composition." 3
There does not seem to be any obvious commonsense excuse for
talking about things in the world as if they are made of sense.
WTiile we do in ordinary situations distinguish the smell or the
colour of an orange from the orange itself, e.g. we say that the
orange is sour or is green, we do not assume that the colour or
the taste is a diTferenjb thi^ from the orange. We abstract to the
extent of paying attention to the colour or the taste of the fruit
and not to the fruit itself© Yety in commonsense terms, it would
be extraordinarily eccentric to suppose that by doing so we 'take
away the colour', as Berkeley would have it.
"For when we abstract red from this object we do not 
leave it colourless." ^
We do not apply some strange kind of datum-eradicator. Neither does
commonsense envisage the world as a network of portions of smell,
minute shades of colour, tiny bits of textures, but as an ordered
world of physical things which have different qualities. A sane
mother would not teach her child the meaning of 'cherry' by saying
anything like this: "That very shade of red, that particular
taste and texture, that degree of juiciness, that very kind of
smell, shape, shininess, dullness, and all those other sensa,
whenever they occur together in precisely that way, and also when
they are slightly different, for example when the juiciness or
the texture is not quite the same, or the colour entirely different,
etc., are called, as if they were one thing, 'ohengy'." This
is as absurd as the situation with which Berkeley taunted the advocates
of abstract ideas, when he imagined children unable to chatter about
their trinkets until they had tacked together numberless properties
in their minds, A child is taught by pointing, "That's a cherry.
p. 87
4. ibid,. p, 87
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and so is that, but not that, or that and although he will
then recognise a cherry by its sensory qualities, it will never 
occur to him until he goes to philosophy classes, and possibly not 
even then, that those qualities may be the constituents of the cherry, 
as the cards are the constituents of the pack. "Cherries are red", 
he will say, and never mean that certain sensory qualities co-exist 
in a certain complicated way.
This is not the chapter in which I intend to tread too far the 
perilous ground of what non-philosophers mean by "physical objects", 
and how the common notion of houses, spoons, buses and all the 
other familiar inanimate objects of the world differs from the 
metaphysical presuppositions about them. ^ But I wish to emphasise 
immediately the point that the Locke-Berkeley dispute is carried on 
largely in technical terras - in terms of 'having ideas' rather than 
eating apples. I wish to emphasise the difference between their 
dispute about the external world and everyday disagreements about 
the contents of that world, like the one about whether there are 
abominable snowmen on Everest, or the one about whether flying 
saucers come from Russia, America, or another planet. The metaphysical 
disagreement seems to rest on a strange and mutual presupposition, 
incomparable with any to be found in ordinary talk, namely the 
presupposition that the world we experience is a complicated jigsaw 
puzzle whose pieces are discrete sensa, or 'simple ideas of sensation'.
Let us now reconsider the familiar accusation that metaphysicians 
fail to pay due attention to ordinary language. This suggests that 
we should be able to tell whether Locke or Berkeley is mistaken 
or confused by comparing their views with the way in which we usually 
talk about the material world. We should be able, one would have 
thought, to refute or confirm "A cherry is an unknowable substratum", 
or "A cherry is no more than a collection of ideas", by finding some 
way in which we ordinarily talk about things like cherries which the
5. This point is most fully considered in Chapter Nine of this 
thesis.
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metaphysical assertions either describe or misdescribe, understand 
or misunderstand, use correctly or incorrectly.
First, the accusation may be that Locke, or Berkeley, or 
both, intend to describe or to use ordinary language correctly 
in their theories and fail. This seems to me very implausible, 
if only because of the sort of points these philosophers make 
about ordinary language. It seems evident from these that neither 
Locke nor Berkeley intehded to give a description of common speech, 
and it also seems evident that where their theories could not 
be suitably expressed in plain commonsense terms, they were fully 
aware of this and unconcerned about it. Consider Berkeley's 
statement :
"But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink 
ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge that it 
does so, the word 'idea' not being used in common discourse 
to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities, 
which are called things: and it is certain that any
expression which varies from the familiar use of language 
will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern
the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no 
more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those things 
which we perceive immediately by our senses .. If therefore 
you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with 
the immediate objects of sense which cannot exist unperceived 
or without the mind: I shall readily grant it is more
proper or conformable to custom, that they should be called 
things rather than ideas." °
In short, Berkeley is fully prepared to accept ordinary speech,
the commonly used word 'thing', provided that we accept his
philosophical point about the significance of the word 'thing'.
We may speak of 'things', and keep in line with ordinary language,
provided we realise that strictly speeaking our assertions are
about ideas. It will no doubt be objected that in ordinary
language 'thing' does not mean 'collection of ideas'. It is,
of course, not easy to say what this word does mean in ordinary
language, but presumably one common meaning of the term is inanimate
object. The propositions "A thing is an unknowable material
6. Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. II, pp. 56-57 (PRINCIPLES, para. 38) 
My italics
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substance", and "A thing is a collection of ideas", surely do 
not misdescribe this common meaning of the word, although neither 
do they merely describe it.
Some philosophers have spoken of "ordinary language" as if it 
were a precise calculus, a set of tables to which we should refer 
whenever a metaphysical problem appears otherwise irresolvable.
This presupposes that metaphysical problems result from and are 
couched in ordinary language terms. %ile it is obvious that Locke 
and Berkeley wrote for the most part in ordinary English, it is 
equally obvious that important parts of their theories lead to 
some assertions which are not translatable into statements which 
would normally be made in non-philosophical contexts. When this 
happens, they realise that their language has become technical, and 
do not try to avoid making uncommon statements, but rather point 
out the point of doing so. Berkeley says that his technical 
statements convey the truth better than ordinary ones.
"In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be 
retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, 
or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary 
for our well-being, how false soever they may be, if taken 
in a strict and speculative sense." 7
Berkeley distinguished between the common expressions of ordinary
talk which are useful, and the 'true' metaphysical statements about
the nature of the external world which may reveal the inaccuracy
of common expressions. He goes on to emphasise that ordinary
language is best suited to "received opinions, which are not
g
always the truest."
Locke too studied ordinary language, and decided that it was 
inadequate for metaphysical theorising. The ordinary signification 
of the word 'gold', for example, "must unavoidably be very uncertain". 
Certain qualities are "always united in nature" to make up gold, 
but individual people will know gold by some of its qualities and 
not others; one person will mean by 'gold' something of a certain 
colour, weight and fusibility, while another will mean by it something
7" * G i&id., p. 63 (PRINCIPLES, para. 52)
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with a certain weight and colour but also with the property of
9
being soluble in aqua regia, etc© Consequently "we have
but very imperfect descriptions of things, and words have very
uncertain significations". For metaphysical purposes, Locke
thought that ordinary language would require some sifting;
"But I am apt to imagine, that, were the imperfections 
of language, as the instrument of knowledge, more 
thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies 
that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves 
cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, 
lie a great deal opener than it does." H
Now since both Locke and Berkeley seem to have believed that 
ordinary language is not in itself entirely adequate for the purposes 
of metaphysical speculation, or arriving at 'the truth' in 
metaphysics, I find it hard to believe that their theories are even 
disguised descriptions of that language, whether successful or 
unsuccessful. It seems clear that they were not interested in giving 
accounts of ordinary expressions, or tracing the logic of our speech, 
but in proving something about the world. If we suppose that they 
intended to describe common usage, we cannot explain why they 
introduced technical terms, like 'idea', and pointed out the merits 
of doing so. Surely they had other fish to fry.
We come to the other accusation, that Locke and Berkeley were 
confused about, or misused, ordinary langauge unintentionally, and 
that their views are refutable, or cease to require refutation, as 
soon as we see the linguistic muddles they produced. This Wittgensteinian 
attitude to metaphysics is perhaps the most common today. For all thet, 
it is implausible©
Because this view is so widely held by so distinguished a company, 
further discussion will be devoted to it in Chapter Eight, where
more metaphysical material will have been expounded to provide examples.
9. Locke, op© cit., Vol© II, p. II6 (Bk« III, Ch. 9 )
10. ibid.t p. 117 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 9 )
11. ibid.. pp. 119 - 120 (Bk© III, Ch. 9 )
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Some remarks will be mdde here, however, about the inapplicability 
of the accusation to Locke and Berkeley©
In the first place, it seems that both were aware of the 
nuances and common purposes of ordinary expressions. V^here their 
theories depart from common discourse, they tell us so© We 
normally mean by a piece of gold something we see and touch,
but considered truly, or in itself, gold is a hidden substance.
We normally mean by a mountain something which exists unperceived, 
but the truth of the matter is that it is a sensible thing, and so 
cannot exist unperceived by any mind at all. Usually 'idea' has
quite a different sense, but we must use this term if we want to
see what our experience 'really is'. If this is the way these 
metaphysicians think, it sounds a little absurd to accuse them 
of linguistic confusion. Consider the possibility of accusing 
poets of making linguistic mistakes, of saying that the following 
couplet must be rejected since in ordinary language it expresses 
nothing but self-contradictions:
"Shape without form, shade without colour,
Paralysed force, gesture without motion" 12
If we made such an accusation, we surely would have missed the
point of the expressions used by Eliot. Similarly, I suspect
that to say "Simple ideas inhere in some substratum", or "Nothing
exists without the mind", have no sense in ordinary language,
or no commonsense counterpart statements, misses the point of
these metaphysical assertions. I shall try to show this in detail
as this study progresses or lengthens. In the meantime the
following points are notable. It might be said that Berkeley
denies the existence of Matter, and is consequently making a false
ordinary language statement. Berkeley himself was aware that this
might be said, and he made it quite clear that his statement was
12. From T.S. Eliot's "The Hollow Men"
not to be understood as an ordinary language one at alia |
pi-
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"The only thing whose existence we deny, is that 
which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance.
And in doing of this, there is no damage done to the
rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it."
"Matter does not exist" is not translatable into "Chairs, trees,
mountains, etc. do not exist". Berkeley did not intend it to be,
for he wanted to affirm that these things do exist. As soon
as we imagine that Berkeley is misusing ordinary language,
by not allowing 'matter' to refer to chairs etc., it is hard to
explain why he produced his theory at all.
This brings us to the other accusations, that Locke and Berkeley, 
although they do not try to describe or to use ordinary speech 
correctly all the time, ^nd fail by mistake, do deliberately set 
out to misuse or misdescribe it. I think the reasons why it is 
implausible to say that they describe common speech apply 
equally to show the implausibility of saying that they misdescribe 
it. They do not utter statements about words and phrases, 
they make statements about things. To say, however, that Locke 
and Berkeley deliberately misuse some ordinary language expressions 
seems more nearly true, but ambiguous.
These metaphysicians do not always use ordinary language, 
and sometimes they give ordinary expressions implications which 
they normally would not be considered to have. For example,
Locke infers from the grammatical form of many of our ordinary 
propositions that they refer ultimately to an unknowable substance.
In this sense, if someone insisted, it would be possible to admit 
that he deliberately misused or was confused about common speech©
But it is a very thin sense of 'misuse' and 'confused'. If 
someone misuses a word, he is using it for a purpose which it is 
not designed to serve, he mistakes or ignores its dictionary 
meaning. If someone thinks that 'to expedite' means to set forth 
on an expedition he can be corrected and the correction will be 
accepted. If he persists, and says that he prefers his own meaning
13. Berkeley, op. cit..Vol. II, p. 55 (PRINCIPLES, para. 35)
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to the commonly accepted one, he will still be considered to 
be misusing the word. But suppose he is a poet, and uses the 
phrase "tenuous membrane" to refer to what people would normally 
refer to by the word 'soul*. In this case, when he makes it 
clear that he knows his expression is given unusual application 
and he uses it in this way in order to make a point about his 
introspective experience, we would not, I suspect, continue to 
say that he is misusing language© He is using it in an unusual 
way in order to express something which he does not feel can be 
appropriately expressed in plain speech. In the same sense, it 
is doubtful whether Locke and Berkeley misuse language, for they 
use words in a special way designed to express argumentation 
in favour of what they believe the world is really like. In 
short, to say they misuse, or are confused about, language suggests 
that they change the meanings and implications of terms and 
statements simply for the sake of doing so, and not for a specific 
purpose. This, as I shall attempt to show in this thesis, seems 
quite wrong©
c) The Criterion of Internal Consistency
Some philosophers, unable to find the facts against which 
metaphysical theories might be measured, and dissatisfied by 
the ordinary language criteria for judging them, have concluded 
that if one metaphysical system is 'better* than another, it is 
beeeuse it contains fewer non sequitors or exhibits more logical 
consistency.
With this criterion in mind, we can accuse Locke of contradicting 
his original maxim that all knowledge arises from sense-experience 
by his doctrine of unknowable substance. Or we can accuse Berkeley 
of contradicting his esse est percipi principle when he introduces 
'notions' of spirits. It is well known, however, that these 
complaints fail to provide conclusive refutations, at least in 
the minds of adherents to the views which they criticise. There 
is always room in philosophical discussions for defences. "Certainly
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Locke believed that all knowledge arises from sense-experience.
Knowledge that there must be some substratum arises precisely from 
this. It is sense-experience which leads to the necessity to 
postulate Substance." "When Berkeley said esse est percipi he
was, of course, referring, as he said, to sensible things. Spirits 
perceive, and sensible things are perceived by them. Of the first 
we have notions, of the second ideas. There is no self-contradiction."
In this way a philosophical dispute can arise as easily between the 
advocates and enemies of a metaphysical system as it can between 
mts author and a rival metaphysician. However inconsistent a view 
may prima facie seem, there are always those who, without seeming 
in the least absurd, refuse to reject it. They would, of course, seem 
absurd if the criterion of internal consistency were indeed appropriât 
as a guide to judgments about metaphysical systems.
Even John Stuart Mill's alleged 'howler' in equating what is 
desired with what is desirable is defensible. While it would not be 
defensible to say, for example, that 'desired' in fact, in ordinary 
language, means the same as 'desirable®, for it does not. But it is 
in the best metaphysical tradition to say that 'desired' really 
means 'desirable', that it is a truth to state that whatever is 
desired is also desirable. By urging this view, we would not have 
to deny anything that is written down in dictionaries.
Suppose there were a caae of a metaphysical view which all philosghers 
unanimously agreed wa@ incohsiatcpt. Even then, those who sympathised 
with its spirit could say, without seeming unreasonable, "It's badly 
argued,, but it's true". The criterion of internal consistency 
cannot be very helpful in this type of situation.
d) Philosophical Insight
Some people judge metaphysical views by asking which of them 
contains the most 'insight' into philosophical problems, or, in the 
current idiom, into the structure of philosophical problems.
The difficulty is to know what is to count as 'insight'. There 
is a danger that by "X had great insight when he said S" we mean 
merely "I sympàthise with X when he says S". Consider, for example.
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what Professor Ayer once said about Berkeley's insight:
"Nor is it fair to regard Berkeley as a metaphysician^ (sic)
For he didsnot, in fact, deny the reality of material 
things, as we are still too commonly told, % a t  he 
denied was the adequacy of Locke's analysis of the notion 
of a material thing. He maintained that to say of various 
'ideas of sensation' that they belonged to a single material 
thing was not, as Locke thought, to say that they were 
related to a single observable underlying 'somewhat', but 
rather that they stood in certain relations to one another.
And in this he was right. Admittedly he made the mistake 
of supposing that what was immediately given in sensation 
was necessarily mental; what Berkeley discovered was
that material things must be definable in terms of sense- 
contents." 14
The discovery which is here attributed to Berkeley was, it might 
be argued, Locke's, for Locke's theory about the nominal essences 
of material things surely implies that "material things must be 
definable in terms of sense-contents". The issue at stake was not 
this, but whether the definition made in terms of ideas can be the 
final and only definition of a material thing. Ayer regards Locke's 
answer to this as a mistake. But there is no conclusive reason why 
someone else should not regard Berkeley's answer as the mistake, 
and Locke's as showing insight. There are no rules for determining 
what is mistake and what is insight in metaphysics. In a sense we 
can say that both Locke and Berkeley had some sort of insight and 
this is why we still read their works. But it is hard to state 
what exactly.the quality we are attributing to them is. I do not 
believe that it has anything to do with discovering truths, or 
describing new facts.
The criteria of facts, common beliefs, language, consistency and 
degree of insight do not provide us with a reliable instrument for 
gauging the value of a metaphysical theory. All these possible 
criteria are either inapplicable or indeterminate. Nevertheless the 
feeling remains that surely some waycould be found of deciding whether 
these theories are true or false, right or wrong, or at least correct 
or incorrect. So I shall p#Mdi%^lnyvsd:!^^ .
14. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Gollancz: 1946 (second 
edition), p. 53
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The strength of Berkeley’s contention that Locke wrote doivn
’manifest contradictions’ seems to come from certain redefinitions he
makes of important terms in the dispute. In particular his
redefinition of ’idea' enables him to find contradictions in Locke’s
doctrines of abstract ideas aid substance, as I have &ried to show.
His extension of the meaning of the ordinary word ’perceive’, to
cover contemplation of any of our ideas, i.e. to cover what would
normally be meant by ’imagining’, or ’conceiving of’, or ’conjuring
up’, cuts us off from an obvious escape route - ”0f course I can
conceive of things existing unperceived in the material world; penguins
at the North Pole, for example" - since now to imagine something
to perceive it. Nothing can be imagined existing unperceived, since
what is imagined is ipso facto perceived.
"But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than to 
imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing 
in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I answer, 
you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all
this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain 
ideas which you call ’books’ and ’trees’, and at the same 
time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive 
them ? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them 
all the while ?" 15
We are, as it were, trapped in the cage of our own ideas when we
try to contend against Berkeley that things exist in the material
world whether any mind perceives them or not.
Let us now consider in a little more detail Berkeley’s line of 
argument, and see if it provides any clues about how we might judge 
the truth-value of his theory, or about what sort of theory it is.
The following is one of his main arguments:
(1) AVhen I immediately perceive a physical thing, I always 
apprehend sense-data, and however hard I try I cannot apprehend 
anything else.
(2 ) Therefore a physical thing cannot be anything more than 
a group of these sense-data.
15. Berkeley, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 50 (PRINCIPLES, para. 23) 
My italics
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(3) But I do believe, for example, that penguins exist at 
the North Pole even when I am not there to perceive them*
(4) Therefore some other mind must be having these data, and 
that must be the only all-seeing, omnipresent mind - God’s.
(1 ) is a necessarily true proposition. It is logically impossible 
to immediately perceive a physical thing without having sense-data,
(or, as Berkeley himself would say, ’ideas’), since sense-data are 
defined as what we immediately perceive. (l), we might say, is 
the trivial tautology ’’’Vhen I immediately perceive a physical thing 
I immediately perceive it", expressed in such a way that its 
triviality, but not its necessity, is disguised. Now although 
Berkeley gives (2 ) as one of the reasons for believing (l), (2 ) 
does not follow from (l). (2) is not in ordinary usage a tautology,
or even a true statement. Outside the context of Berkeley’s system,
(1 ) would not appear to be a reason for believing (2). No non­
philosopher would be moved by the argument that since, when I see 
a thing, I always have visual data, that thing I see cannot be anything 
more than a group of such data. He would not be moved, because the 
line of thought would seem so alien.
Take some common non-philosophical types of reasoning. If I 
am told that a horse has not won the Derby, because it came second, 
and I know that it is true that it came second, it would be very 
bad logic, or ignorance of the meaning of ’won’, if I continued 
to be hopeful that it may have won. But it is not bad logic, nor 
ignorance of the meanings of the terms involved, to know that it is 
true that whenever I immediately perceive a material thing, I 
apprehend sense-data and nothing else, yet continue to feel that 
a material thing is something more than a group of sense-data. Yet, 
while we read Berkeley, it does seem as if this should be bad logic. 
Then there is the causal sort of ordinary reasoning, which is equally 
unlike Berkeley’s. If I am told that my train will be late, because 
the station has received word from down the line that it has broken 
down, and I rely on this report, it would be foolish to say: "Yes,
I know it has broken down, but I think it will be on time." For the 
truth of "The train has broken down" makes it very highly probable on
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the basis of past experience that it will be late, "Whenever I 
immediately perceive a physical thing I always apprehend sense-data,
I know this, but a physical thing is something more than a group of 
sense-data" is not foolish in this way, and it makes no sense to 
say "on the basis of past experience it is highly probable that 
a physical thing is a group of sense-data". There is nothing to 
which the phrase "on the basis oÉ past experience" can refer in this 
case.
V/liat sort of reason, then, could Berkeley have considered (l) 
to be for believing (2 ) ? . It seems to me that (l) is a very 
strong reason for believing (2 ) if it is interpreted in a certain 
way. It becomes a strong reason if it is interpreted as, not 
the simple tautology which most of us regard it to be, but as a 
statement which implies that I could directly perceive more than 
sense-data when I directly perceive a physical thing, but that it 
so happens I never will, because as a matter of fact there is nothing 
other than sense-data to be directly perceived. This would make it 
more like saying "%en I see a live fish I always see scales, so 
all live fish must have scales". Regarded from this admittedly 
eccentric angle, (from the position Berkeley himself recommends), 
the statement (l) does look like evidence for saying that physical 
things consist only of ideas. To put it another way, the necessary 
truth that it is logically impossible to experience anything but 
experiences is interpreted as a truth about the physical world, to 
mean that nothing as a matter of fact exists in the world except 
experiences. Berkeley’s reason (l) is a reason for conclusion (2) 
if and only if we play his metaphysical game and make the tautology 
do the work normally done by a statement of fact about what exists.
Having made point (2), an opportunity has been created for 
Berkeley. (2) as it stands conflicts with the common conviction we 
all share which is expressed in (]). Physical things, almost by 
definition, and certainly by vulgar opinion, do not depend for their 
existence in the world on the presence of any sentient creature.
The madness of solipsism struck Berkeley as it strikes most people.
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Berkeley wishes to accommodate the commonsense faith, not to deny 
it. But he turns the concession he makes to commonsense into a 
reason for believing in the existence of a divine percipient, for 
accepting (4 ) This is even more bizarre than giving (l) as a 
reason for holding (2 ). We are now told that a true empirical 
statement, "All sane people believe that mountains and penguins 
exist independently of their experience", is evidence for the 
truth of the statement that God exists and continually apprehends 
what we perceive.
It is sometimes said that Berkeley’s notion of God is dragged 
in to patch up some holes in the fabric of his theory. I suspect 
that this às a misjudgment. It seems that the contrary is true, 
that the holes in the early part of his theory are made in order 
to leave room for a divine percipient. It is worth remembering 
what so many of his current admirers forget, that Berkeley’s main 
motive was to refute atheists. It seems that Berkeley led up to 
point (4 ) deliberately. He reconciles the sense-datum picture of our 
experience of the external world, and his esse est percipi principle, 
with the common notion that physical objects are mind-independent, 
by asserting "There is therefore some other will or spirit that 
produces them." In this way, he builds up presuppositions
which make (3 ) look like a good reason for believing (4 ).
In terms of Berkeley’s own system, the assertion of the existence 
of a divine percipient is established by his argumentation. But 
this conclusion is not ’established’ according to ordinary criteria 
for judging that a proposition has been proved. It is not established 
with reference to the laws of logic or the occurrence of particular 
facts and events in the material world. We can only regard (l) and
(3) as reasons for believing (2) and (4 ) within the context of 
Berkeley’s system, by making certain interpretations and sharing 
certain presuppositions. It begins to look as if in order to agree
16. Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 53 (PRINCIPLES, para. 29)
Of. Luce, op. cit, p. 6 9: "Berkeley’s reticence about God is 
conscious art; he unfolds his theology gradually. You think 
he is building a house; you find he has built a church."
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that Berkeley’s proffered evidence evidence, it is not enough 
to read it; we have to read something into it.
It is at least evident that Berkeley’s reasons for believing 
his metaphysical statements would not, in the contexts of non- 
speculative philosophical thought, be considered good ones. For 
their connection with what they are said tè imply is very thin if 
we have in mind ordinary connections between reasons and conclusions - 
either logical orccontingent ones. It may then be suggested that 
this is simply because they are bad reasons. It is difficult to 
be convinced, however, that they are like ordinary bad reasons.
It would be a bad reason for believing that the train will be 
late to assert that it is July 27th, since experience reveals no 
correlation between this date and delayed trains# Berkeley’s cannot 
be this sort of bad reason; it is absurd, for example,to ask ourselves, 
’’Have I found that a physical object is more than a group of sense- 
data whenever I directly apprehend nothing but sense-data?": compare 
"Have I found that my train is late whenever it is July 27th?" If 
I can answer ’no’ truthfully to the second question, I detect a bad 
reason. But the first question does not even make sense, and I 
cannot einswer either ’yes’ or ’no’ comfortably. Suppose then that 
Berkeley’s reasoning is simply bad logic; then we should say that the 
tautology about direct perception does not entail the statement 
about the composition of material things. It does not entail it, 
within the context of ordinary speech. For within this context,
(if it is proper to say that we could place Berkeley’s reasoning in it 
at all), "Direct apprehension of sense-data is all I have when 
I directly perceive physical things,,but physical things are not 
collections of sense-data" is not an inconsistent statement, asy 
for example, "Visual sensations are all I have when I see colours, 
but I see colours without having visual sensations" is inconsistent.
But Berkeley makes an entailraent relation between the tautology 
and the statement - about the constitution of physical things, and makes 
the assertion of the one together with the denial of the other 
result in self-contradiction. If ’physical thing’ is to mean ’sensible
-72-
thing*, and ’perceive* is to mean ’sense’, we can substitute for 
the statement concerned: ’’% e n  I sense a sensible thing I sense 
nothing but a sensible thing, therefore a sensible thing is no more 
than a sensible thing’’. To deny the second statement of this 
combination, while affirming the first, would of course result in 
self-contradiction. Because the words ’physical object’ and ’perceive’ 
have been given certain meanings, it is self-contradictory to assert 
that when we perceive physical things we apprehend only sense-data, 
but that physical things are nevertheless more than sense-data, 
although this would not be self-contradictory if we had in mind 
the more usual meanings of the words, and not those Berkeley gives 
to them©
It is silly to say that Berkeley had bad reasons for his conclusions 
on the grounds that they are not couched in language which would make 
them good reasons outside the context of his system with its special 
set of definitions. For they are not meant to function anyvrhere but 
within his system. They are not bad reasons; they are metaphysical 
reasons. They function as evidence for certain conclusions if they 
are interpreted in a special way - e.g. if we interpret, in the 
example above, ’physical thing’ to mean ’sensible thing’ and ’perceive’ 
to mean ’directly apprehend’. If we do this, we are not guilty of 
linguistic abuse, only of using a linguistic device for a particular 
purpose, i.e. to establish a metaphysical conclusion within the context 
of a metaphysical system.
The necessary truth about direct perception which Berkeley regards 
as a reason for saying that physical things consist of percepts is, 
oddly enough, regarded by Locke as a reason for saying that they do not© 
This, I think, indicates further that we shall not understand the 
nature of metaphysical argumentation if we do not resist the temptation 
to cpmpare it with the argumentation of science or mathematics©
If two competent mathematicians drew an opposite conclusion about a 
property of a geometrical figure which they both claimed was entailed 
by its definition, one of them would most certainly have made a mistake. 
If two scientists drew conflicting conclusions from the same test
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results, they would assume that one had dra^ vn the right conclusions 
and not the other; the matter would be decided by further observation 
and analysis. But in the case of Locke and Berkeley, who draw 
conflicting conclusions from the same tautology about perception, 
it is impossible to give this sort of concrete meaning to the assertion 
that one must have made a mistake, or that one must have drawn 
’the wromg’ conclusion.
Just as Berkeley’s reasons function as such only if we follow 
his presuppositions, so Locke’s reasons require, if they are to be 
accepted at all, a certain way of looking at the necessary truth, 
i.e. a determination not to equate the meaning of ’physical thing’ 
with the meaning of ’sensible thing’.
I noted before that Locke and Berkeley both base their speculative 
conclusions on the nominalist presuppositions about our knowledge 
of the external world. They both assume that this knowledge consists 
basically of discrete sense-experiences. Locke, with his aim to plot 
the limits of knowledge, sees as an alternative to the egocentric 
predicament which the nominalist picture suggests the possibility 
that the external world exists beyond the scope of sense-knowledge.
The sharp distinction which results from his presuppositions between 
the experience of temporary, shifting, disordered sense-data and 
the externally ordered physical things cries out for explanation©
Common beliefs that images are different from veridical percepts, 
that we do not dream up the chairs and tables in the room as we 
dream up their images in our minds, that things have colours and shapes, 
appear to Locke to be ample evidence for believing that material 
reality is not identical with the uncommonsensical world of ’ideas’.
But the very same considerations seemed to Berkeley to be arguments
for the existence of a divine mind©
The Locke-Berkeley dispute seems to be a situation in which two
people with very different outlooks pay attention to the same set
of statements, facts, beliefs and assumptions about our experience 
of the world, yet place different interpretations upon them. We 
might say that there are no reasons for accepting either theory;
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yet each gives many pages of reasons. We might say they are not 
convincing reasons, but then it seems that they are not the sort 
of arguments which could be convincing in themselves, and in order 
to feel convinced it would be necessary to enter into the spirit 
of the appropriate context, and agree, for example, to redefine 
certain terms, or look at the material from which the views are 
built from a certain angle.
We cannot strictly say that the dispute is about physical things, 
and whether they are made of imperceptible substance or groups of 
ideas, for this suggests that some appeal to the characteristics 
of physical things is possible which would serve to refute one or 
both of the disputants. No such appeal could count, however, since 
the terms of reference make it logically impossible to experience 
anything whatever which would confirm or discredit either view. 
Similarly, the abstract ideas dispute is not strictly speaking about 
the function of general words; no fact about this function is denied 
by either side, and consequently no fact can be brought forward 
to contest either conclusion. The dispute is made to sound, at times, 
as if it were directly concerned with describing certain facts.
Yet in the end we find that both metaphysicians advance a priori 
conclusions which are out of reach of any facts.
It is possible that we shall explain the ^  priori conclusion 
and argument which in these views is constantly mixed with an appeal 
to fact, common belief, and plain sense, and also the irresolvability 
of the dispute, if we suggest that Locke and Berkeley interpret the 
material world, rather than describe it, in an attempt to say, not 
how it is describable, but how it ought to be described. I shall 
examine this suggestion in some more detail.
One puzzling feature of metaphysical style is exemplified in
Berkeley’s invitation to his readers to ’’try to separate in has own
17
thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived’’ , 
i.e. to conduct an introspective experiment, when all the while, by
17. Berkeley, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 43 (PRINCIPLES, para. 6)
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definition, he has made the success of the experiment logically
unattainable. For, as he says a little later, to imagine ot
to think of is, on his terms, to perceive, and:
"IVhen we do our utmost to conceive the existence of 
external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our 
own ideas." 18
Locke suggests at one point that substance is a commonsense hypothesis,
and that if we were to introspect we should find ourselves assuming
its existence.
"not imagining how these simple ideas eon subsist by 
thjDffiselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose ..." 19
However, should anyone deny that he himself makes this assumption,
that something underlies sensory qualities and that thing is substance,
Locke is ready to put the matter once and for all out of the reach
of matter-of-fact reports. He is ready to make statements in tones
of final authority:
"The particular bulk, figure, number and motion of the 
parts of snow or fire are really in them, - whether anyone's 
senses perceive them or no." 20
I believe that if the dispute is regarded as one about how
the material world ought to be described, as opposed to how it
normally is described, it is possible to begin to explain its mixed
logical style and its irresolvability. If we persist in malcing an
analogy between metaphysics and empirical enquiry, it is hard to
see why Locke and Berkeley attached an air of certain truth to their
conclusions, yet reached rival hypotheses from the same empirical
considerations. If, on the other hand, we draw an analogy between
metaphysics and mathematics, it is hard to see why they placed such
value on the appeal to matter of fact, ordinary belief, and
introspective evidence. But suppose that Locke and Berkeley were
urging us to see the world in a certain way, to accept a certain
interpretation of it, in terms of how they felt it ought to be described,
then it may be helpful to compare their dispute with this sort of case:
18. ibid., p. 50 (PRINCIPLES, para. lYT"
19. Locke, op. cit.,Vol. I, pp. 390 - 391 (Bk. II, Ch. 23) my italics
20. ibid.. p. 174 (Bk. II, Ch. 8) my italics
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Someone might say: "Life really is a dome of many-coloured glass 
which stains the v.rhite radiance of eternity", and someone else 
might retort: "I disagree entirely, it is a dome of many-coloured 
glass which reveals the white radiance of eternity". Both these 
people are using metaphor as a device to express what they feel 
life is really like. In this type of dispute, it is no good at 
all to be coramonsensical or matter-of-fact* If we interrupted the 
argument by saying: "It all depends what eternity is supposed to 
be", or "It depends whose life you are talking about", we should 
doubtless be considered cynical. Such disagreements are not about 
facts, or at least, if they are, their relation to facts is very 
indirect© They are primarily clashes of attitude© On this analogy, 
we would accept or reject a metaphysical view, have sympathy or 
antipathy towards it, but remain incapable of producing a conclusive 
confirmation or refutation of it© It may all be a matter of 
intellectual rapport, of certain attitudes or outlooks which are 
expressible in saying that the material world is really like this, 
or like that© In less professional moments, even professional 
philosophers have been heard to say "I like Locke", "I prefer 
Berkeley", etc., where clearly the men themselves are not refereed 
to, but their views, or the general impressions their views give©
Then the dispute between Locke and Berkeley may turn out to be 
a clash of attitude which expresses itself in a clash between two irrec­
oncilable persuasive pictures of the world, two conflicting feelings 
about how it ought to be described, or how it ought to be intellectually 
savoured. If so, clearly the a priori manner will give to the 
conclusions that air of finality to be expected of someone who 
has some emotional attitude at stake in his argumentation© On the 
other hand, the appeal to facts and common beliefs about the world 
and the empirical manner will help to create the impression that 
it is the material world which is really such-and-such.
I shall attempt to give my suggestions a firmer outline by 
inventing a non-philosophical dispute which would have the same 
structure as I believe what will turn out to be the skeleton of the
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Locke-Berkeley dispute.
Suppose a historian writes a paper attacking the writings of 
other historians who say that the Battle of Gettysburg is the one 
at which General Lee’s army was defeated by Union forces. Suppose 
this historian’s attack consists of saying that Lee’s army was not 
defeated at this battle, but only retreated to the Potomac River 
for a well-earned rest. "Retreated", he contends, does not mean the 
same as "defeated". An army is only defeated when there is no part 
of it left which is capable of retreating. 'Vhile you are in a position 
to retreat, you are not defeated. Therefore, he continues, the 
Confederate Army was never defeated.
This man’s fellow historians would undoubtedly feel that he had 
thrown no light on the history of the Anerican Civil War. They would 
accuse him of holding a purely personal opinion about the meaning of 
the word "defeated". Yet suppose, for the sake of argument, that this 
historian was quite earnest and serious. Suppose he was neither 
joking, nor playing a game to annoy his colleagues. Then, we should 
feel, he must surely have a reason for advocating a new sense ân this 
context for the word "defeated". He surely was not restricting the 
standard usage simply for the sake of doing so, like the man who 
called his stick a "s^ vord" simply because he was tired of calling it 
a "stick".
In all probability the historian would then turn out to be a 
member of an old Southern family, with an ancestor ’murdered’ by 
the Union forces, and a home background charged with the emptions and 
outlooks rampant in the Southern States during the nineteenth century.
It may then occur to his fellow historians that, far from being general#" 
prejudiced against the customary use of the word "defeated", he disliked 
its use in this particular context, since changing its use a little 
enabled him to interpret the same historical facts in a way more 
agreeable to his attitude. The point here is that this eccentric 
historian does not deny any of the facts or probabilities of the 
historical situation known as the Battle of Gettysburg. He simply 
interprets them differently, and gives them a new significance. He
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emphasises the retreat of the army, which is less upsetting to him 
than the more conventional emphasis which is placed upon its defeat.
The fact that he restricts the ordinary meaning of the word 'defeated* 
in order to do this is incidental, except so far as it shows that 
he has not discovered new facts, but achieves his effect by verbal 
manipulation. He wrote his paper because of his hesitation, no 
doubt due to a complicated set of sociological and psychological 
factors, to admit that the South lost battles, while he was not 
sufficiently mendacious to deny that at least they were put at a 
considerable disadvantage by Lincoln.
I think it is helpful to say that although "Lee's Army was not 
defeated at Gettysburg, it merely retreated" is a statement which 
cannot be refuted or confirmed by the historical facts alone, (none 
of which are denied), it is nevertheless a statement which has some 
relation to those facts. It is not nonsensical or a piece of pure 
faction. It is, in some sense, a statement about an actual army at 
an actual battle, and it asserts something about what happened without 
denying anything that really did happen. If we ask what the relation 
is that this statement has to the facts, the answer seems to be that it 
is one of reinterpretation in the service of a special attitude 
towards them. Our mythical historian is not giving a plain description 
of the facts, he is interpreting them in accordance with the way they 
strike his imagination, and with the part his prejudices or interests 
play.
We might now v/onder whether Berkeley's special meanings for 'idea* 
and 'perceive', the first narrower than contemporary philosophical 
usage, and the second wider than ordinary usage, are given for the 
same sort of reasons that the historian had for his altération of 
the applicability of 'defeated*. Berkeley, no more than the historian 
is changing the significance of terms purely for the sake of doing so. 
Berkeley, like the historian, seems to have a special attitude towards 
the subject-matter of the dispute, although it is a more complicated 
one. Berkeley has definite notions about how the material world ought 
to be described as the historian had about how the Battle of Gettysburg
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ought to be described. It may be that Berkeley too reinterprets 
the facts in a way which is expressive of an attitude or motive, 
or both, and in a way which places his reinterpretations beyond 
the possibility of being refuted by reference to the facts. For, 
as I have tried to show and will attempt to show further, Berkeley 
denies no facts.
It is perhaps unfashionable to take seriously the theological 
claims made by a metaphysician© Consequently some of Berkeley's 
more sophisticated modern admirers overlook the strong language 
he uses to express his religious sentiments. As I have mentioned, 
Berkeley's explicit motive is to prove that God is the direct cause 
of all sense-experience, or at least of all veridical sense-experience 
I have also said that his postulation of a divine percipient does
not appear to be simply a convenient way of taking account of certain
commonsense beliefs. If it were, his defence of commonsense would 
certainly create more problems than it solved. It seems more 
plausible that Berkeley deliberately led up to the need to account 
for commonsense faith, for example in the human-mind-independence 
of physical things, in order to 'prove the existence* of, or to 
provide a role in his scheme of things for, a divine percipient.
Berkeley makes it quite evident how desirable he felt it was
to establish the existence of a cognitive God© Passages to
exemplify his main motive can be collected almost at random from his
principal book:
"It seems to be a general practice of the unthinking herd 
that they cannot see God ... but alas we need only open 
our eyes to see the sovereign Lord of all things with a
more full and clear view than we do any of our fellow
creatures." 21
we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest 
tokens of the divinity." 22
".© I shall esteem them (my labours) altogether useless and 
ineffectual, if by what I have said I cannot inspire my 
readers with a pious sense of the presence of God." 23
21. Berkeley, op. cit., p. 108 (PRINCIPLES, para. 148)
22. ibid., p. Î09 HraiNCIPLES, para. 148)
23. ibid., p. 113 (PRINCIPLES, para. 15&)
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"And it is the searching after and endeavouring to 
understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature, 
that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher, 
and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal 
causes; which doctrine seems to have much estranged the 
minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and p. 
wise spirit, 'in whom we live, move, and have our being'".
In these passages, Berkeley uses the language of the zealot with
a mission, and not the plain descriptive terms of the scientist,
linguistic analyst, or logician. He speaks of inspiring his
readers, and of what ought to be the employment of natural scientists.
Before drawing some tentative conclusions about Berkeley's aims,
let us examine Locke's motives a little more fully. Locke, like
Berkeley, quite explicitly stated his aim:
"If, by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding,
I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to 
what things they are in any degree proportionate; and when 
they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the 
busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things 
exceeding it's comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost 
extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance 
of those things which, upon examination, axe found to be 
beyond the reach of our capacities." 25
This motive is fulfilled, for example, by his conclusion that we are:
"ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways 
of operation, whereby the effects which we daily see are 
produced." 26
Although Locke was influenced and excited by his scientist friends,
Boyle and Newton for example, and lived at a time when the mathematical
treatment of natural phenomena described in terms of universal laws
and denuded of particular sensory qualities seemed so promising,
his main philosophical interest was to advocate sceptical caution:
"But as to a perfect science of natural bodies, (not to 
mention spiritual beings), we are, I think, so far from 
being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost 
labour to seek after it." 27
His metaphysical message is unmistakably a plea for intellectual
humility, and for a belief that the material world is infested with
24. ibid., pp. 69 - 7 0 (PRINCIPLES, para. 66): Berkeley's favourite
biblical text is quoted again in Principles, para. 149
25. Locke, op. cit.. Vol. I, p© 28 (introduction)
26. ibid., Volo II, p© 215 (Bk. IV, Ch. 3 )
27. ibid., p© 223 (Bk. IV, 6h. 3 )
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mysteries into which we cannot, and should not therefore attempt,
to pry. There is also the hint that even supposing we were
capable of attaining knowledge about the ultimate constitution of
Matter, there would not be much value in it. The smith and the
jeweller know more about the nature of iron or diamonds than the
2 8philosopher - (more about their ’nominal essences’) , and these
complex ideas of things which we attain are sufficient for all
practical purposes. Even supposing philosophers, or scientists,
could detectssomething about the ’hidden* substances which Locke
calls real things, no useful purpose would be served. Locke is
anxious to persuade us not only how ignorant we must always be,
but also how we lose no practical gain by our ignorance. We should
’’sit down in a quiet ignorance’’ and rest content.
’’And if by the help of such microscopical eyes (if I may 
so call them) a man could penetrate further than ordinary 
into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies, 
he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such 
an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market 
and exchange. ’*
It is curious that Locke’s interest in Newtonian science should not 
have given him a more optimistic outlook on scientific endeavour.
His metaphysical impulse is to veil the world in permanent mystery. 
This impulse appears stronger than his scientific knowledge and 
interest,in shaping the metaphysical picture he presents. That 
picture reminds us less of the conception of a solid, impenetrable 
extended stuff of atomic structure, and more of Plato(s Allegory 
of the Cave© The impression Locke conveys is of the world of 
shadows, cast by things we can never observe, while we mistake those 
shadows for the things themselves©
Let us now reconsider the suggestion that the dispute between 
Locke and Berkeley is a clash of attitude and outlook. The picture 
of the world as a permanently drawn curtain hiding an unknown and 
impassive reality, which we imagine to be a reality rather like the
28. See ibid., Vol. I, p. 393 (Bk. II, Ch. 23)
29. ibid.. Vol. I, p. 403 (Bk. II, Ch. 23)
30. See The Republic of Plato, trans. Cornford, Oxford University
Press: 1946. • p. 222
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dead world of Newtonian mechanics, upset Berkeley. He did not
merely think it was false, he tried to establish that it was a
self-contradictory notion, and he did this, surely, because he
found it repulsive* Berkeley was aroused by the spirit rather
than by the letter of Locke’s text.
’’What treatment then do those philosophers deserve, v/ho 
v^puld deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all 
reality ? How should those principles be entertained, 
that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the 
creation a false imaginary glare ?’’ 31
’’Matter being once expelled out of Nature, drags with 
it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an 
incredible number of disputes and puzzling questions, 
which have been thorns in the sides of divines, as well 
as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for 
mankind; that if the arguments we have produced against 
it, are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they 
evidently seem) yet I am sure ill friends to knowledge, 
peace, and religion, have reason to wish they were.’’ 32
Berkeley frankly expresses his antipathy to Locke’s picture.
It is possible that all his interrpetations, redefinitions, and
the detailed arguments he produces to show that nothing can exist
unperceived in the material world, are more correctly regarded
as intellectualised byt direct expressions of an attitude than as
impartial criticisms of what he regarded as an incorrect description
of matters of fact. This would explain how, in the abstract ideas
dispute, he seems to ignore Locke’s definition of ’idea’, in terms
of which Locke’s view is not self-contradictory. The missionary ,
is not interested in trying to see the heathen’s point of view,
he is interested only in urging the truth of his oto point of view*
’’The truth of his own point of view’’ is a phrase which we cannot
take literally. The apparently a priori true conclusions which 
these metaphysicians reach - i.e. conclusions irrefutable by fact 
or logic - are, I have argued, acceptable as ’truths’ only if we 
are also prepared to accept certain presuppositions and redefinitions 
of the systems in which they occur. Certainly to their authors they
31. Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 211 (Second Dialogue Between 
Hylas and Pliilonous)
32. ibid., Vol. II, p. 82 (PRINCIPLES, para. 9 6)
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appeared unequivocally true. There is however a sense of ’true’, 
(although perhaps it is too vague to be recommended with any 
enthusiasm), which is equivalent to "appears to me to be so", where 
what appears to me to be so is the sort of thing which cannot be 
falsified on objective grounds. This sense of ’true’ is not 
applicable to conclusions which result from observations, investigation^ 
or calculations which all rational beings will accept on the 
grounds of those procedures and what they show. It is the sense 
perhaps which Coleridge may have had in mind when he exclaimed:
"The immense difference between being glad to find
Truth and to find Truth I "33
I am not yet sure, however, whether any useful purpose is served 
in the attempt to explain metaphysical dispute by saying that there 
is any sense in which it is strictly correct to call the views 
involved ’true’, although I do believe they are irrefutable©
I must say something now, although it will anticipate what- is 
to come, about the phrase I have used perhaps rather too glibly, 
"metaphysical picture". iVlany philosophers, in particular logical 
positivists, have declared that metaphysical views are meaningless.
It is easy to see the point of this kind of declaration. Bewildered 
by the complete absence of the feature of testability, and, on the 
analogy with science or history, searching for a method by which 
metaphysical views might once and for all be judged, or some 
objective criterion by which they might be measured for truth-value, 
it is natural that people conclude, when they cannot discover any 
such means of testing metaphysical statements, that they have no 
meaning. A statement which is neither true nor false suggests 
a statement which is bogus.
But I believe that if we think about metaphysical views less on 
the analogy with scientific hypotheses, ordinary descriptions of 
matter of fact, or mathematics, and more on an analogy with works 
of art or aesthetic criticism, it will become evident tÿat metaphysical 
systems, while not literally true or literally false, may neverthless
33© S.T. Coleridge, Anima Poetae, ed© E.H. Coleridge, Heinemann:l895.
p© 220
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be meaningful and in some manner l'effective*
This is the point I have in mind when I speak of Locke’s and 
Berkeley’s "metaphysical pictures", or "the impressions they 
convey", or "the attitudes they express". ’Picture’ is, of course, 
used metaphorically here. But if we ask what effects these views 
have upon us, I think they can be correctly described in terms of 
this sort of metaphor. It was the picture of a hidden and mysterious 
material reality which aroused Berkeley’s opposition, and produced 
his substitution of the picture of a spirit-activated, mind-dependent 
material reality, identical with the familiar world of sense- 
experience.
There is another point which is perhaps worth mentioning here, 
about ways in which the analogy with art seems appropriate. Metaphysical 
views, like paintings, can be sympathised with by people who have 
different motives for their sympathy. I shall try to show in 
Chapters Eight and Nine how, for example, Professors Ayer and Luce 
appreciate Berkeley’s metaphysics for entirely different reasons.
A plain description of matter of fact, or a scientific theory, do 
not produce this variety of imaginative response, among-people who 
share the same attitude of interest or sympathy towards them.
Consider, for example. Professor Luce’s complaint that a fellow 
admirer of Berkeley had not, in some lines of his poetry, recognised 
the true Berkeley, and how extraordinary it would be if there were 
a similar difference of option about the import of a scientific 
theory:
"The false Berkeley Yeats knew, as we all do, by hearsay; 
it is the Berkeley of legend and textbook tradition .. it 
is, in Yeats’ words, the
* God-appointed Berkeley that proved all things a dream 
That this pragmatical preposterous pig of a world.
Its farrow that so solid seem.
Must vanish on the instant if the mind but change its
theme’
The Berkeley of those lines if not the true Berkeley, not the 
Berkeley Yeats really loved; for the Berkeley ’that proved 
all things a dream’ filled no notebooks, published no
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philosophy, never existed in the flesh."
Luce’s conception of the 'true Berkeley’, who did not give the 
impression that ’all things are a dream’, is probably the result 
of the fact that he shares Berkeley’s religious motive, and takes 
more seriously than Yeats that aspect of Berkeley’s theory which 
suggests not that sense-experience is as personal as dream experience, 
but that it differs from it by being a direct revelation of the 
divine mind© It is possible to stress one aspect of a metaphysical 
picture without blatant misdescription of the theory. Just as it 
is possible, without misdescribing a paintj.%, to express appreciation 
for it in terms of one of its presentations, one figure or object 
in the portrayal, or one feature of its execution, which has a 
particular and personal appeal© On this hypothesis it does not 
follow that a person who agrees with at least one aspect of Berkeley’s 
metaphysics, e.g© Professor Ayer, is necessarily one who has entered 
wholeheartedly into the spirit of the system. Admittedly someone 
might prefer one view to another because of the kind of emphasis or 
interpretation he wishes to place on certain perceptual or linguistic 
facts or customs. But I believe wanting to emphasise or interpret 
fact or language is a sign that some attitude is being expressed.
Someone who wishes to emphasise how physical-object statements are 
verified, and prefers to take less notice of the belief that they 
assert something more them how they can be verified, may well consider 
that Berkeley at least talks less nonsense than Locke© But the fact 
that this person should want to emphasis^e how physical-object statement 
are verified, shows, I think, that he believes that physical-object 
statements ought to be analysed in one way rather than another.
The force of this ’ought’ appears to be personal preference, rather 
than a result of impartial consideration of the uses we ordinarily make 
of physical-object statements. In order to produce, or to sympathise 
with, to defend or to attack a metaphysics of the external world 
it may be that a certain mental bias, a bent for entering into the
34. Luce, op© cit., "preface", pp. viii - ix
-86-
spirit of pure speculation, is a necessary condition. Similarly, 
it is necessary to interpret events and character, and not merely 
to catalogue them, in order to produce or to appreciate a novel.
The analogy with works of art may turn out to be a way of exhibiting 
how the metaphysics of the external world differs from its physics.
The Locke-Berkeley dispute, perhaps, is like a dispute between 
rival story-tellers. The theory of substance iê like a very 
sophisticated and intellectual piece of fiction, which purports to 
be about the true nature of the world as Alice in Wonderland 
purports to be about the adventures of a living child. Locke’s 
story about Substance, however, cannot be refuted any more than 
Alice in Wonderland can be. Either it will appeal to us, or it 
will not©
Suppose the authors of Alice and Wonderland and Gulliver’s Travels 
were to have a disagreement about whether the first or the second 
story is the most convincing. Clearly by ’convincing’ they would 
not mean ’true’ in any literal sense of that word, since both books 
are fiction. They would mean something like ’convincing as fiction’, 
’good as satire’, or ’achieves what it sets out to do’. Each would 
undoubtedly proffer different criteria, according to his attitude 
to his work and to the point of writing fiction, for the application 
of these terms. Their dispute would be irresolvable because it would 
involve not a conflict of testable claims, but a conflict of outlook. 
Locke’s and Berkeley’s stories are of course in many respects very 
different from works of fiction, as I shall try to show. They are 
more serious, the result of more general, or more basic attitudes 
to a very different type of subject-matter. Nevertheless, when 
Locke commented that ’’every thing does not hit alike upon every 
man’s imagination’’, as quoted at the head of this Chapter, he 
suggested a clue to the riddle of the irresolvability of metaphysical 
dispute, which may be the same clue which explains disputes about 
the relative value of works of fiction©
Cnl- t en
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Only tentative feelers have been put forth in this chapter 
towards an explanation of the Locke-Berkeley dispute. It 
would be unwise to pursue the hints further before a study has 
been made of some other examples of metaphysical theorising about 
the nature ox the external world. The suggestions made here 
also depend on the assumption that the Locke-Berkeley dispute 
does not belong to philosophical history, but is still going 
on* This assumption, together with some of the others, will 
now be further examined by a consideration of more recent 
metaphysics.
CHAPTER FIVE
ALEXANDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE MATERIAL WORLD
in practice I am accustomed in 
thinking of Space and Time by themselves 
to keep constantly pictures of material 
things and events before my mind and then 
forget their richness of colours and smells 
and other qualities; and I recommend this 
practice to my readers," 1
Samuel Alexander, Space,Time and Deity, Macmillan: 1920. 
Vol. I, p© 39
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Samuel Alexander envisaged the metaphysical study of the nature
of the external world as a method of enquiry approximating to
the kind used in the sciences.
"Since, then, philosophy differs from the sciences nowise 
in its spirit but only in its boundaries, in dealing with 
certain comprehensive features of experience which lie 
outside the purview of the special sciences, its methods 
will be like theirs empirical." ^
He explicitly advocates the odd combination of a priori and empirical
style which was so apparent in the theories of Locke and Berkeley.
"Let the examination be an empirical examination of the 
world in its a priori features." 3
The "a priori features" are those pervasive characteristics of things
which "we experience" in addition to their non-pervasive empirical
qualities.
"The categorial is the pervasive, and the empirical is the 
variable or contingent". 4
The metaphysical cloth out of which Alexander believed the world 
was cut is Space-Time. It would be impractical here to enter into 
a discussion of the intricacies of Alexander’s views about Space-Time; 
the aim is simply to give a very brief account of that function 
he gave to Space-Time which impinges upon his description of the 
ultimate nature of physical things.
Space and Time are inseparable and continuous; we are told that
Space is full of Time and Time is full of Space, each forming a
perfect continuum.^ Space and Time are also infinite. Their continuity
and their infinity are said to be presented in our experience.
These characteristics are sunmied up in the following two statements:
"Space-Time does not exist but is itself the totality 
of all that exists. Existence belongs to that which occupies 
a space-time.’’ 7
2. ibid.. Volo I, p. 4
3. ibid., p. 30
4o ibid., po 343
5o ibid., po 65
60 ibid., po 40
7# ibid,, Po 338
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"Just as a roll of cloth is the stuff of which coats 
are made but is not itself a coat, so Space-Time is the 
stuff of which all things, whether as substances or under 
any other category, are made." 8
Space-Time, according to Alexander, is the all pervasive material
running through all existence.
Alexander’s main contention is that material things are not, in
any way whatever, mind-dependent. This, he believes, is shown by
experience itself. Echoing Berkeley’s phraseology while putting it
to opposite use, he says:
"the distinct existence of any object from my mind is 
attested by experience itself. This is a truth which a man 
need only open his eyes to see." 9
He goes on to add:
"In sensory experience compresence with the physical revelation 
of a physical thing is brought about through the direct 
operation of the thing upon the senses." 10
We become aware of a physical thing, says Alexander, as a synthesis
of its appearances to mind on different occasions. This sounds like
the Locke-Berkeley contention that we become aware of physical things
by noticing a certain pattern among our ’simple ideas of sensation’.
But Alexander emphasises that the pattern and the qualities exist
in the external objects in that very form in which we perceive them.
He stresses that the percipient in no way causes what he sees.
"The shilling in my pocket owes it to me that it is mine,
but not that it is a piece of silver." 11
8. ibid., p. 341
9. ibid., p. l6. Cp. Berkeley, op. cit.,Vol. II, p. 43 (PRINCIPLES,
para. 6): "Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind,
that a man need only open his eyes to see them."
While Berkeley promises us that looking will show that nothing 
can exist unperceived, Alexander promises that looking will show 
us that things exist independently of being perceived.
10. ibid., p. 25
11. ibid., p. 15
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A physical thing, on Alexander’s view, is a contour of space
which persists in time, and within which primary motions take
place which are correlated with the qualities of that thing.
For example, primary movements connected with yellow, and others
connected with hardness, exist within the contour of Space-Time which
is a piece of gold, grouped together according to the laws of
12construction of gold. Sir John Cutler’s silk stockings,
darned out of recognition, are nevertheless the ’same’ stockings 
since the configuration of movements within the space contour 
would still be preserved - they persist in time. ’’Organisation’’, 
Alexander exclaims in another connection, ’’is a great empirical fact’’© 
This might be called the motto for his picture of the external 
world.
A physical thing, besides being a union of movements in a 
contour of Space-Time, is also a union of qualities, with which 
those movements are correlated. The unity is in each case supplied 
by the portion of Space-Time ’’within which the qualities are 
disposed’’.
’’ Each quality inheres in the substance because it is 
included in the space which unifies the substance. Thus 
the proposition, this sugar is sweet, means that the 
universal sweet in an individualised shape, that is as 
a definite and particular motion, iê found within the 
volume of the sugar.’’ i4
’’The volume of the sugar’’ is the space-time which provides the unity
to the qualities which inhere in it; this seems to be what Alexander
means by saying that Space—Time is the universal stuff of which all
things are made.
The question which quickly arises in the mind of someone familiar 
with Locke’s doctrine is anticipated by Alexander himself:
12. ibid., p. 270
13. ibid., p. 237
14. ibid., pp. 274 -275
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"There is no pretence of any mysterious support of 
qualities ... The support of qualities is nothing more 
nor less than the space—time within whose spatial contour 
they are united, they themselves being parts of the space, 
whose contour their configuration defines." 15
Tills sounds as if Alexander wished to say that qualities are
identical with spaces, rather than, as commonsense would suggest,
In spaces. We spealc of things occupying ppaces; Alexander
suggests that they are spaces.
In the second volume of his book, Alexander introduces a somewhat 
startling analogy. It is drawn between the relation of mind to 
body and that of Time to Space, and also the relation of flatter to 
its qualities. Mind and body, says Alexander, are not two distinct 
processes, but one. Consciousness, (i.e. mentality) and its underlyiig 
neural bases (i.e. physiological processes) form a totality which 
is the mind. The mind is not distinguishable from its neural 
processes. Analogously, Time and Space are not two distinct things, 
but one indissoluble thing. Tliere is no Time without Space and no 
Space without Time. The intended parallel seems to be that there 
is no Mind without Body and no Body without Mind. This strange 
pronouncement may stem from the ^fact* that time is always the time 
of something somewhere, and space is always at a time. Pursuing 
the analogy, Alexander comments that Time is the mind of Space, and 
explains:
"I mean that in the matrix of all Existence, Space-Time, 
there is an element Time which performs the same function 
in respect of the other element Space as mind performs in 
respect of its bodily equivalent." l6
This ext^remely puzzling analOgJ^yis fortunately of no immediate
concern here. But it does lead to comments about Matter. Alexander
seems to hold that the element of body in a physical thing is the
complex of motions which underlie its sensory qualities, and that
the sensory qualities themselves are comparable to the *mental element.
15. ibid., p. 276
16. ibid., Vol. II, p. 44
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"Matter, like Space-Time, contains an element of body 
and an element correspondent to mind which is its 
materiality, whatever that may be.." 17
"Accordingly for me the sensible charactèrrof what we 
apprehend in the object, that is of the sensum, stands 
to the movements in a thing, that is to the primary 
determinations which underly it, in the relation of 
consciousness to its underlying vital process. The 
secondary quality is the mind or soul of its corresponding 
vibration o± whatever the primary movement may be." l8
At this point in the exposition it might prove salutary to 
return to ground level, and examine some of Alexander’s detailed 
argument for his conclusions about the nature, for example, of 
an apple, a mountain, or a tree.
lYhen I sense a sensum, e.g. the green of a leaf, Alexander
holds that the relation of my mind to that sensum is like the
relation of a table to the floor on which it stands, a causal
19
realtion between two distinct things. Just as it is impossible
for an external object to affect a mind without evoking a conscious
act in it, so it is impossible for a conscious act to come into
being without appropriate stimulation from an object in the external
w o r l d . " T o  know anything is to be along with it in Space-Time".
To be conscious, one must be conscious of something. I cannot
see an orange unless there is an oraage there for me to see.
V/hat I see is the orange, not merediy the sense-datum, or the patch
of colour which is all I apprehend in vision. This is because in
the course of experience the various appearances of the orange
are synthesised; but the synthesis is not of my making, it exists
independently of experience in the union of qualities in Space-Time.
It is an external substantial coherence which ray mind recognises
22and does not arrange or invent. Physical things, Alexander
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and not the fact that they exist.
"So far as they are there, and in the form in which 
they are there, they are there whether they are 
contemplated by a mind or not." 23
Physical things would exist with the very sensory qualities
which they now have even in the absence of any mind.^^
For when Alexander speaks of the independence from minds
of physical objects, he does not exclude their secondary qualities.
"Our plain experience is that we do not see colours in pt- 
our eyes, but only with our eyes and ^  the rose or apple."
The rose is, in itself, pink. It is always pink, even in the dark*
In the dark, however, it is pink in rather a different way from that
in which it is pink in the light. Alexander has a somewhat
bizarre theory that in the dark the rose’s pinkness is a potential
pink rather than an actual sensory quality.
"When not active as a sensum or a sense-datum, the sensible 
quality slips into a disposition which is on the primary 
level." 26
"The primary level" is the level of movements within ^he contour 
of Space-Time with which sensible qualities are said to be 
correlated.
Alexander insists that all sensa or sense-data exist in 
physical space and not in the mind; externally and independently, 
not privately for the viewer. The appearance of the bent stick 
in water is as real, and as much part of the external world, as 
the straight appearance of the stick out of water. An image of 
the stick is as real and as much part of the external world as 
the stick itself. The huge appearance of the tower seen from 
close by it is as much of a real appearance as the tiny circular 
appearance seen at a distance. The mind, Alexander suggests, is 
a kind of mirror; it sometimes distorts, but in so far as it 
apprehends physical things or sense—data it never creates or 
invents.
23o ibid., p. 95
24. ibid.,p. 106
25. ibid., p. 140
26. ibid., po 60
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Illusion is explained by mental selection» The bent appearance
of the stick in water is produced by the relation of the stick to
the water, and the mind happens to select that aspect of the
external relationship which, as we say, fâakes the stick look bent.
"In itself the illusory appearance is as much object 
as the real appearance". 27
Similarly, an image of a golden mountain, Alexander insists, is
real in the sense that it is based on reality:
".. however unreal it may be, all the materials are in 
the non-mental world out of which it is built, or, to 
put the matter otherwise, reality provides the basis of 
the imaginary object ... There may be no golden mountain 
in reality but at least there are mountains and gold." 28
The question of perspectives, the fact that the appearances
of a thing vary with the position and condition of the percipient,
led Berkeley and many others to find fault with the notion that
a thing possesses its qualities, and to assert that a thing is
a series of sense-experiences. Alexander sees the matter in a
different light. He holds that all perspectives, the round and
the elliptical shape of the penny, are synthesised in the real externd
object, the "piece of real or geometrical space".
"The real thing is not ’the class of perspectives’ in the 
language of Mr. Russell, but it is that from which its 
perspectives are selected by the finite observer according 
to his position." 9^
In a statement which sums up his opposition to Russell’s view, 
Alexander says:
".. the synthesis characteristic of the thing is in no 
sense the work of the mind but discovered by it.." 30
There are two very different aspects of Alexander’s metaphysics 
of the external world. There is the exotic aspect, illustrated 
by metaphysical paradoxes, by statements claiming that Time is the 
Mind of Space and Matter contains an element corresponding to &!ind 
although physical things could exist in the absence of Mind,
21. ibid., p. 60
28. ibid., P* 85
29. ibid., P* 196
30. ibid., p. 184
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There is also a defence of commonsense beliefs or language, 
illustrated by his attack on egocentric interpretations of the 
external world; "Our plain experience is that we do not see 
colours in our eyes, but only with our eyes.." His exotic views 
intermingle with his defence of commonsense. They depend upon each 
other for the total effect which his system produces.
I shall attempt to sum up some of the main points which Alexander 
makes about the nature of physical things, and then consider them 
more thoroughly. The following points are representative of his 
metaphysics of the external world:
(1) The fabric, stuff, or substance of the external world 
is Space-Time
(2 ) Hence physical things are portions of Space-Time, in which 
their qualities are unified at a primary level
(3 ) Their sensory qualities are correlated with movements 
in the portions of Space-Time with which they are identical
(4 ) The relation of the sensory quality to the primary movement 
with which it is correlated can be compared to the relation between 
a mind and a body with which it is correlated. (Since Alexander 
believes that mind and body are inseparable, one process, it seems 
as if he also believes that sensory quality and primary movement 
are inspparable, one process rather than two things).
(5 ) Appearances of a physical thing - i.e. qualities which we 
sense - exist in the pattern which we experience quite independently 
of our experience, i.e. in Space-Time.
(6) Hence perceiving a physical thing is a situation in which 
a percipient is affected by an external independent body. The 
fact that he perceives the thing in no way determines its nature 
or existence.
(7 ) The existence of a physical thing is a necessary condition 
for the existence of a mind, but not vice versa# Alexander holds 
an evolutionary theory that minds evolve from things, which is 
not easy to reconcile with his other view that sensory qualities 
of things are like the minds of bodies. He may mean that mind
is a later stage of evolution than primary Space-Time, although
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both mind and matter are "made of" Space-Time,
Bearing in mind that Alexander stated that his metaphysics 
"differs from the sciences nowise in its spirit but only in its 
boundaries", the question arises whether his hypothesis so far 
as it relates to the nature of physical things is verifiable, 
with reference to the items of experience and commonsense which 
he cites as supporting evidence, or in any other way.
Alexander, like Locke, was interested in the activities and
results of natural science. He comments, for example, that
scientific results make it "not very far fetched to suggest" that
11the electron may itself be "a complex of motion",*' which discovery
would lend support, he feels, to his view that sensory qualities
are primarily movements in a contour of Space-Time. He also cites
psychological theory in discussing the psycho-physical relation.
He feels sure that the successful metaphysician will be one who is
familiar at first hand with some of the results of physics and 
32
mathematics.
The bow to science which Alexander often makes may seem to 
give a certain plausibility to his view that the sensory qualities
of a thing are correlated with primary movements in a contour of
Space-Time. Another kind of plausibility seems to be given to his 
view by the appeal to commonsense. The plain answer to the idealist 
philosopher is that things like oranges, and theit various tastes 
and smells etc., are there to be discovered by us, and in no way 
what they are because of us.
Yet Alexander by no means permits his ans^ yers to be either plain 
or scientific. He draws conclusions which are bizarre. The plain 
man thinks the colour is ’on* the orange; science decààres 
that colour depends for its existence on light. Alexander seems
31. ibid., p. 54
32. ibid., p. 53
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to make the most of both worlds, and offers the strange view 
that the yellow is on the lemon, as commonsense supposes, even 
in the dark, but, as science knows, in the dark it does not 
appear yellow,as yellow depends on light for its existence; 
so in the dark the yellow of the lemon is potential, it has 
'slipped* into a dispositional role. For all that, it is still 
really yellow, since yellow is, at the primary level, a complex 
of motions in Space—Time, and these persist through the darkness 
of the night.
This is a theory we cannot test. We cannot devise a way of 
finding out whether or not a lemon in the dark is potentially 
yellow. We cannot experience the movements in the contour of 
Space-Time which we are told are the colour of the lemon.
Suppose a scientist could. It would still be impossible to tell 
whether these movements or vibrations are the sensory quality 
yellow at its primary level. For in one very obvious sense, 
ofÜn reiterated by Berkeley, the colour yellow - the sensory 
quality - is n£t a movement, nor anything like a movement. To 
say that when it is not a perceptible quality - e.g. in the dark - 
it is still the perceptible colour yellow, but at a primary level, 
is to say something which cannot be decided by observation or 
experiment. There are no facts to which we can turn, and there 
are none for which we can seek, since it is logically impossible 
to devise a test or have an experience which will show that a 
colour is really a series of motions. We might very easily 
discover that it is caused by motions, but this is a very different 
matter from discovering that it is identical, at least in certain 
situations, with movements.
Consmder too the view that physical things are made of Space-
33Time. This we are said to be able to 'intuit*. It is here 
admitted that we cannot test the claim by appealing to facts alone.
33o see ibid., p. 147
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Yet we need only open our eyes, thinks Alexander, to understand 
that what we see in no way depends upon our seeing it.^^ This 
suggests that we can refute Berkeley simply by opening our eyes.
There is a very vague sense in which visual experience suggests 
that there is an external world which is in no way dependent for its 
existence or character upon my seeing it. But it does no more than 
suggest this, it cannot provide evidence for the metaphysical contention 
that the external world exists independently of anyone’s experience, 
in the way in which calculating machines provide evidence for the 
contention that physical things can do sums without anyone’s direct 
help. The reason why sense-experience cannot provide evidence is that 
statements like ’’The external world exists independently of anyone’s 
experience’’, "The external world is really a network of experiences", 
are so comprehensive that there is no possibility of a refuting instance. 
The statements refer to everything material, and consequently there is 
no material thing which c^ould be pointed out as an exception. Since 
there is no possibility of finding a exception to the generalizations, 
it would seem highly inappropriate to seek confirmation of them 
by studying our experience of the external world.
It is then most probable that Alexander cannot be refuted by a 
study of lemons and other physical things, and that such observations 
will not serve to confirm what he tells us. Evidence from observation 
is ruled out of the metaphysical court by the policy of making the 
contention cover all possible experience whatever.
Let us take another point in Alexander’s account and ask whether 
his "hypothesis" allows the possibility of refutation by fact. All 
the veridical appearances of a thing, he holds, are correlated in the 
geometrical contour of Space-Time which defines the thing. At first 
sight Alexander seems to be talking commonsense, although it is couched 
in uncommon phraseology. It is the sort of commonsense we feel inclined 
to cite against Berkeley’s or Russell’s view. We are naturally inclined 
to believe that whether anyone sees it or not a lemon is sour, shiny, 
and yellow. But in a way Russell was quite right when he said this 
belief was u n w a r r a n t a b l e o u r  experience cannot provide a warrant
34. See ibid., Vol. I, p. l6
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to justify it in tne way in which, for example, it can provide one 
to justify the assertion "This lemon is sour" made while eating 
a lemon. Tlie best ’evidence* which Alexander could produce would 
be the faith of many people in the external nature of things and their 
qualities, suggested by common speech, ( "Was Macbeth’s dagger really 
there?" - "there" suggests that genuine things exist in space in a 
sense in which illusory things do not), and assumed in behaviour.
But these matters are as much, or as little, ’evidence’ for metaphysical 
conclusions quite different from Alexander’s, and cannot be said to 
show ’the truth’ of his view.
Although the concept of Space-Time in relativity physics is very 
far from being an ’intuition’, in Alexander’s metaphysics it becomes 
one, since he describes it as an a priori ultimate which makes the 
world what it is. To say that we ’intuit’ Space-Time is to admit, 
it seems, that we do not experience it. It is indeed a well-known 
argument that we do not experience Space or Time, only spatial and 
temporal relations, only spaces and times. One of the earliest feats 
of the human intellect was to abstract from experience of times and 
places a conception of absolute Time and Space, of infinite and 
continuous Time and Space. Nevertheless, the statement "Space-Time 
is the matrix of all existence", as Alexander intends it to be taken, 
is such that the study of calendars or distances, of any experience 
of times or places, cannot serve to verify. In physics the concept 
of Space-Time does not serve as an a priori ultimate as it does in 
Alexander’s metaphysics.
When Alexander spid that Space-Time is the a priori feature of 
all that exists, I believe he was extending the significance of certain 
ordinary necessary truths. It is necessarily true that if X is a 
physical thing, it must exist in some place at some time. "X is a 
physical thing which is nowhere" and "X is a physical thing at no 
time" are either self-contradictions, or amount to saying in a 
roundabout way that X does not exist. Alexander’s claim, however, is 
not merely the obvious affirmation that these necessarily true 
propositions - "If X is a physical thing, it is somewhere" etc. - are
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necessarily true* If we suppose so, there is no explanation for 
his belief that physical things are made of Space-Time. He 
certainly intended to convey something more impressive than the 
truism that things are spatially and temporally located. His 
emphasis on Space—Time as stuff, like the roll of cloth from which 
a suit is cut, alone suggests that when he asserted it was the 
basic reality of the world he meant to do more than point to the 
linguistic fact that "a physical thing exists" means that it exists 
somewhere for some period.
Alexander’s view, which in spite of his appeals to scientific 
method seems itself unbeatable, is not a meaningless view spun out 
of the air, or a mere string of fanciful statements about mythological 
entities. A detailed and definite, if paradoxical, intellectual 
picture is presented of the external world, although it is not 
anything like a photograph. It seems to be of the external world 
because it assimilates some commonsense and scientific beliefs 
about it, and its subject-matter is things and their qualities.
Yet it is a picture, rather than a photograph, because the assimilation 
of the data results in some bizarre metaphysical transformations 
of the commonsense and scientific notions involved. Space-Time is 
said to be the ultimate reality which explains the material world, 
its order and its features. By this statement Alexander seeks partly 
to account for the commonsense faith in the complete independence 
of the external world from the activities of percipients. Yet by 
underlining the commonsense point he gives it a strange new garb which t 
the plain man would not recognise. For example, the ordinary belief 
is made to imply that the image which I conjure up of the Albert 
j^ e^morial is as real as the solid structure in Kensington. This 
result, which seems to "offend ordinary thinking, is achieved by an 
argument from common experience, for example the argument that when 
I feel and smell an orange in the dark I can imagine its colour. 
Alexander interprets this as a sign that sensa and images can be 
substituted for each other, and consequently must on all occasions
be equally real,
35, Alexander, op. cit.. Vol. II, P«
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Alexander’s main complaint against idealist metaphysicians
was that they construe the world in the likeness of mental images.
It is this imaginative construction which he specifically wishes
to replace. But as a result, his opponents might well say that he
has achieved an opposite extreme, and constructed the world out
of most unrealistic terms - limitless space and endless time,
imperceptible events and vast abstraction. It seems that whether
or not we have sympathy for Alexander’s design will partly depend
upon whether we wish to emphasise external material things rather
than our sense-experience, or to rate the objects of perception
above the activity of perceiving itself in the scale of metaphysical
values. This may be a question of our imaginative response or
general outlook, of a personal preference, for example, for thinking
of the world as a unity rather than as a plurality of sense-data.
Itiis interesting to find that Alexander himself explicitly appeals
37to the imagination as well as to the reason of his reader.
Alexander’s view about the nature of the external world is in 
many ways similar to Locke’s, in spite of his own denial of what 
he would regard as this ’’accusation’’. This I shall attempt to show 
in Chapter Eight. If Alexander has affinities with Locke, it is 
Russell who comes quickly to mind as a twentieth century philosopher 
whose intellectual affinities are with Berkeley. Consequently in 
an attempt to trace the pattern of theories about the nature of the 
external world, the next Chapter will be concerned with a brief
study of a view which was at least once held by Russell, and which 
conflicts sharply with Alexander’s metaphysics. I shall then go 
on to enquire whether we can take at its face value the claim which 
both Alexander and Russell make, with totally different results,
i.eo,that they employ scientific method in order to produce correct 
results from their philosophical enquiries.
36. ibid.. Vol. I, po 24
37. See ibid., Vol. II, p. 6O: Alexander here appeals ’’without scruple" 
to Meredith’s Hymn to Colour as support for his view that a colour 
is the ’mind’ of its primary movements in Space-Time.
CHAPTER SIX
AN ACCOUNT BF THE MATERIAL WORLD 
GIVEN BY BERTRAND RUSSELL
"Regarded merely as hypotheses and as 
aids to imagination, the great systems 
of the past serve a very useful purpose, 
and are abundantly worthy of study. But 
something different is required if 
philosophy is to become a science, and 
to aim at results independent of the 
tastes and temperament of the philosopher 
who advocates them." 1
Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World 
Allen & Unwin: 194% p. 7 (Preface)
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For the purposes of this discussion it is necessary to select 
from the complexity of Lord Russell’s views concerning the nature 
of the external world one of his theories. I shall concentrate 
on the early view he puts forward in Our Knowledge of the External 
World, namely that physical things are logical constructions out 
of their sensory aspects. This view is given background elaboration 
in his article "Logical Atomism", toned do^ vn in The Analysis of 
Matter, and partly rejected in his "Reply to Criticisms" which 
appears in the Library of Living Philosophers Volume devoted to his 
works. Although a fair exposition of Russell’s thought about the 
external world could not be given solely in terms of his early work, 
my concern is limited to giving one of a view he once held, which 
is self-contained, lucid, and typical. This theory provides an 
example of a twentieth century interpretation of the nature of 
material objects which seems a direct descendant of a classical 
metaphysics, and it has a more appropriate place in this thesis than 
a historical account of the development of Russell’s thought; although, 
of course, that development will not be completely ignored.
Russell gave the lectures printed in Our Knowledge of the External 
World following his success in applying a new method of analysis 
in the fields of mathematics and formal logic, after the publication 
of the Principles of Mathematics and Principia Mathematica. This no 
doubt partly explains the optimism and confidence which pervades 
his early attempt to apply similar methods of analysis to the 
traditional questions about the nature of external objects. The 
Theory of Descriptions, which had been successfully used to clarify 
problems in the foundations of mathematics, and also seemed to solve 
the philosophical problem of the logical status of non-existent 
entities, was at that time one of the most exciting new^  principles 
in philosophy. It operated by the mathematical method of reducing 
the complex and less basic to the simple and basic, on the maxim:
"Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known
entities for inferences to unknovm entities." 2
2. Russell, "Logical Atomism", Contemporary British Philosojj^, 
Allen & Unwin: 1924* P* 3^3
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The success of this method in formal logic inspired Russell to declare 
that the new "logical atomism" - "the substitution of piecemeal, 
detailed and verifiable results for the large untested generalities 
recommended only by a certain appeal to the imagination" represented 
in philosophy the same kind of advance as Galileo introduced into 
physics.^
In this spirit Russell first considered the traditional metaphysicà
question, what is the ultimate nature of the material world ? He
assures us that his answer , unlike those given in the past, will be
"scientific" rather than "^mystical", will be free from the taint of
subjectivity, unlike those traditional answers which he believes to
be no more than "pleasing d r e a m s " . H e  says:
".. the new logic provides a method which enables us to 
obtain results that do not merely embody personal idiosyncrasies, 
but must command the assent of all who are competent to form 
an opinion." 5
The method for obtaining the new answer about the nature of
material bodies will be logical substitution, applied to the facts
of experience, and the invention of hypotheses "which only logic
would have suggested".^ These will serve as guides to the formation
of correct and precise descriptions of the facts of the external
world. Russell’s approach sounds scientific - proceeding by hypothesis
and verification. Yet it is notable that the kind of hypothesis
he envisages is a kind which only the new logic would have suggested:
"The old logic put thought in fetters, while the new 
logic gives it wings." 7
This new method of analysis enabled him to define number, but it is
not the sort we should normally expect to be used to attain description
of the material world. His hypothesis, it seems, will not be one
suggested by the facts. From the start Russell makes it clear that he
3. Russell, op. cit., p# 14
4. ibid., p. 39
5. ibid., p. 69
6. ibid.,p* 68 
7o ibid., p. 68
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intends to treat the concept of a physical thing in the same way 
as he successfully treated the concepts of number and class.
The facts which his hypothesis will be designed to order are 
those which most impress Russell concerning our knowledge of the 
external world. He describes some of this knowledge as psychologically 
primitive, and some as logically primitive. My immediate sensory 
knowledge of red patches, screams, cold, etc., is psychologically 
primitive, (knowledge by acquaintance), since it is believed "without
g
the support of any outside evidence". My knowledge that trees
and tables exist when I turn my back on them is logically primitive,
"in all men except a few philosophers", but it is psychologically 
derivative, since I only believe it "through having seen" those trees 
and tables - but of course not while my back is turned on them.
"There is accordingly more need of justifying our psychologically 
derivative beliefs than of justifying those which are 
primitive." 9
The distinction between psychologically primitive and derivative 
beliefs, (between knowledge by acquaintance and by description), 
leads Russell to classify data into those which are "hard" and 
those which are "soft". It is absurd to have doubts about the 
existence of a hard datura directly presented to me, it is "luminously 
certain"; e.g. it is absurd when I have a headache to wonder if 
I have a headache. Yet it is not absurd to have doubts about the 
existence of soft data, those not directly presented in my experience; 
e.g. it is not absurd to doubt whether I see a tree when I see a 
tree-like form, since I may be having a hallucination, optical 
illusion, etc. Russell favours the hard data. They are awarded 
the basic function in his hypothesis about the nature of physical 
things. Tliey have an aura of indisputability and are made the 
ultimates, the bricks from which all other knowledge of the world 
is constructed. %at Russell qyite explicitly sets out to do, when
8^. ibid., p® 75 & seq.
9. ibid., p. 77
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he attends to the traditional question about the nature of the 
material world, is to see what sort of world can be constructed 
solely out of the hard data of sense and of logic# The general laws 
of logic seem to him to have the same epistemological status — i.e. 
certainty — as the immediate data of sense.
Russell’s method appears Cartesian; he builds a theory out of 
only those terms which appear to permit no doubt. He fiees the 
contents of his description of the external world and then works 
out T.hat that description will be. The traditional question, which 
was at the centre of the Locke-Berkeley dispute, is then asked in 
this form:
"Can the existence of anything other than our own hard data 
be inferred from the existence of those data?" 10
It looked as if Russell would describe our knowledge of the external
world and produce pure epistemology; but the form of this question,
and the answer at which he arrives, suggest that he is to give a
metaphysical description, via a description of our knowledge, of the
ultimate nature of the world.
An example of a hard datum is "just that patch of colour which
11is momentarily seen v/hen we look at a table". The commonsense
assumption that when we walk round a table we are walking round a 
single thing which has different aspects is a very soft datum, and 
has to be eliminated, from Russell’s hypothesis which will admit only 
hard data as its terms. Thus walking-round-a-table becomes:
. "a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations 
with changes in visual sensations". 12
Such an analysis suggests to Russell a "model hypothesis" which he
discusses as if it were a possible explanation of the facts.
This hypothesis suggests a description which Russell himself 
likens to Leibnitz’s Monadology.
10. ibid., p. 80
11. ibid., p. 83
12. ibid., p® 85
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"Each mind sees at each moment an immensely complex three- 
dimensional world; but there is absolutely nothing which 
is seen by two minds simultaneously." 13
The world is a system of perspectives, both perceived perspectives
which are the points of view of individual minds, and unperceived
perspectives which are not, at the moment, the points of view of
any mind. The hypothesis that the material world is a system of
perspectives leads to the definition of a material thing as a system
of aspects.
A material thing, on Russell’s view, is a correlation of hard 
sense-data which occur in a number of perspectives, i.e. in all the 
perspectives of those people who, we say, are "perceiving it". Russell 
then states:
"All the aspects of a thing are real, whereas the thing is 
a merely logical construction." 14 
It is interesting to notice at this stage another remark which he
makes, which suggests that he has in mind a Heraclitean picture of
the world:
"In the yorld of immediate data nothing is permanent; 
even the things that we regard as fairly permanent, such
as mountains, only become data when we see them, and are
not immediately given as existing at other moments." 15
Mr. Chisholm wondered why it was that Russell believed percepts,
e.g. a sense-datum of a brom shape, are epistemologically prior to
things, e.g. tables. In his reply, Russell gave as a reason for 
choosing percepts rather than things as ultimates the fact that it is 
both logically and physically possible to have an experience which we 
would call "seeing the sun" when this experience does not have "the 
usual connection" with the sun. I cannot be mistaken about what
I see, but I can be mistaken about how I interpret what I see. I cannot 
be mistaken that I see something which looks like the sun, but I can 
be mistaken in thinlcing that it is the' sun. Such facts seemed to Russel
13. ibid., p. 94
14. ibid., p. 96
15. ibid., [p. 109
16. Russell, "Reply to Criticisms", Library of Living Philosophers 
Volume 5, Northwestern University: 1944. p. 713
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to suggest, in his early work, that physical things, about which
I can make mistakes, are unreal* Even in his later modified version
of the theory, he still stresses the importance of shifting sense—
impressions at the expense of "fairly permanent" physical things.
He describes a material object as "a group of events arranged about 
17
a centre". Calling percepts ’events’ further emphasises their
impermanence. Russell continues:
"There may be a substance in the centre, but there can be no 
reason to think so, since the group of events will produce 
exactly the same percepts; therefore the substance at the 
centre, if there is one, is irrelevant to science, and belongs 
to the realm of mere abstract possibility." 18
But this admission, that there may be a substance at the centre of
a group of events which constitute a physical thing, is not taken
very seriously by Russell, even in this later work. He still urges
that:
"percepts are always events, and common sense is rash when 
it refers to them as things with changing states". 19
In his early theory Russell attacks commonsense suppositions about
material bodies with determination and vigour. To suppose that the
wallpaper which fades through the years is a thing with different
appearances at different times is "a piece of gratuitous metaphysics".^
To suppose that when ice melts the water which replaces it is the
same thing in a different form is simply a method for stating the
21
phenomena "in a way which is consonant with our prejudices".
The common belief that mountains and the moon are fairly permanent
22
bodies is " a piece of audacious metaphysical theorising." Russell 
emulates scientific method by making liberal use of Occam’s Razor.
It is astonishing that the Razor should be employed to remove a 
fundamental belief of ordinary thinking which is reflected in ordinary 
speech - the belief that there are things which have qualities.
17. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, Kegan Paul: 1927. p. 224
18% ibid., p. 224
19. ibid., p. " 247
20. Russell, bur Knowledge of the External World , p. 112
21. ibid., p. 110
22. ibid., p. 107
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Russell, Like Berkeley, finds no difficulty in proposing to think 
with the learned and speak with the vulgar;
’We find it easier to imagine a wall-paper with changing 
colours than to think merely of the series of colours; 
but it is a mistake to suppose that what is easy and 
natural in thought is what is most free from unwarrantable p. 
assumptions, as the case of ’things’ very aptly illustrates.’’
Russell claims to clear up an old philosophical question by
S' new logico—scientific method. Let us consider some of 
the steps which he takes to arrive at his conclusion ^hat physical 
things are no more than logical constructions from sense-data, 
from the bits and pieces which are said to be immediately given in 
sense-experience, about which it is pathological to have doubts.
He tells us first that he has a new method, which will produce a 
theory free from personal idiosyncrasy, which will command the 
assent of anyone who is capable of forming an opinion. This method 
will be to obtain a hypothesis from logic, which will accurately 
explain the relevant facts. But what are the relevant facts, and 
what is there about them that needs explanation, and what sort of 
explanation ?
The relevant facts here seem to be facts about how we come to 
know that propositions about material things are true. For example, 
it is a fact that I know ’’I am cold’’ is true without the support 
of outside evidence, of any evidence but my feeling of cold. It 
is also a fact that I cannot in the same sense know that the thing
I see across the road is a pillar box, since I may be seeing something
which looks like one but in fact is not one.
These points, however, seem to me to be interpretations of fact 
rather than descriptions of it. Sense-data statements may not be 
as basic as Russell supposed. For example, it is open for someone 
to claim that I cannot know the truth of ’’I am cold", on all 
occasions, without appeal to outside evidence. In paralysis the
feeling of cold would not be present, and the truth of "I am cold"
23. ibid., p. 112
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would have to be inferred from ’putside evidence'. It might also 
be argued that I can feel cold when in fact I am hot - e.g. in 
fevers. We might disagree with this type of argument, but there 
appears to be no misreporting of facts if a person wishes to say 
that inference is involved even in knowing the truth of sense-data 
statements, although, of course, it will be a different kind of 
inference from that said to be involved in knowing the truth of 
physical-object statements. The point is that Russell's 'facts' 
about sense-experience are beliefs about how we know red patches 
on the one hand and tables on the other; but the beliefs are 
disputable.
However, Russell assumes with complete confidence and long 
philosophical tradition on his éide that in certain cases, e.g. 
when I see a red patch, I am directly acquainted with a hard datum, 
and I can know immediately that the relavant proposition about it 
is true without making any appeal to any other data. Refusing to 
take account of any but these items of immediate sensory knowledge, 
and inspired by logic, Russell states a hypothesis to describe the 
material world in terms only of these hard data. Since the facts 
to be described are these hard data, it is natural enough that the 
hypothesis 'fits the facts'.
Quite plainly Russell believed that his hypothesis was verifiable 
in the way in which scientific hypotheses are. He claims for it 
a difference from those large untested generalities of the past, 
which appeal only to the imagination. If it is verifiable, it 
should be a simple matter to refute or confirm it according to 
what we know of mountains and the other furniture of the earth.
Yet it turns out to be extremely difficult, and I suspect beside the 
point, to verify by any observation the view that physical things are 
logical constructions out of sense-data.
Suppose we try to test Russell's account of what it is to walk 
around a table. By an almost superhuman effort of intellect we 
might decide that this experience is describable as " a correlation 
of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual
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sensations". Certainly walking round a table involves muscular 
and visual sensations, etc,, and perhaps when we walk round tables 
we do in fact set about correlating various experiences. But this 
in no way supports Russell's theory, for he is not claiming only 
that as a matter of fact walking round tables involves having and 
correlating sensations. His claim, like Berkeley's, is much less 
trivial than that. He is claiming no less than that experiencing 
and correlating sensations is all that is involved in v/alking 
around a physical thing, and that this is what we mean, for example, 
by "I am walking round a table". He is claiming that "walking round 
a physical object" means no more than "certain sense-data are correlated" 
He claims that it is false to imagine that the phrase signifies that 
there is a single external thing around which we walk.
jViany people "competent to form an opinion", however, would surely 
disagree. They would feel that there is a single thing, not a 
series of aspects, around which a single person, not a correlation 
of sensations, walks. Yet it is equally important to note that this 
common conviction fails to discredit Russell's view. lYhat happens 
when Jones walks round his table is, in a sense, a correlation of 
sensations. But it is also a matter of walking round a table. IVhat 
it also is, however, cannot count against Russell's view for the 
simple reason that he explains what it also is in terms of what we 
must admit it partly is. Russell's procedure is to translate the 
common assumption that there is a single thing into a statement that 
v/hat there is amounts to a correlation of sensory experiences. If we 
say his translation is a bad one, he will retort that our assumption 
that there is a single thing is an unwarrantable one, and has no 
place in his 'hypothesis'. Clearly he cannot be refuted by repetition 
of an assumption which, however common, he rules out as mistaken, and 
which his view is expressly designed to avoid making.
We admit that sensations are always involved in walking round 
tables. Whatever else is involved can equally well be described by 
Russell in terms of hard data. Consequently any objection we bring 
from experience can be turned by him into grist for his o^m mill.
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This is not the characteristic of a verifiable hypothesis.
Take, further, the case of the wallpaper. It is true that all 
we see over the years is a set of fading colours. Common speech
and thought, however, indicate that the wallpaper does not consist 
of the colours, but that has them. This Russell calls 
gratuitous metaphysics. He pleads that in the experience of 
seeing wallpaper no more is given to the senses than certain 
visual sensations or colours. But psychological description fails 
to support Russell just as it fails to support the opposing vi^w 
that the wallpaper is the subject of its qualities. It fails 
to support Russell not simply because we can speak of gestalten 
as well as of discrete sensations, but because psychology has nothing 
to say about what the Amllpaper is. Only philosophers argue about
the ultimate nature of physical things without referring to their 
structural nature as revealed in laboratories. Russell's 'hypothesis' 
is not about the structural nature of things in this sense, nor is 
it simply about the psychology of perception.
The argument most frequently brought against the view that 
physical things are constructions from sense-data is that the subject 
of a proposition like "The wallpaper is coloured" cannot be equated 
with a series of experiences; "The wallpaper is coloured" does 
not mean "Colours are coloured", or "Pink patch is pink", etc. 
Russell's retort to this is that there is no evidence for saying 
that the wallpaper is something other than the series of coloured 
patches. And, of course, no amount of examining wallpaper, or 
statements about wallpaper, will serve to show that he is wong.
Russell's labourite appeal, however, is to logical analysis.
Not every proposition which has a grairimaticàl subject to which 
it ascribes a predicate has a logical subject-predicate form.
Because "The table is brown" has a grammatical subject-predicate 
form, it does not follow that its logical form is similar. Yet 
the grainmatical form suggests that it does. Russell admits:
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"It is extraordinarily difficult in considering substance 
from the point of view of logic to avoid being unduly 
influenced by the structure of language." 24
Suppose we try not to be influenced by the structure of language,
can the logic of statements about material things reveal that
material things themselves are constructions from sense-data ?
Suppose that it were possible to replace the phrase "the table"
with expressions which refer only to percepts without altering the
sense of ordinary comments about tables by this substitution. This
would not prove that the common assumption that tables are single
things is false. All it would prove is that the common assumption
is compatible with another way of talking, i.e. the phenomenalist
way. For any substitute for the phrase "the table" would only be
correct if it could replace that phrase without changing the meaning
of the sentences in which it appears. In other words this
substitution, if it could be made, and if its result were a correct
translation of ordinary statements, would not show that tables are
logical constructions, only that they can be described solely in
terms of sense-data. And if they could be so described, which is
doubtful, there would still be no evidence from the logic of
statements about them to support the assertion that all the aspects
of the table are real, whereas the table itself is a "merely" logical
construction.
If Russell's theory that things are logical constructions out 
of their sensory aspects is to be verified by appeal to logical 
analysis, there are no facts vmich will serve that verification.
If thing-words turn out to be replaceable by aspect-words in every 
case, this still will not confirm the view that they refer to mythical 
entities, nor will it refute the view that they do not. "Things are 
unreal, only their sensory aspects are real" is not a statement 
about symbols, it says more than "Thing-words can always be replaced 
by aspect-words". It says something about things, not about words 
for things. This is precisely how it excites and perhaps startles 
the reader.
Indeed if thing-words were eliminated from language a different 
24# Russell, Analysis of Jyîattei^ , P# 239
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description of things would result. Yet we should be at a loss to 
know on what objective grounds to choose between the new and the 
old forms of expression. Russell himself was aware of this when 
he said, in another connection:
is a colour' will be replaced by 'C is a class of all 
entities {paving exact colour similarity with a given entity*. 
In this case, no facts can be conceived which would give 
reason for preferring one form of statement to the other, 
since any ascertainable fact can be interpreted equally well 
on either theory." 25
Russell himself, confronted with two possible descriptions,
always has a strong tendency to prefer the more analytic one
to the less analysed, e.g. to prefer statements about sense-data
to statements about physical things.
"The essence of philosophy as thus conceived is analysis, 
not synthesis ... 'Divide and conquer' is the maxim of 
success here as elsewhere." 26
Normally commonsense interpretations are the ones to which
philosophers turn for support when they discuss the ontological
character of the external world, and they are certainly the ones
to which we feel inclined to point when we are informed that physical
things are mythical and only their aspects real. Nevertheless, the
moment we are tempted to do this, Russell is ready to charge us
with indulging in stone-age metaphysics, in glib and thoughtless 
27prejudice. For the possibility of refuting Russell's view on
25. ibid., p. 288
26. Russell, "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", (Herbert Spencer 
Lecture at Oxford, 1914), Mysticism and Logic, Pelican Books: 
1953. p. 109
27. See Russell. "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics", (Scientia , 
No. 4, 1914), Mysticism and Logic, p. 148.
"But by the principle of Occam's Razor, if the class of 
appearances will fulfil the purposes for the sake of which 
the thing was invented by the prehistoric metaphysicians 
we should identify the thing" with the class of its 
appearances." (My italics)
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some objective grounds vanishes when he employs Occam's Razor 
to excise the commonsense concept of a physical thing.
In his more recent "Reply to Criticisms" he does seem to be
indirectly aware of the irrefutability of his type of 'hypothesis'.
"Mr. Boodin says: 'Nature does not consist in separate 
and distinct entities'. I fancy almost every reader of 
this volume will agree with him. But I must ask how he 
knows this ? He gives, so far as I can see, only two 
reasons: first that physics uses the conception of a 
'field'; second that babies have no clear ideas. I admit 
both, though the second is an inference involving considerable 
theory; but I fail to see that either is relevant." 28
Mr. Boodin's remarks in defence of the belief that nature does
not consist of distinct entities - e.g. sense-data - are perhaps not
sufficiently cogent to seem 'relevant' to Russell. But the point
is that any argument for this belief would be 'irrelevant', since
it will in the nature of the case talk about things, and Russell
on every occasion will have no hesitation in pointing out that
such talk can be translated into statements about aspects or
sense-data. He will go on to point out that his translation of
plain statements about things is preferable, since it avoids making
any unnecessary assumption, i.e. avoids speaking of single physical
bodies for the existence of which he believes there is no direct
evidence.
The facts will accommodate Russell's view about the external 
world or its opposite equally well, or equally insufficiently. 
Russell demands of Mr. Boodin, how does he Icnow that nature does 
not consist of discrete items of experience; lir. Boodin would 
probably have asked Russell, how does he know that it does.
Neither could point to considerations which would once and for all 
decide the issue at stake. Russell's question is not like asking 
]Vlro Boodin how he knows that sparrows are bro\m; he cannot point 
out anything which is, or is not, a physical thing identical with 
a series of its aspects, as he could point out a sparrow which is 
brown. It is more like asking, "How do you know that sparrows 
are not collections of sensa?" I hope I have indicated that this
280 Russell "Reply to Criticisms", loc. cit., p. 717
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is not the sort of question which can be answered "to the satisfaction 
of all who are competent to form an opinion". IVliich is not to say 
that answers to it cannot be disputed; indeed, trying to answer 
the sort of question which does not have right answer" is one 
of the surest ways of generating a dispute.
hussell is concerned to bridge a gap which he thinks hessees 
yawning between, for example, the imperceptible particles of physics 
and our daily sense-experience. He chooses to bridge it by denying 
the reality of external things, which leaves intact the truths of 
sense-evidence and also points the way to the interpretation that 
the theoretical entities of physics are definable in terms of sense 
items.
"The persistent particles of mathematical physics I regard 
as logical constructions, symbolic fictions enabling us 
to express compendiously very complicated assemblages of 
facts; and, on the other hand, I believe that the actual 
data in sensation, the immediate objects of sight or touch 
or hearing, are extra-mental, purely physical, and among 
the ultimate constituents of matter." 29
In a chronologically later passage Russell admits that his omission
of the notion of single physical things is the result of facing
a dilemma arising from the comparison of commonsense and physics:
"Common sense says: *I see a brown table'. I will agree 
to both the statements: 'I see a table' and 'I see something 
broTO*. Since, according to physics, tables have no colour, 
we must either (a) deny physics, or (b) deny that I see a 
table or (c) deny that I see something brown. It is a painful 
choice; I have chosen (b), but (a) or (c) would lead to 
at least equal paradoxes." 30
It is as if there were, to parody Eddington, three different kinds
of table, the physicist's, the one I see, and the one I talk about
and use. Most of us would find no difficulty in admitting that the
table I see and use, i.e. the commonsense table, is identical with
the table studied by the physicist. To the plain man the physicist's
29. Russell, "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" (Monist, July 1915), 
Mysticism and Logic_, p* 123
3O0 Russell, "Reply to Criticisms", loc. cit., p. 705
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insistence that tables have no colour would not count against the 
statement "I see a coloured table". The fact that physicists say 
tables have no colour does not show that they have no colour in the 
sense that "I have a brovm table" becomes a false statement. Tables 
having colour is the sort of fact from which scientists start. When 
and if a physicist says "Tables have no colour" he is saying in 
a very misleading way that colour percepts depend on light and eyes. 
This, of course, does not show that "I see a broYm table" is false 
nor that "That's a brow table" is false. All it shows is that in 
terms of scientific theory the fact expressed by these statements 
can be expressed in different terms - light waves, retinae, etc.
In other words, Russell's *painful choice" is artificial. There is 
no need to deny either that physics is true, or that I see a table, 
or that I see something brow. But the fact that he felt he must 
nialce a choice of two but not all these statements does indicate, I 
think, how much he wanted to eliminate a certain notion of material 
things from his map of the physical world. The symbols on this map 
must all stand, without any exception whatever, for events, or those 
fleeting, discrete and illusive items which he calls indifferently 
* aspects', 'sense-data*, 'sensa*, 'percepts', 'appearances'. For, 
as he declares:
"All my somewhat elaborate constructions are designed to 
reduce inferred entities to a minimum." 31
It is not altogether surprising that Russell's view turns out 
to be unverifiable if we remember how he chooses the terms in which 
he states his hypothesis, Those terms must all be 'hard data', and 
they are chosen with the specific purpose of avoiding giving any 
function to the common concept of a physical thing, either in the 
hypothesis'or as a possible refuting instance against it. The 
ordinary belief in what sort of thing a table is, for example, is then
31. Russell, ibAd., p. ?08
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restated in terms of sense—data; once this has been done, the 
ordinary belief is not only transformed but made to look false, but 
because the ordinary belief is not denied — i.e. Russell does not 
say "Tables do not exist" in the sense in which "I have a table" 
would be falsfied — it is not something which counts against Russell's 
transformation of it. It is almost as though someone were to say :
"It seems that x will always dissolve in water; anything which does 
not will not be called x; the hypothesis about x must be stated 
solely in terms of solubles." Such a hypothesis will never be confirmed 
or refuted, since any experimental results will be accommodated by 
it, and no experiment whatever could be conducted to produce negative 
results to refute it. Russell's hypothesis, however, is not vacuous 
or trivial, and this makes it very different from arbitrary pseudo­
hypotheses.
Russell thought that the metaphysics of the past were valuable 
as "aids to the imagination". Yet it seems that Russell's own vif^ w 
is effective because it has the character which he attributes to 
traditional philosophy. His conclusions are stimulating because 
they have a certain appeal to the imagination. Commonsense assumptions 
about material things - unthinking, pedestrian, and monotonously 
familiar - appear to be undermined by Russell's account of the external 
world as a system of perspectives. Yet commonsense remains the daily 
guide. However impressed by Russell's arguments a person may be, it 
will still be natural to regard ice and water as the same thing in 
different form. Russell has made no discovery which will change our 
behaviour, our common beliefs, or our way of talking. Nevertheless, 
his view does something; it persuades us to reflect analytically 
about the nature of the external world, and to stress our own experience.
Russell undoubtedly believed his philosophy was scientific, but 
what people Relieve they are doing is not always the best guide to 
finding out what they are doing; few people would now contend that 
Berkeley had proved the existence of an actual percipient deity, yet 
he himself clearly believed that he had done so. An indication of 
the imoort of a metaphysical view is perhaps best obtained from asking
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how it is likely to affect its readers. Berkeley seems more likely 
to produce a reaction to the picture he gives of a sensory world 
than a pious sense of the presence of God; Russell is more likely 
to produce a similar reaction than a pious sense of the advent of 
logico-scientific method.
One of Russell's favourite classical metaphysicians, next to 
Leibnitz, seems to be Heraclitus.
"In such a nature we see the true union of the mystic 
and the man of science - the highest eminence, as I think, 
that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought." 32
Heraclitus, as the first known western metaphysician to pfesent
the arresting notion that the external world is a stream of brief
events, where it is impossible to step into the same river twice
and the sun is new every day, had something of Russell's outlook.
Russell recognises mysticism as well as scientific curiosity in
Heraclitus. He regards the fragment "We step and do not step into
the same rivers; we are and are not" as mystical, and explains:
"Mysticism is, in essence, little more than a certain 
intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is 
believed about the universe".
For example:
"It is poetic imagination, not science, which presents 
Time as despotic lord of the world." 33
Perhaps it would not be too far fetched, though a little unusual,
to say that Russell shared some of the poetic imagination and intensity 
of feeling towards the nature of the universe which he attributed 
to Heraclitus, but himself disclaimed. Russell presents us with 
a view of the world as a flux of sensa, governed by precise and 
interrelated rules, but in which solid, permanent objects are not 
permitted to exist. The present philosophmcal idiom, and his obsessiofi 
with scientific and mathematical method, prevent Russell from the 
flights of fancy to which Heraclitus was able to soar, but in some 
ways 11 sol ___________________
32. Russell, "Mysticism and Logic", Mysticism and Logic , p. 11 
33. ibid., p. 10
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respects there are similarities between the two. Logic, rather than 
fire, becomes the magic principle with which Russell orders the 
kaleidoscopic world of discrete appearances; but he has the same 
wish to make the old metaphysical point that Nature is Many, not 
One; or, in his ovm idiom, that the business of philosophy is to 
analyse, not to synthesise.
Nevertheless it cannot be denied that Russell claimed to have 
obtained results which do not merely embody personal idioÿsyncrasies, 
And Alexander claimed that his o\m results differed from those 
of the sciences not in spirit or significance but only in the extent 
of their subject-matter. Further examination is warranted of what 
'scientific philosophy' could be, if anything at all*
CHAPTER SEVEN
ALEXANDER’S AND RUSSELL'S 'SCIENTIFIC*
METAPHYSICS
"By adopting scientific method, philosophers 
are to learn from scientists and mathematicians 
how to agree; and steady calculation, guaranteed 
to produce an acceptable answer, is to replace 
philosophical disputation. If some such hope as 
this inspired Russell .o his program was a failure. 
The merits of his views on philosophical analysis 
have to be argued on philosophical grounds; and 
to baptise them as 'scientific* can only generate 
confusion". 1
Max Black, "Introduction", Philosophical Analysis $ 
ed. Black, Cornell University Press: 1950. p. 6
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Alexander and Russell claimed to give a 'scientific* account 
of the nature of the external world* Alexander, unlike Russell, 
was quick to admit that he was writing 'metaphysics', yet he thought 
that v/hat he wrote would differ from the sciences only in its subject- 
matter, which would be more comprehensive. He would examine "the 
world in its ^ priori features"  ^whereas the natural sciences only 
manage to examine particular features of particular classes of 
things. Russell believed that (re was writing new 'scientific philoso^y', 
distinguishable from metaphysics because its results would "command 
the assent of all who are competent to form an opinion". They 
both thought that their philosophy was the result of employing 
scientific method, and they both thought that they were giving true 
accounts of what the world is like.^
\yhat is this scientific method in metaphysics, and were Alexander 
making the same or different points in insisting that this is what 
they used ? Can we give any sense ip 'scientific* as applied to 
their theories about material things ? This is, briefly, the 
questionnaire I have set myself in this chapter.
Alexander's 'scientific philosophy' seems to involve two 
distinct claims, which I shall discuss in turn.
(l) His study of the pervasive characteristics of the external 
world is by empirical method yet with a priori results - or this is 
what he tells us. 'Empirical method' here is not intended to mean 
procedure by observation, experiment, prediction, or verification 
with reference either to facts about physical things or by 
mathematical calculation. It is frankly an "arm-chair" empirical 
method.
2. Alexander, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 30
3. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 69
4o Russell believed that, like Alexander, he was a 'realist'. See 
"The Ultimate Constituents of Matter", loc. cit., p. 120;
"My main position, which is realistic, is, I hope and believe, 
npt remote from that of Professor Alexander, by whose writing 
on this subject I have profited greatly." This somewhat 
s t a r t l i n g  statement refers to Alexander's "The Basis of Realism", 
British Academy, Vol. VI.
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The scientist meditating upon the structure of a molecule 
in his arm-chair may indeed, by sheer thinking, have an inspiration 
about it, which he puts to the test, or works out mathematically, 
all according to the precise rules of his particular science. His 
thinking is empirical in the sense that he is wondering about the 
relationship between certain facts which can, once thought of, be 
confirmed or refuted, entertained as probable or improbable, by 
following certain conventional scientific procedures. The conclusion 
of his thinking is euchtthàt in principle there is no reason why 
it will not be finally rejected or accepted by himself and all his 
colleagues. Now Alexander's empirical method is to be applied to 
'a priori facts', for example the 'fact' that any physical thing 
whatever must be in space and time. To call his method 'empirical' 
at all is strange, but at least this suggests that having cogitated 
on the facts about the universal characteristics of the external 
world, Alexander will be able to prove, once and for all, to the 
satisfaction of all competent colleagues, that his conclusions are 
either correct or incorrect. At least it suggests that he will be 
able to do this by explaining those a priori facts, by malcing deductions 
from them which increase, or clarify, our understanding of the 
material world. This, without doubt, is what he thought he would do.
Yet there is something queer about the logic of explaining a priori 
truths about the world. IVhat sort of thing will we count as an explanabn 
ion of the fact that a physical thing must be somewhere and at some 
time ? When we wonder about this, we seem, as Wittgenstein would 
have said, to bump our heads against the limits of our language. It 
seems clear that if we ask for an explanation of this necessary truth 
we do not ordinarily expect the sort of answer which will shed light 
on the nature of the material world, the sort which, for example, 
will make us understand better what it is about books and spaces 
which makes it a fact that our mislaid books must be somewhere.
(2) The other claim involved in Alexander's 'scientific meta­
physics' is that the results of physics, mathematics, physiology and
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psychology, for example, have important impliaations for a 
metaphysical study of the world. He believed that a metaphysician 
who was not equipped with some knowledge of these results would 
fail in his theoretical efforts. Metaphysics for Alexander is 
super-physics, the 'beyond physics’ of Aristotle. He seems to 
believe that it can continue to explain the physical world from 
where physics leaves off. In this sense he would hold that physics 
provides the subject-matter for metaphysics, as the names suggest 
ÿo many a laymeui. But we find that the concepts which Alexander 
does borrow from the natural sciences are so transformed when they 
become a part of his metaphysical scheme that they are recognisable 
only by name. For example, the space-time of relativity theory 
becomes something which can be 'intuited', it ceases to be a hypothesis 
designed to order a range of complicated scientific results and 
formulae, and becomes the universal stuff which metaphysicians of a 
certain school have sought to describe since the Pre-Socratic 
philosophers asked what the v/orld was made of.
Again, certain scientific results lend credibility to the view 
that the colour I see on the orange is caused by a series of 
physiological events and light wave movements. Alexander, however, 
transforms this into the metaphysical theory that the colour is, 
at least on accasion, identical with movements in Space-Time, i.e. 
when light is absent. This is not a view which we can hope to 
verify. It only begins to make sense if we cease to think of it 
as 'scientific', 'verifiable', 'empirical', etc.
Russell, belonging to a totally different philosophical tradition, 
does not talk of making an empirical investigation of the a priori, but
5. Russell, however, deplored 'scientific philosophy' in this sense.
See "On Scientific Method in Philosophy", loc. cit., p. ?6:
"IViuch philosophy inspired by science has gone astray through 
preoccupation with the results momentarily supposed to have been 
achieved. It is not results, but methods, that can be transferred 
with profit .. to the sphere of philosophy."
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he does thinlc that his method is scientific, and that he is 
investigating matter of material fact. Consideration of his method 
and his conclusions reveals an astonishing similarity in type to 
those of Alexander.
Russell's favourite use of scientific method is his frequent 
appeal to t%ie principle of Occam's Razor. This axiom as it is used 
in scientific endeavour is readily understood. We can see the point 
of designing scientific hypotheses with the minimum number of terms; 
giving, for example, one name to a class of germs producing similar 
symptoms, rather than a number of names. It is a matter of 
convenience, and an aid to the use of testing procedures. But, as 
Mr. Warnock asked in a paper, what sin would a philosopher be 
committing if he multiplied entities beyond necessity ? We are 
tempted to ask, beyond necessity for what ? The answer to this 
question is even more elusive when we consider how Russell used the 
axiom - "What is the smallest number (or type) of elements from 
which we can construct the universe?" - and how his use of it resulted 
in eliminating the concept of single physical things. He did not, 
as we should expect from the name 'scientific philosopher', examine 
the facts about tables and mountains before deciding that the common 
name for them and things like them should be omitted from his 
hypothesis about the external world. He omitted 'material object',
(and by doing so ruled out the possibility of applying the phrase in 
its usual connotation to emything whatever), on grounds of logic. 
Reducihility, from the complex compound to the,simple ultimate, worked 
well in mathematical logic, and he tranfers it without hesitation to 
his metaphysical study of the world. The method of Occam's Razor, 
borrowed from scientific methodology, and of reducibility, borrowed 
from mathematics and formal logic, are transformed by Russell when tl^y 
are applied to the description of the material world. By the Razor 
'physical thing* is deprived of its common application, and by 
reducibility it is replaced with words for sense—data. Like Alexander,
6. G.J. Warnock, "Reducibility", (Symposium); Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XXVI, 1 9 5 2 % p^lOo
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Russell, having done his armchair thinking, is left with a theory 
which cannot be tested. He leaves his readers, perhaps, with an 
uncomfortable feeling that it would have been best to keep Occam's 
Razor away from the concept of a physical thing. As Mr. Warnock has 
said on this point,
"The philosopher is not multiplying entities by offering 
unwanted explanatory hypotheses; he is multiplying words 
by offering undesitable re-descriptions." 7
I would quar^èi, however, with the use of the adjective*"undesirable"
in this context, for reasons which I shall attempt to make clear later,
Alexander's reason for saying that his 'empirical study' would 
reveal a priori characteristics of the external world, and their 
relation to each other, was that he sought universal characteristics.
So did Russell. He sought a description of the external world which 
would be applicable to any of its contents whatever. Just as it 
would be pointless to say to Alexander; "But are all material objects 
really contours of Space-Time?", it would be pointless to say to 
Russell; "But are all material objects constructions from sensory 
aspects ?" I strongly suspect that Alexander would reply by making 
it sound as if we had asked him; "Are all material objects in space 
and time?", (which would be absurd), and Russell would reply by making 
it sound as if we had asked him; " Do all perceptions of material 
objects involve sense-perception?" (which would be equally absurd).
I take it that one thing at least that we can say about genuinely 
empirical descriptions is that it is always possible in theory to 
find something to which they do not apply and to which they are 
nevertheless designed to apply. But consider what we should be 
doing if we tried to find an example, even in theory, of a material 
object which cannot be correctly described as a contour of Space-Time, 
or of a material object which cannot be correctly described as a 
construction from sense-data. It would be more like seeking a 
four-sided equilateral right-angled plane figure which cannot be 
correctly described as a square, than like looking for a swan which
7. ibid., po 109
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cannot be correctly described as white.
How then are we to know which of the views is right? Someone 
might say, "Of course they are both wrong. Physical things are 
physical things, they are neither made of Space-Time nor sense-data. 
Bulls are bulls and books are books. V/hat is there to explain?"
This possible, and not altogether uncommon answer shows further 
that the views are unlike empirical ones. Imagine someone saying:
"Of course it's wrong to say water is H^O and also to say water 
is HjO. Water is water. IVhat is there to explain?" The second 
is silly; but for the first many would have a sneaking sympathy 
without seeming in the least silly. The first is more rational 
than the second; the second shows ignorance, the first shows 
merely a disinclination to do metaphysics.
Someone else might say: "Russell is right. IVhat the wallpaper 
but a series of its aspects? I can't see that it is made of Space- 
Time, but I can see that it is a series of aspects. There is no 
reason for supposing that it is ^  object which was red last year 
and pink this year, but every reason for saying that the red patch 
I saw last yeaf and the pink patch I see now belong to a series 
whose terms I relate to each other." The slightest acquaintance with 
philosophical dispute on these matters would indicate that someone 
else is then likely to say: "No. Alexander is right. He brings
out the point that Russell missed, the point that the nature of 
a physical thing is not in any way influenced by our experience 
of it. The wallpaper is what it is whether anyone correlates 
its aspects or not."
It might be objected that these comments are old-fashioned.
Then they can be reconstructed in the non-material mode of speech 
which is more & la mode. Someone says: "Russell is right, by
which I mean that he makes an important contribution by urging that 
there is a philosophical advantage in replacing statements about 
chairs by statements about sense-data. This will cure people of 
the muddled thought that words like 'chair' are proper names for
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things as 'John' is a proper name for a person." But again, there 
is very little doubt that another fashionable philosopher will retmrt:
" No, Alexander makes a point, in an obscure way I admit, that Russell 
ignored. Behind his confused metaphysics, one can discern an attempt 
to point out that 'There is a broTO table in the next room' does 
not translate without residue into 'If I were to go there, I would 
see..etc-j' That there is a broivn table in the next room does not 
mean anything about some future time, but what it says, be. there 
is a table there now, and it is brown now."
This sort of dispute has many sides and many idioms. It is so 
familiar that it almost becomes boring. But, as far as I can see, 
it has never been resolved to the satisfaction of all competent 
parties©
The conclusions of Russell and Alexander can be called a priori 
in two ways:
(a) Both present us with a description which is designed to apply to 
any physical thing whatever, actual or possible, seen or imagined.
Now although the old view that all swans are white was doubtless 
designed to apply to any swan whatever, there was always the theoretical 
possibility that a swan of another colour would bf^ found, that was 
indeed fulfilled when it was discovered that Australia had black swans. 
But there is no theoretical possibility that a physical thing which 
is not a contour of Space-Time, or a series of sense-data, will turn 
up. This is because whateverjturns up in the world of material things 
ccin still be described in these metaphysical terms. "All swans are 
white" was not designed to exclude the possibility that swans might 
be a different colour one day, or had been a different colour in the 
past, or that some hitherto unobserved swans might turn out to be 
black, pink, blue, or any other colour. Yet the philosophical 
conclusions about the ultimate nature of a material thing are 
comprehensive, all-embracing, unlike conclusions about certain 
material objects, or certain groups of them. Metaphysical conclusions 
relate to the evidence by accounting for it all, and all it might be, 
and so, in a sense, by not accounting for any of it. This is, surely, 
a distinctive feature of a non-empirical claim.
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(b) It seems to me that Alexander’s and Russell’s conclusions 
can also be called ^ priori because they depend for their air of 
necessity on genuinely necessarily true propositions, which are 
interpreted in a special way.
It is a necessarily true proposition that it is logically 
impossible for a material thing to be nowhere or at no time, as 
I noted in a previous chapter. Now no metaphysical statement is 
made until something is said about the nature of things. The 
ordinary necessary proposition does not obviously show anything about 
the nature of things, only about the definition of the phrase 
'material thing'# Yet it is possible to think about this definition 
in a special way, as if it suggested that space and time must be 
essential ingredients in material things, rather than mere necessary 
conditions for the correct use of the phrase used to describe them.
This seems to be the imaginative interpretation which Alexander 
malces when he concludes that physical things are not merely in 
space and time, but are space-time, and made of space-time. It 
is not a genuine necessary truth that they are; but neither is it 
the sort of thought which can be an empirical truth about the world, 
as I have tried to show. The fact that there ^  a genuine necessary 
truth which is related to Alexander's metaphysical conclusion, 
i.e© because looked at in a certain way it could suggest that space 
and time are inextricably mixed with material things, as water is 
mixed with mud, gives to his conclusion an apparent certainty.
RussellÈ metaphysics of the external world seems to be developed 
\ to a certain extent from the same genuine a priori truth which
impressed Berkeley; that is from a proposition about our sense-knowledge 
rather than one about anything in the external world itself. It 
is logically impossible to be directly aware of a material thing 
without apprehending sense-data; it is necessarily true that perceiving 
material things involves having sense-impressions. Yet, as I tried 
to show in discussing Berkeley's view, it does not follow from this 
necessary truth that a material thing is composed of sense-data or 
sense-impressions. Russell decided to describe material things 
in terms only of sense-data because they seemed to him to admit
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none of the doubt involved in inferred data. "V/hat I perceive 
is what I perceive" may seem a trivial necessary truth, but it 
seems that Russell viewed this from a particular imaginative 
point of view, so that the trivial truth suggested that what 
I perceive ( sense-data ) have an ultimate and basic status in 
the world. Sense-data become, not merely the way in which I know 
about the material world, but the items from which the material
world is constructed. The necessarily true proposition about
our experience is transformed into a metaphysical statement which 
becomes imbued with the logical necessity of the original, but also 
claims more than the original, i.e. claims something not merely about 
the nature of knowledge but about the nature of the world.
Then what are we to say, if someone asks whether Alexander 
or Russell have given the most true, or correct, or enlightening 
account of the external world ?
Perhaps the difficulty in answering such questions is one
which arises when the precise points at issue are out of mind,
and perhaps it would be wise here to recall some of the conflicting 
details in the views of Alexander and Russell.
Consider, for example, the different interpretations put by 
the two philosophers on the relation between physics and the 
psychology of perception. I see a green book, and it is a perceptual 
fact that I see the green as part of the surface of the book.
Yet the physicist tells us that the green I see is not part of the 
surface of the book, but something to do with physical and physiolog­
ical events, although in the actual constitution of the book there 
must be an explanation for the fact that I see the book as green 
and not some other colour. Both Alexander and Russell had in 
mind that the perceptual situation and the account given of it in 
physics should be taken into account. Alexander fills in what 
seems to,be the gap between the two by saying that a material thing 
is a contour of space-time involving characteristic movements 
which are, at a primary level, the sensory qualities we perceive.
The book is green independently of my visual processes and of
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light waves, etc., it is green in the dark, since these primary 
movements with which the green is identical persist. Russell, however, 
uses the need to bridge the gap between the world of physics and the 
world of sense by making it an excuse for saying that the bridge 
can be built if we deny the existence of physical objects as 
ordinarily conceived. We see a green book; physics denies that 
books have colour; therefore we do not see a green book, but a green 
shape which we relate to certain other sensory characteristics, thus 
constructing the idea of a single external object, the book.
Most people, I suspect, would not feel inclined to accept either
of these metaphysical stories as the true account of the relation
between physics and sense-perception. They would not feel happy
about saying that the worlds of physics and sense are of the same type,
so interrelated that they are almost identical, nor about saying
that the world of material objects with which physics deals is only
real in so far as it is statable in terms of sense-data.The difficulty
is still, however, to know on what grounds we can say that neither
account is correct. We might argue against Alexander: "When I
say, 'That’s green* I do not imply anything about primary movements".
This would not, however, be convincing to him, since he is well aware
that statements about the perceived colour green do not strictly
imply statements about motion in Space-Time. This is why he defines
colours as (ultimately speaking) movements in Space-Time. Suppose we
then quarrel with Alexander on the grounds that his definition is
wrong, by saying that, ultimately speaking or otherwise, colours are
not movements, and the two are clearly distinguishable. Alexander
would probably reply that unless we refuse to malce the distinction,
however natural it may seem, we cannot explain the cohesion of sensory
qualities - for his purpose in identifying colours with movements
8
is to explain how qualities relate to a physical thing. The
argmment that in fact sensory qualities and movements can never be 
identical - even in cases where, as he puts it, sensory qualities 
have ’slipped’ into potential roles - because in fact we clearly 
distinguish the two, would be powerless against his view. For him 
8. Alexander, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 274-276
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qualities and movements must be closely correlated, since his external 
world is permeated by Space—Time which is the stuff, among other things, 
of which material things are made, and since his fundamental theme 
is a denial that qualities are mind—dependent. If material things are 
portions of Space—lime, and also have colours independently of light 
waves and minds, then colours must b^, at the ppimary level, movements. 
Now it is true that there are means of finding out that colours are 
physically correlated with movements , but Alexander seems to claim more 
than this, i.e. that they are, in certain circumstances, no more than 
movements. There is no way of finding out whether this is true 
by observation or experiment, since Alexander would readily admit that 
we never see the movements except in so far as we see the colours, 
and this rules out the possibility of refuting on giroundsuofr.factt 
the view that colours are movements. We can look closer at a flower 
which someone says is painted blue and conclude: "So it is, though
it looked quite naturally blue." We cannot look closer at a blue 
flower and say: "It’s moving, though it looked quite still" and be 
saying something about the nature of its colour. Looking at qualities, 
we will see qualities, not movements: but this Alexander never denies.
Consequently we cannot say he is v^rong on grounds of what we can observe.
% n y  philosophers would still insist that Alexander had made a 
mistake. But what is this mistake ? It is not a false description 
of experience, because he is not describing experience, he is putting 
fonvard a view about what lies behind experience. It is not a 
misunderstanding of language either. Statements like "That’s blue" 
certainly do not in any normal context imply statements like "Those 
are blue movements", but Alexander did not claim that they did. "Blue" 
even in his system refers to the colour to which it is ordinarily used 
to refer, the ’colour-as-seen*. The fact that he makes it refer 
ultimately to movements in Space-Time does not violate ordinary language, 
since he does not deny that ordinarily it refers to the sensory quality 
blue. We might take the logical positivist way out, and say that 
Alexander is not wrong, he is merely uttering nonsense. We can attach 
no meaning to, there are no rules for the use of, a statement like:
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"Qualities of a thing are identical with certain movements within 
the contour of Space—Time which is the thing". But Alexander’s two 
detailed volumes on the subject supply a meaning and give rules for 
the use of such statements. The statement is only meaningless if 
it is taken from its natural habitat and examined alongside commonsense 
statements. In its context it makes sense, and to urge that it says 
nothing significant amounts to saying; "It’s a metaphysical statement, 
not one we would use in ordinary conversation." Clearly Alexander’s 
mistake cannot be that he uttered metaphysical statements, for he 
was doing metaphysics.
I shall now turn back to Russell’s account of the relation between 
physics and sense-experience, to see if it is easier to find objective 
grounds for saying that he was mistaken than it is to find them for 
saying that Alexander was.
It would seem prima facie that the interpretation which physics 
puts upon, for example, the nature of a table provides a reason for 
claiming that the commonsense notion of what a table is like, based 
on direct sense-experience, is v^rong. A table is not a solid brown 
thing, it is a pattern of energy, or etc. Yet Russell does not 
conclude that the real table is the thing described by physics as 
a pattern of energy, or etc., he concludes that the real table is 
a series of its sensory aspects. Furthermore, he thinks that his 
conclusion explains the relation between physics and sense-experience, 
and that the common notion that a table is a single thing is contradicted 
by physiee, whereas his notion is not. Tables, according to physics, 
have no colour; deny that the brown patch we see belongs to a real 
table, and assert that it ^  the real table, seems to Russell to be 
the procedure for avoiding paradox. He believes that physics can 
be interpreted solely in terms of sense-experience.^
See Russell, Our Knowledge of the External WorM, p. 117
"Thus it is unnecessary for the enunciation of the laws of 
physics, to assign any reality to ideal elements: it is 
enough to accept them as logical constructions, provided 
we have means of knowing how to determine when they become 
actual. "
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"I thinlc it may be laid doTO quite generally that in so far 
as physics or common sense is verifiable, it must he "capable 
of interpretation in terms of actual sense-data alone." 10
Commonsense suggests that there is some sort of fallacy in saying 
that the table we see is "unreal" in any sense, for example in 
saying "The table isn’t really brown, because physics shows that 
external objects are not coloured." But commonsense does not suggest 
that the best way to avoid the fallacy is to deny the reality of 
external objects, or to interpret them as logical constructions out 
of sense-data. This explanation looks wrong. Yet it is extraordinarily 
difficult to find grounds for saying that it wrong.
Someone might say: "Of course Russell is mistaken, for he denies 
a plain fact, that there are material objects in the world." Yet, 
as I hope I may already have shovm, this critic would not be able to 
establish that Russell denies the existence of any such fact. It 
is no good talking about sitting on chairs and smoking cigarettes 
in order to point out that material things exist, since these very 
examples only provide Russell with further instances of series of 
sense-data. It is no good pointing out that words like "chair" 
do not, as a matter of fact, stand for collections of sense-data, 
as words like "platoon" stand for collections of individuals, since 
there is a sense in which they do and no clear sense in which they 
stand for anything else. Russell cannot be decisively refuted on 
grounds of fact or language, and there are no final reasons for accept­
ing or rejecting his theory in the way in which there would be for 
accepting or rejecting a mathematical theory.
Nevertheless, both Russell and Alexander insisted that their 
philosophy was ’scientific’. Plainly we cannot take this claim 
literal!#. The conclusions reached by Alexander and Russell are 
not established by even an arm-chair examination of the facts, they 
throw no new light on our knowledge of material things, they do not 
enable us to predict events in the material world, and we are at a 
loss if we try to find a way of verifying them. It is appropriate to 
consider what ’scientific’ might mean in this context.
10. ibid., pp. 88-89
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In the first place, ’scientific’ might be taken to mean what 
it normally means, appertaining to the natural sciences, i.e. those 
studies covered by the Royal Society. But this cannot be what it 
is intended to mean in this context, since no one would now class 
Philosophy as a natural science.
Another sense of ’scientific’, sometimes attributed to philosophical 
theories, is that historically they have often been the breeding 
ground for inspirations later developed by natural scientists,
Democritus held a crude form of the atomic theory of matter, which 
was later to be developed as a scientific hypothesis. Descartes 
preached the importance of painstaking observation and mathematical 
formulation, of order and measurement, which was to produce the 
beginnings og modern physics and mechanics, and was the method used 
by Newton in Principia. Examples of this kind are numerous in the 
history of western philosophy. Most of those ancient Greeks who 
started philosophy in the west also started scientific enquiry. However, 
the view that philosophy is ’scientific’ on these grounds suggests 
that scientific endeavour only emerges after arm-chair metaphysical 
speculation has laid the foundations. Although it is a fact that 
some topics once studied only by philosophers, or once studied only 
by people who were called ’philosophers’, are now studied by scientists,
I do not believe that this can show that metaphysics is primarily 
concerned with problems which have become, or will become, the 
appropriate studies of natural scientists, leaving no topic which is 
a field of enquiry peculiar to metaphysicians. Certain questions about 
the ultimate nature of the external world, for example, continue through 
the ages to haunt the metaphysician, and they are not the type which 
scientists could answer within the boundaries of their discipline.
Since no standard methodological procedure can be evolved for deciding 
on grounds of fact whether a material object is a bundle of sense-data 
or a substance, or whether statements about material things can be 
effectively replaced by statements about sense-data, the old metaphysical 
problem about material substance is likely to persist as one to engage 
the attention of metaphysical speculation, whatever advances science 
might make. Physics may build up an impressive body of knowledge about
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the nature of matter, but it is still open to metaphysicians to 
return to their old problem by asking what relation this knowledge has tb 
common perceptual experience. It may be, as an advocate of ’scientific 
philosophy’ in this sense has admitted, (obviously with metaphysics 
in mind), that:
’’kiany a philosophical system is like the Bible, a masterpiece 
of poetry, abundant in pictures that stimulate our imagination, 
but devoid of the power of clarification which issues from 
scientific explanation. ’’ 11
A final common view of what it means to call philosophy ’scientific* 
is that philosophy is a subject which serves to throw light on what 
scientists do and achieve. The physicist can be reminded that there 
is a philosophical theory, for example, which warns that if an atom 
is never directly revealed in sense-experience, there are insufficient 
grounds for calling it an actual, rather than a hypothetical, entity.
The practical electrician can be reminded that if he thinks of an 
electric current as an invisible stream he is using a metaphor, since 
the current is no more than a hypothesis useful for the ordering of 
certain phenomena. If philosophers wish to call their subject
’scientific* on these grounds, one can only remark that the use of the 
epithet suggests more. In any case, this sense of ’scientific’ applies 
more appropriately to logic and methodology than to the metaphysics 
of the external world. No such metaphysics would help to show the 
scientist what he is doing, for it is not relevant to the observations 
or the formulae of physics, let alone of the other sciences.
There is a sense in which it probably would be true, but useless, 
to say that metaphysics is scientific. If by calling it this someone 
wished merely to point out that metaphysicians often appeal to facts, 
speak of ’hypotheses’ or ’examinations of the world’ or ’truth’, there 
is no objection. Nevertheless, one of the main purposes of this thesis 
is to show that however metaphysicians may talk, their methods and 
their descriptions are as dissimilat as they could be from those of the 
natural sciences.
11. Hans Reichebbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, University 
of California; 1951. p. 9
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One reason why the views of Locke, Berkeley, Alexander and Russell
do not have the empirical or scientific characteristics they claim
is that they seek a very general, comprehensive answer to the question:
"V/hat is the nature of the external world ?" As Mr. Murphy said
in his review of Alexander’s book:
"Thought seeks identities, it works towards the elimination , 
of the variable and contingent, it seeks an absolute." 12
In these metaphysical views it is assumed that the answer to the
question "What is the nature of the material world" will be in terms
of an ultimate, or ultimates, which cannot be further analysed. Once
the ultimates are presented, we find in each case that other things
which we might want to call ultimates are ruled out as they can be
translated into those terms which the metaphysician says are the
ultimates. Nothing but Space-Time can be ultimate in Alexander’s
system; we cannot show that something else is, since everything is
Space-Time. Nothing but hard data can be ultimate in Russell’s system;
we cannot show that something elseeisÿ since anything we suggest can
be translated into hard-data terms. But which are ultimate, hard data
or Space-Time ? It is a distinctive feature of metaphysical thinking
that we have no definite means of telling.
Nevertheless, philosophers continually imagine that they can tell
which theory is right and v/hich wrong, at least those philosophers
with rival theories. Stout, for example, criticised Alexander on the
grounds that he had produced a "penny-in-the-slot" theory of perception.
Alexander, in other words, assumed that the physical conditions of
perception merely put a penny in the slot to unveil the world, to
remove the screen between us and it. Stout says of Alexander:
"He asserts and I deny that sensa are identical with perceived 
features of physical existence". 13
He goes on to say that it is the "natural view suggested prima facie
12. Arthmr E. Iviurphy, "Alexander’s Metaphysics of Space-Time",
The Monist, Vol. XXXVII, 1927. P» 359
13. G.F. Stout, "Professor Alexander’s Theory of Sense Perception", 
Mind, Vol. XXXI, 1922. p. 386
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by the facts" to suppose that sensa have no existence apart from the 
percipient’s organism:
But Ivir. Alexander thinlcs that the facts can be otherwise 
construed, and he holds that they must be otherwise 
construed if we are to give any tenable account of our 
knowledge of the physical world." 14
Stout seemed to recognise that Alexander presents what we might call
a ’must-be theory’, one against which it is pointless to cite facts
if we hope to refute him by doing so. All the same. Stout proceeds
to disagree with Alexander by citing facts. This is a familiar
pattern of metaphysical argument, which even psychologist-philosophers
are prone to enter. The facts are familiar to everyone, to Alexander
as well as to Stout and to Russell. Yet they can have very different
interpretations put upon them, and these interpretations are advanced
as if they were quite certain truths.
It is now fashionable outside the realm of metaphysics, in which 
practically all philosophers avoid talking, to give a plain answer 
to "What is the mature of a physical thing?" We say: "V/hy, a 
physical thing is an apple, or a mountain, or even a soap bubble, 
or anything to which we give a material-object name. Everyone knows 
what a physical thing is, there is no problem," The metaphysician 
will naturally be dissatisfied with the Moore-like reply, and ask 
again, "But what is the nature of a physical thing ?" He will go on 
to say that he did not ask for a list of examples, he asked for 
an ansTver to the question about what makes any physical thing what it 
is. The next move by the fashionable anti-metaphysician is: "Since 
the obvious answer does not satisfy you, what sort of answer do you 
want ? IVhat do you mean by ’nature of’? Do you want the answer to 
be in terms of chemical constitution, or in terms of physics, or in 
terms of mechanics, or in terms of what makes physical things different 
from non-physical things, i.e. in terms of a definition of ’material’?" 
The metaphysician has to explain: "No, I am asking a philosophical
question. For example, would you say that a material thing is definable 
solely^in terms of sense-data?" The fashionable reply to that is 
something like this: "It’s confusing to say that it is, or is not.
14. ibid., p. 387
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If you say the apple is a series of sense-data it suggests that the 
apple is a strange kind of patchwork quilt, made of bits of experience 
instead of bits of cloth. This is not what an apple is# If, however, 
you say the apple is something besides a series of sense-data, it 
suggests that it is something queer, e.g. an unknovm substance, 
which is equally wrong as the apple is what I see it to be. But both 
andrwers make a point. The point of saying that the fruit is a series 
OIÊ sense-data brings out the fact that the apple is what I see, feel, 
taste, and smell it to be. The point of saying that it is something 
more brings out the fact that the subject-term o§ statements about 
apples does not signify an infinite series of statements about the 
actual and possible appearances of apples."
This line of argument does show, I think, that metaphysicians 
find excuses for their views in commonsense and language. But it 
fails to explain, as metaphysical critics usually do, the a priori 
tenor of metaphysical conclusions about the nature of the world.
The metaphysician is surely doing something more than pointing out 
obvious and pedestrian facts about the way we talk and think of 
apples and other material things, while ignoring other facts. He 
presents what he regards as an absolute truth about the ultimate nature 
of the material world. An absolute truth is a truth which is intended 
to be true independently of the facts of the moment, it is meant to 
be true of all possible experience. Wittgenstein recognised that this 
is the kind of answer metaphysicians seek when they ask about the 
nature of propositions. Clearly they ask the same type of question
about the ultimate nature of the external world.
"’The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem
now assumes. We ask: ’What is language?’, ’% a t  is âsproposidon?’ 
And the answer to these questions is to be given once for 
all; and independently of any future experience." 15
The metaphysician gives what he feels to be a final comprehensive
answer, and not a series of reminders about our ordinary speech or
thought. On the other hand, his answer is not one which either
explains or fails to explain all the relevant facts, it is one which
accommodates them all, and in this sense transcends them.
15o Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, 
Blackwells 1953. p. 43 (para. 92)
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The insistence by Alexander and Russell on the ’scientific’ 
character of their methods and conclusions perhaps amounts to no more 
than an insistence on the truth (importance) of their conclusions©
Their use of the word ’scientific’ appears emotive; i.e. its use 
is not strictly correct, but helps to persuade them and us that 
metaphysical method is capable of producing true results which all 
rational beings will be bound to accept. Indeed, in some non­
metaphysical contexts ’scientific’ has come to mean ’true’, ’objective’, 
’commands assent’. "He has a scientific outlook" is a description 
sometimes designed to evoke our praise for a person who is interested 
in uncovering truths of any type.
Alexander and Russell give irreconcilable answers to "What is the 
nature of a material thing?", both of which are comprehensive and 
accommodate all the relevant facts and common opinions by using them 
as grist to their own mills. Both these views also have commonsense 
excuses. Alexander seems to defend the commonsense belief that what 
is perceived is not always dependent on the percipient; but in doing 
so he transforms it into a metaphysical system far removed from common 
thought. Russell expands the necessary truth that what we know of 
the material world can be related only to sense-experience; but in 
doing so he transforms it into a metaphysical view which completely 
changes the ordinary assumption that the contents of the material 
world are different from series of private sense-data.
The views of Alexander and Russell, in short, seem to have those 
characteristics and use those methods which were evident from a study 
of the metaphysics of Locke and Berkeley. This statement will now 
be examined in detail.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE DISPUTE
A. Comparison of the views of Locke and Alexander
B. Comparison of the attacks by Berkeley and Russell
C. Typical contemporary forms of the dispute
"Their terminology has been abandoned - 'ideas' and 
'impressions' have given way to 'sensa* 'sensibilia* 
'sense-data* and other such technical terms - but 
the questions they asked have continued to be asked 
and even their answers (with more or less modification) 
adopted." 1
G.J. Warnock, Berkeley, Pelican Books: 1953. po 236 
(â propos of Locke and Berkeley)
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I shall ask in this chapter whether the dispute between Locke and 
Berkeley concerning the ultimate nature of the material world is 
repeated in the opposing views of Mexander and Russell, and in a 
typical contemporary discussion. Perhaps, although the old disagreement 
is given a new dress, its shape and body remain the same®
My first contention is that Locke and Alexander make metaphysical 
claims about the nature of material substance which are more alike 
than they first appear, and that Berkeley and Russell attack these 
claims by using very similar arguments. My second contention is that 
philosophers today carry on what amounts to the Locke-Berkeley dispute 
in a linguistic idiom. If this is true it will be evident that a most 
remarkable feature of the dispute about the nature of material things 
is the persistence of the two kinds cfvview and the absence of any 
final decision that either or neither is "the correct one". This, it 
will be recalled, is the assumption I said I would examine further, 
since the suggestions about the Locke-Berkeley dispute in Chapter Four 
seemed to stand or fall by it.
A. Comparison of the views of Locke and Alexander
The obvious similarity is that Locke and Alexander both hold that 
material things, in the final analysis, are unrevealed by sense-evidence 
alone, are "something more ultimate" than their sensory qualities.
The similarity between them extends further.
That their "something more ultimate" cannot be established by 
sense-evidence alone bothers neither Locke nor Alexander, who both 
believe that their ultimate substances can be knoTO to exist by 
observation of what the senses do reveal followed by an inference.
It may be objected that Alexander does not hold that an inference is 
involved in knowing about Space-Time, since he says that it can be 
intuited. The use of the word 'intuited* suggests that Space-Time is 
directly apprehended. But a study of what Alexander means by "the 
intuition of Space—Time" shows that in fact he asserts that we know of 
its existence in a manner similar to that in which Locke asserted that 
we know of the existence of Substance.
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By the senses, said Alexander, we see and touch only limited
spaces, and we experience only finite durations of time. Then we
"discover" that spaces and times are continuous with one another, and
"partly by imagination but largely by conceptions founded on experience"
we imagine very large portions of space and time, until finally we
2
intuit Space-Time itself. Alexander uses the expression "percepts
extended by thought",^ and says, for example, "the primary qualities
4
are apprehended by intuition but through sensation'.' In other
words, having an intuition involves the mental extension of percepts, 
and surely this, in plainer language, means simply that we make an 
inference from what we perceive#
We experience finite portions of space and time, we imagine enormous 
portions of them, and we infer that, since these finite portions which 
we imagine and experience are continuous, there must be something which 
is infinite, which is Space-Time itself. The inference made is a typical 
metaphysical one, from the known to the unknown, where the unknown 
inferred is unknowable in terms of sense-evidence. Yet, in spite of 
this, sense-evidence is cited to support the inference; the conception 
arrived at is founded on experience, or, as Alexander would say, 
basically it is "empirically given", it is inferred from what we 
perceive and imagine. Locke's inference that Substance must exist is 
similarly described. Studying sense-experience, Locke holds, will 
indicate that the pattern of our 'ideas' is quite inexplicable unless 
we imagine that they are upheld by Substance. Substance is an abstract 
idea, abstracted from experience, an extension of our percepts.
The abstract idea of Substance like the intuition of Space-Time is an 
inference from experience to account for experience, and in each case 
experience is cited as evidence in favour of the concept.
2o Alexander, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 41-42 
3. ibid., p® 42
4„ ibid., Vol. II, p. l60 ( %  italics)
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It may be felt that this similarity is trivial. I hope to show that, 
although on the face of it one would thinlc that "Substance exists" 
m^kes a very different claim from "Space-Time is the material of all 
that exists", the functions which Locke and Alexander allot to their 
concepts are so similar that it becomes difficult to know how to 
distinguish between Substance and Space-Time.
Locke urges that nothing much can be said about the nature of 
Substance, an "I know not what", while Alexander implies that the 
nature of Space-Time is fully kno^ vn. However, if we consider Alexander's 
account of Space-Time and its functions appertaining to physical things, 
it turns out that it performs those very functions which Substance was 
designed to perform by the earlier metaphysician.
Four propositions central to both views can be written down in 
propositional function form, and "Substance" or "Space-Time" can be 
substituted indiscriminately for "X" without injustice to either author:
(1) X is the basic stuff from which material things are made, or 
their undifferentiated support, and it has“causal properties.
(2 ) X's causal properties involve primary qualities.
(3 ) X unifies sensory qualities
(4 ) "Material objects are X" is the most basic assertion that can 
be made about them. It cannot be further analysed, since X is 
an ultimate.
I shall take these four propositional functions in turn and compare the
values given to them by Locke and Alexander.
(1 ) Alexander holds, quite literally, that things are made of
5
Space-Time, just as a coat is made from a roll of cloth. Matter is 
"made out of the original stuff which is Space-Time". By this he did
not mean simply that things are always in some place and at some time;
he meant that Space-Time is an ultimate stuff which causes material 
things, also, perhaps paradoxically, which is material things. Similarly 
Locke meant quite literally that material things are made of Substance,
5 . ibid., Vol. I, p. 341
6. ibid., Vol® II, p. 50
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and this is what led him, since at least half his thoughts were that 
Substance is not merely unknovm but unlcnowable, to conclude that it 
would be lost labour to seek after a perfect science of natural bodies.^ 
This point is closely connected with the claim both philosophers make 
that Substance somehow cements together sensory qualities, so that they 
form material things rather than hap^hazard collections of properties 
unattached to things, and, as it were, floating with no support or 
anchor. For Substance/Space-Time is the material from which those 
qualities are made.
Now Locke implied that material things are really Substance: e.g. 
secondary qualities are not included in their real natures and primary 
qualities are pai't of those real natures, i.e. part of Substance® 
Alexander on the other hand seems to suggest that material things are 
made of Space-Time plus both secondary and primary qualities, i.e. 
that they are really all these things. Yet when we recall that he also 
held that some qualities, e.g. colours, have a primary level and 
sometimes exist in dispositional form, as described in Chapter Five, 
it seems that he also held that qualities are sometimes secondary 
and have real primary counterparts which are motions in Space-Time. 
Besides, since on his view qualities as well as things are made of 
Space-Time, there is certainly no doubt that Alexander, speaking in 
ultimate metaphysical terms, would say: "Space-Time is all that 
material things are made of", just as Locke, speaking in those terms, 
would say: "Substance is all that material things are made of."
(2 ) Alexander claimed that primary movements inhering in Space- 
Time are correlated with sensory qualities , and further that the 
configuration of primary movements are, for example, the green of the 
apple in the dark®^ Locke claimed that primary movements, and other
7. See Locke, op® cit., Vol. II, p. 223 (Bk. IV, Ch. 3)
8. See Alexander, op® cit., A^l® I, P* 270
9. See ibid., p. 60 (Vol. Il): "%en not active as a sensum or a
sense-datum, the sensible quality slips into a disposition which 
is on the primary level."
-143-
prii>iary qualities, are correlated with simple ideas of sensation; he 
also claimed that the configuration of primary qualities are, for
example, the green of the apple.
AJ.though both philosophers held that the ultimate imperceptible 
substance has causal properties which are responsible for our percepts, 
there are differences of detail in the views at this point. I believe 
these can be explained as differences of contemporary scientific theory 
which had profound influences on both philosophers. Alexander does 
not agree with Locke that all the primary qualities inliere in Substance 
(Space-Time) while secondary qualities do not. He believes that
motion inheres in Space-Time, and that motion alone plays the role 
of Locke's primary causal agents. He also believes that all qualities, 
including secondary ones, are i^ependent of the percipient, e.g® 
a colour
"though it does not exist as colour in the absence of light,
exists as colour in the absence of the eye." 12
I am not sure that these differences are as great as they first appear.
Alexander's emphasis ofi the dependence bf colour on light, rather
than on the eye or mind, is an echo of Locke's comment that porphyry
has no colour in the dark, but a
"configuration of particles .. as are apt .. by the rays 
of light rebounding .. to produce in us the idea of 
redness." 13
Locke's view that colour is not "really in the object", (except at a 
primary level), is at least akin to Alexander's view that a colour 
is "really in the object", (sometimes only at the primary level)®
The notable point is that both philosophers insist that sensory qualités
10. i.e. Locke's doctrine that secondary qualities "rightly considered"
are combinations of primary qualities inhering in Substance.
See o p e  cit., Bk. I I ,  Ch. 8
lie See Alexander, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 207
12. ibid., Vol. II, p. 5^
13® Locke, op. cit., Vol. I, p® 17^ (Bk. II, Ch. 8)
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are basically imperceptible events in an ultimate substance#
Both philosophers urge this point for it makes sense of postulating
an ultimate stuff, it suggests,that the durability of things is
guaranteed in spite of the transience of sensory qualities* Alexander
comments that Sir John Cutler's much darned stockings remmin the
same stockings since "the configuration of the motions within the
14substance" endure; Locke also speaks, e.g. in the passage quoted
above, of the "configuration of particles" as a guarantee of an 
object's endurance.
I commented that the fact that Locke states that all the primary
qualities inhere in Substance, while Alexander reserves this activity
for primary movements alone, is understandable in terms of the
different scientific influences on the two philosophers. Locke was
deeply impressed by the Newtonian view of Matter, and would naturally
have particles in mind while formulating his metaphysical view of
material substance. Particles suggest the properties of size, shape,
solidity and number as well as motion. Although, as I tried to show, '
Locke transforms this notion taken from natural science into an
invérifiable view, there is no doubt that the contemporary scientific
influence determined the details of that view. \Vhen Alexander came to
formulate his form of the substratum theory, however, the results
of physics in,this century suggested that Locke's other primary qualities
were reducible to motions. For example, Alexander's inspiration from
the science of his time malces it appropriate for him to wonder
15
whether electricity is distinct from matter. Velocity, inertia,
and energy were the scientific notions which Alexander had in mind, 
while Locke drew his ideas from a billiard-ball conception of matter® 
Consequently it seems reasonable to suppose that the details of 
metaphysical difference between the philosophers' accounts of the 
primary cause of sensory qualities are incidental, differences in the 
letter rather than the spirit of their views. The fact that both
14o See Alexander, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 273
15. See ibid., Vol. II, p. 54
-145-
Locke and Alexander, in spite of the progressive history of science 
that separates their periods, borrow notions from physics and transfom 
them into the metaphysical theory that the ultimate material of 
the external world has within it imperceptible causal properties, 
seems to me more striking than the dissimilarity between the 
philosophers’ accounts of what those imperceptible primary events 
are®
(3 ) Alexander says:
"Each quality inlieres in the substance because it is 
included in the space which unifies the substance". 16
Locke says that simple ideas of sensation which væ form into complex
ideas of substances
"have always the confused idea of something to which they 
belong, and in which they subbist." 17
The notion that sensory qualities are discrete items which are
unified into material bodies by a sort of imperceptible cement
is common to both views.
Locke says that the notion is a confused one, yet he persistently 
argues as if it were an undeniable one. Alexander does not say that 
his notion of the underlying element which synthesises secondary 
qualities is confused, yet at times some of Locke’s emphasis on 
ignorance creeps into his discussion. For Alexander does sometimes 
suggest that "intuition" involves having confused notions, and this
r
follows from his belief (discussed above) that an intuition is based
on fallible sense-experience, although it is also extended beyond
sense-experience. In his oto words:
"our senses only cheat us by their weakness and partiality 
of selection, but our intuitions cheat us because our 
senses are cheats." I8
This remark suggests that Alexander did not believe that the intuition
of Space-Time is free from the confusion Locke attributed to the
abstract idea of Substance. Nevertheless both had no hesitation
16. ibid., Vol. I, p. 274
17. Locke, op. cit., Vol. I,, p. 393 (Bk. II, Ch. 23)
18. Alexander, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 207-208
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in urging that some imperceptible material does underly and produce 
sensory appearances. If more attention were paid to Alexander’s 
work in contemporary philosophical discussion we should no doubt hear 
less of the opinion that no serious philosopher since Locke has 
entertained a thorough-going substratum view.
(4 ) "Material things are imperceptible substances", according to 
Locke, is the most basic assertion it is possible to make about them.
No more final definition can be given. Bocke imagined that we could 
never say more, for example, about the nature of gold; the nominal 
definition we can and do give is in terms of sense-evidence, its 
peculiar colour, weight, etc. But this depends on and is explicable 
by "that constitution of the parts of matter on which these qualities
19and their union depend." Alexander makes similar statements, and,
oddly enough, also uses gold as the example. A physical thing, on his
view, has "defining motions" within the contour of Space-Time which is 
20
that thing. Primary motions connected with yellow, and others
connected with hardness, are grouped together within the contour
21
according to "the laws of construction of gold". VAiile Alexander
would not want to go as far as Locke by saying that the primary
motions alone are the real gold, and the qualities which we observe
provide only a nominal definition, there is a hint of Sihis conclusion
in some of his comments, for example when he speaks of Sir John
22Cutler’s smlk stockings.
Substance and ,Space-Time, to sumarise, are described as universal 
imperceptible and undifferentiated supports from which sensory qualities 
result. They have causal properties, unify sensory appearances, and 
provide the fundamental unanalysable character of the material world.
19® Locke, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 61-62 (Bk. Ill, Ch. 6)
20® Alexander, op. cit., Vol. I, p® 270
21. ibid., p. 270
22. See ibid., Vol. I, p. 273, and discussion earlier in this chapter
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It still seems that the conclusions about Substance and Space- 
Time must make conflicting claims. Substance, surely, is something 
different from Space-Time. "Substance" and "Spcae-Time" are not 
synonyms in ordinary language, (if we can suppose ÿhat they are 
ordinary terms at all). But as both terms are used in the two 
metaphysical views for notions which are given very much the same 
function, it is extraordinarily hard, while realising that the two 
views seem to make different claims, to assess just what that difference
IS.
All the primary qualities are said to inhere in Substance; only 
primary motions are described as inhering in Space-Time. Yet the issue 
is not so clearcut, for Space—Time is also said to have inhering in 
it all the qualities, none of which depend fort their existence on 
perceiving organisms, all of which are said to be made of Space—iinie. 
Locke would not admit that secondary qualities inliere in Substance; 
and yet again this is not entirely right, since he would admit that 
all secondary qualities are correlated with what does exist in Substance, 
and this is the view suggested by Alexander when he speaks of colours 
correlated with primary motions. The two views seem to make conflicting 
points, but further examination suggests that they make the same 
points in different but compatible ways. Alexander, for example, would 
disagree fervently with Locke’s view that our ’ideas’ exist only ’in 
our minds’, that we can never know their real counterparts which exist 
in substance. Yet he would agree that they have primary counterparts 
e.g. imperceptible motions in Space-Time, and that the relation of 
these to sense-experience is a causal one. The picture is similar, 
sensory qualities with non-sensory causes in an ultimate substance.
The difference is that while Locke denies reality to the curtain of 
sensa and affirms it of what lies hidden behind the curtain alone, 
Alexander wishes to affirm that both the curtain and what it conceals 
are real® The substratum iif both these theories is said to involve 
hidden events which are correlated with sensa. The difference that 
ih one the sensa are regarded as mind-dependent and not in the other 
does not enable us to say precisely what the difference is between 
Substance and Space-Time.
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It must be evident at least that Locke and Alexander portray 
material reality in most similar terms. The dissimilarities are 
to be found in details which result from the different periods of 
scientific influence and in the decisions about the metaphysical 
status or degree of reality to be given to sensa. Neither sort 
of dissimilarity enables us to make a clear distinction between the 
view that material reality is ultimately Substance and the view that 
it is ultimately Space-Time. In Chapter Ten of this thesis I shall 
return to this question and ask whether a satisfactory answer can be 
given in terms of the hypothesis about the nature of the metaphysical 
theories which I shall then be in a better position to suggest.
B. Comparison of the attacks made by Berkeley and Russell
The metaphysical theory about the nature of the external world
proposed by Locke and Alexander, (which I shall call the substratum 
2 ^
theory) , is the one which both Berkeley and Russell attacked. This 
is obviously true of Berkeley, since he explicitly attacks Locke’s 
doctrine. It seems equally, though perhaps less obviously, true of 
Russell as represented by his view that material things are logical 
constructions. Russell surely described the coimaon opinion that things 
like apples and mountains are "fairly permanent" external objects as 
"a piece of audacious metaphysical theorising" because he saw &hat it 
harboured the substratum theory. Otherwise there would have been no 
object in doingsso. He wanted to barricade the well-worn path of 
philosophical reasoning from the premiss that we know a material thing 
only by its transient appearances to the conclusion that the material 
thing itself must be something more permanent underlying the sensory 
flux® It was surely not the unquestioning commonsense faith in single 
physical objects which aroused Russell’s opposition so much as the 
temptation it offers to philosophers like Locke to indulge in substratum 
metaphysics® It is not the ordinary use of the word ’thing’ for 
material objects which Russell attacks; it is the use of the phrase
23. ivieaning by this phrase simply that metaphysical theory which 
affirms sensory qualities, or appearances, are produced and 
unified by an imperceptible and undifferentiated support.
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’thing-in-itself* by what he calls ’pre-historic metaphysicians’
who culled their excuse from common l a n g u a g e . T h i s  is exactly
what Berkeley attacks. He reminds us that he has no intention of
disproving the existence of flatter in its ordinary sense, only the
25
existence of what philosophers ( especially Locke) call Matter.
Berkeley and Russell use many similar arguments and produce 
a similar alternative theory to the substratum view they attack.
In the first place, they both present the argument which contemporary 
philosophers sharing their outlook would describe as an exhibition 
of the bad logical grammar involved in the substratum theory. They 
make two main accusations under this heading: (l) that the substratum
view involves a false notion of the logical grammar of general words,
(2 ) that it involves a confusion between the graiimar and the logical 
grammar of subject-predicate statements. I shall take these criticisms 
in turn and show how Berkeley and Russell both made them.
(1 ) Russell commented:
’’An important consequence of the theory of descriptions is 
that it is meaningless to say ’A exists’ unless ’A’ is (or 
stands for) a phrase of the form ’the so-and-so’’’ 26
Thus ’’Ivlatter exists’’, ’’Space-Time exists", "Substance exists", etc.,
are either meaningless statements or else statements about particular
things in disguise. ' The Theory of Descriptions rules out the possibility
of saying that statements about abstract entities have meaning.
General words do not have the sajne logical function as names, and
general words like'"substance" and "substratum" have no ostensive
definitions - which is considered to be the test for deciding whether
a ward does function like a proper name. Berkeley also believed that
statements like "There is an imperceptible substance" are strictly
meaningless. The Theory of Descriptions and Berkeley’s attack on
the doctrine of abstract ideas both exhibit what Professor Luce has
24. Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics", ii^qc^ci^ 1/8 
he speaks of the ’thing’ being ’invented’ "by the prehistoric 
metaphysicians to whom common sense is due."
25. See Berkeley, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 55 (PRINCIPLES, para. 35)- 
"The only thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers
call matter or corporeal substance."
26. Russell, "Logical Atomism", loc. cit^, p. 365
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27praised as "concrete thinking"; by which is meant the replacement 
of abstract notions by reference to basic data directly given in 
sense-experience. Russell, for example, urged:
"wherever possible, substitute constructions out of
knoivn entities for inferences to unknt^um entities". 28
The ’logical atomist’ argument against the substratum theory is that 
the general terms used in talking about substrata reflect the 
mistaken notion that they are names for abstract entities; whereas, 
it is insisted, general words only make sense in sentences which 
can be analysed by substituting words for concrete particulars. 
Berkeley holds that statements about redness are not statements 
about an abstract idea, or the common property of diverse instances, 
but a shorthand way of referring to instances of red. Statements 
about Substance are meaningless, for they do not refer to any concrete 
instances, but to a supposed abstract entity, which is nonsense. 
Similarly, Russell holds that "material thing", used in such a way 
that it is meant to refer to something which underlies the sensory 
appearances of a thing, does not refer to any ascertainable entity 
and is consequently meaningless. He reconstructs the meaning of 
"material thing" in accordance with the theory of descriptions, so 
that a material thing becomes a logical construction out of its 
appearances. And Berkeley reconstructs the meaning of the phrase 
so that a material thing becomes a group of sensory ideas. In each 
case the general term is replaced by a complex of particular ones. 
Insistence upon the principle that general words must not be used 
as if they were names for abstract entities seems, (if one might use 
such an expression), to cut away the ground from under the feet of 
substratum philosophers.
(2) Berkeley and Russell explain the mistake they believe 
substratum philosophers make, treating general terms as names of 
abstract entities, by charging them with another offence, that of
27® Luce, op. cit., p. 63
28. Russell, "Logical Atomism", loc. cit., p. 363
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misunderstanding the nature of subject-predicate statements.
Ihe grammatical structure of sentences for expressing propositions
about the material world suggests that predicates are assigned to
subjects which are not themselves predicates. This reasoning, it
is alleged, leads metaphysicians to the erroneous supposition that
a physical thing cannot be simply the sum of its appearances, and
must be an imperceptible something which has those appearances.
It seemed to Russell that once this "purely logical doctrine" is
rejected, "the whole foundation for the metaphysics of all these
29philosophers is shattered." Berkeley too was impressed by the
importance of pointing out what he called in a notebook entry 
the "of and thing causes of mistake".
Although these two criticisms of the substratum view appear to 
be based on facts of logical grammar, (their exponents exhibit such 
confidence in their infallibility), it must not be forgotten, as I haie 
noted before and will develop later, that these "facts", if we call 
them such at all, are more like interpretations of language-functions 
than impartial descriptions comparable with the work of a philological 
grammarian. % e n  Russell declcires that the vocabulary and syntax 
of language make us thinlc falsely that "triangularity" and "rationality" 
stand for "single universals"^^, and Berkeley declares that they lead 
us to the mistaken supposition that they stand for abstract ideas, 
the mistake alleged to have been made is quite unlike a normal 
linguistic mistake; e.g. quite unlike saying: "I went tomorrow".
It is not in any simple sense a fact that "triangularity" does not 
stand for a "single universal" or an abstract entity, as it is a fact 
that in English "I went", does not refer to an action I will perform 
tomorrow. It is a philosophical theory that "triangularity" does, 
or does not, stand for an abstract entity, and ordinary usage is not
29. Russell, "Logical Atomism", loc. cit., p. 3^0
30. Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. I8 (Philosophical Commentaries, 
entry 115): See also editor’s note authorising this interpretation,
• p. 112. My italics.
3 1. Russell, "Logical Atomism", loc. cit., p. 368 ^
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designed to provide an answer to the question.
The method of reduction from the general to the particular
leads to Russell’s charge that the concept of a substratum is
unnecessary, unwarrantable, and unhelpful. The notion of a physical
thing can readily be reduced to a logical construction from sense-
data. All that is said about material things can be said in terms
32
oê sense-data and the laws of physics®
"Our procedure here is precisely analogous to that which 
has swept away from the philosophy of mathematics the 
useless menagerie of metaphysical monsters with which 
it used to be infested." 33
Occam’s Razor is applied, and, as Berkeley’s modern disciple has
exclaimed:
"Given sense-data, what more in that line is required?"^^
Berkeley urges that it is not merely unnecessary, but sèif-
contradictory to speak of material things which are not equivalent
to their sensory qualities. This is the main difference between
the two attacks on the substratum view. Yet Berkeley also appeals
to the uselessness of the notion of Substance, and so wields Occam’s
35Razor in much the same way as Russell did later. Berkeley
argues, for example, that the supposition of Substance in no way
helps to explain the Occurrence and pattern of our ’ideas^. But
his princip&& contention is that the doctrine of Substance is
self-contradictory:
"You may say, for example, that twice two is equal to seven, 
so long as you declare you do not take the words of that 
proposition in their usual acceptation, but for marks of 
you know not what." 37
32. Cf. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 115:
"Things are those series of aspects which obey the laws of
physics"
33. Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics", loc. cit., p®148
34. Luce, op® cit., p. 159
35. Luce speaks of abstract ideas falling "beneath Berkeley’s ’Razor”’ 
ibid., p. 36
36. See Berkeley, op. cit.. Vol. II, pp. 48-49 (PRINCIPLES, ggyas. l8~
37. ibid., p. 7 5. (PRINCIPLES, para. 79)
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Berkeley reduces a material thing to a group of ideas in the 
mind of God. Russell reduces it to a series of aspects which obey the
laws of physics. Did Berkeley mean by ’ideas’ what Russell meant 
By ’aspects’ or ’sense-data’? Since Russell did not hold esse est 
percipi, although he sometimes worried about whether it was true, 
it may be that by ’sense-data’ or ’aspects’ Russell meant sensory 
qualities, where Berkeley meant by ’ideas’ actual sensations. It 
is clear however, that Berkeley did not mean by ’ideas’ only what we 
normally mean by ’sensations’ - e.g. pains, feelings of excitement, 
etc® Most of the examples of "ideas of sensation" which he gives 
are instances of colour, texture, shape, sounds, etc. , i.e. of
38
sensory qualities. Luce remarks that Berkeley never equates
trrThere was a smell" with "There was a smelling"; by "ideas of smell" 
he always meant the objects smelled, and not the process of sensing
39them. This interpretation of Berkeley’s meaning suggests that,
in spite of the contrary indication in the use of the phrase ’in the 
mind’, he meant by ’ideas’ sense-data, and not sensations or the acts 
of sensing. This is plausible in view of his theory that the ideas 
which constitute material things, as opposed to those which are 
illusory or imaginative, are objective in the sense that they do not 
depend for their existence on the presence of human percipients. 
Whatever this might mean, and fraught with difficulties as the notion 
of God’s epistemological vigilance is, it at least shows that Berkeley 
must have intended by "group of ideas" sensory qualities, or aspects, 
as Russell did by "series of sense-data".
One reason why Locke and Alexander held a substratum view was, 
overtly, because it enabled them to explain how the transient 
appearances of a thing eome to be unified into a single thing, and 
indeed to explain what is meant by "appearances of a thing". Neither
38® See Warnock, op. cit., p. 147, for a discussion of what he feels 
is Berkeley’s confusion about sensations and ideas. We do not 
"get colours" as we "get headaches". But this is no problem if, 
as it seems, Berkeley meant by "ideas" sense-data.
39. See Luce, op. cit.,, p® 65. Warnock’s point seems to be counterd 
by the fact that Berkeley did not hold that a smell is the same 
as a sensation of smell.
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Berkeley nor Russell deny the need for some sort of explanation 
of the subject-attribute relationship. They deny only the need to 
postulate an insensible substance, and they offer alternative 
explanations. Any attempt to argue that Berkeley and Russell 
had very similar views on the nature of the external world is apt 
to meet its Waterloo in a consideration of their alternative 
explanations. In one case, the unity and durability of physical 
things , which are themsleves said to be no more than collections 
of sense-data, is explained by the constant attention of a divine 
mind. In the other the unity and durability is explained by the 
laws of physics and logic. Berkeley and Russell would certainly 
never wish to be saddled with each other’s views on this point.
But still, while the conceptions are very different, they are used 
for identical purposes. The reduction of material things to groups 
of their appearances, the rejection of any thought of an underlying 
substance, leaves phenomenalists with the need to replace the concept 
of substratum by some principle more acceptable to their outlooks 
and interests. Occam’s Razor eliminates terms which axe not strictly 
necessary for describing what is directly experienced. Some notion is 
then necessary to account for the fact that appearances are appearances 
of material things, and this has to be imported. It seems more a 
difference of personal interest or specific motive than one of 
philosophical spirit, which leads Berkeley to annex the notion of 
a cognitive creator, or ’’Author of Nature’’ to the unity of our ideas, 
while Russell conceives that this unity is supplied by the laws of 
physics and correlations of our sense-data.
The attacks of both these philosophers on the theories which make 
inferences from the knoivn to the unlcnovm involves the use of some 
emotive language. I pointed out that Berkeley speaks of the notion 
of insensible matter as ’’repugnant’’, ’’words without a meaning’’, "a 
downright contradiction’’, atheistic and sceptical, etc. Berkeley, 
not content with arguing that the substratum view is mistaken, urges 
that it is imbecile and unattractive. Russell, besides arguing that
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it is mistaken, uses phrases to suggest that it is absurd - "audacious 
metaphysical theorising", "metaphysical monsters", "umvarran^thble", 
"fiction". Part of the method of reducing the notion of a substratum 
to the notion of series of sensa in each case involves scorning the 
explanation which has been replaced.
Of course, although Berkeley and Russell both set out to undermine 
the plausibility of the substratum theory, and although they use 
similar techniques for doing this, I would not wish to claim that there 
are no notable differences at all between their views. Berkeley quite 
explicitly states that he has provided an a priori disproof of the 
rival theory, and his emphasis is on the contradictions he seeks in it. 
Russell states that he has provided a hypothesis which explains all 
the facts explained by the substratum theory without unwarrantable 
assumption., and his emphasis is on the verifiability of his theory.
As I argued in Chapter Six, however, if Russell’s theory of logical 
constructions is a ’hypothesis’, the word cannot be taken literally, 
since his theory is as unverifiable as Berkeley’s.
Russell’s use of the v/ord ’fiction’ to describe the notion of an 
imperceptible object also suggests that his approach is similar to 
Berkeley’s. If this notion is called a ’fiction’, the claim could be 
that it is a priori false, or self-contradictory. For consider, it 
is a fiction that Alice fell do\m the rabbit-hole, or that dragons 
exist; this means that these claims cannot be confirmed or rejected 
by examining facts about living people or animals, since they are 
made in the particular universe of discourse appropriate to works of 
the imagination where it is inappropriate to make ordinary factual tesÿs. 
But when Russell calls a stateraentsabout the substratum of a physical 
thing a fiction he does not imply that this sort of statement belongs 
to a particular universe of discourse where it is inappropriate to make 
factual tests, he surely means that the statement is about something 
which cannot exist, but is supposed to exist when, for example, philosophers 
misunderstand the nature of subject-predicate propositions. It would 
be absurd to say that people suppose dragons exist because they make 
mistalces about the function of statements about dragons. "It is a 
fiction that dragons breathe fire" does not deny that dragons breathe
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fire, e.g. in pictures and books. "It is a fiction that sense-data 
are supported by a substratum" does deny that sense-data are supported 
by a substratum, and since it does not make this denial on grounds 
of fact - no sense-evidence can be called - it may be that this claim 
amounts to an assertion that it is a priori false to say that a 
substratum supports sense-data.
Whether or not this is so, it is clear that the difference between 
the views of Berkeley and Russell, that the first says the substratum 
theory is self-contradictory and the second says that it is a fiction, 
is not sharp®
The dispute between Locke and Berkeley, and the one implicit in 
the views of Alexander and Russell, now look as if they have the same 
issues at stake and produce much the same two conflicting answers 
about the nature of a material thing. I tried to indicate previously 
that it is an irresolvable dispute, and I have tried to indicate here 
that it is not a dispute which was shelved after the eighteenth 
century, but continues to engage the attention of philosophers in 
this century. It is not a curiosity in the museum of the history of 
philosophy, and it is not even confined to those philosophers who 
would like to hea"^  themselves called "metaphysicians"® This last 
point will be the particular concern of the next section.
C# A typical contemporary form of the dispute
One contemporary school of philosophers who adopted the linguistic 
analytic approach first turned the question about the ultimate nature 
of the material world into one about the philosophical utility of 
replacing statements about material things by statements about sense- 
data. These philosophers when they discussed phenomenalism concerned 
themselves with how useful it would be for philosophical purposes 
to adopt a certain terminology. They insisted that questions of fact 
were not the issue at all; the issue, they believed, was a choice, 
i.e. whether to adopt or reject a technical vocabulary. Professor 
Ayer, for example, stated that no dispute about facts is involved 
when philosophers disagree whether a penny, which (on different
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occasions) appears round and elliptical, is really round and not 
really elliptical. In this case we would be:
"not disputing about the validity of two conflicting sets 
of hypotheses, but about the choice of tv/o different 
languages." 40
Nevertheless, Ayer held, the choice of language must be made.
"If we accept the sense-datum terminology, then we must 
reject the terminology of naive realism; for the two 
are mutually incompatible". 41
On what grounds should tre choose? The reason we are expected to have
for choosing a certain technical language is that it seems more
helpful for dealing with a particular philosophical problem than
its alternatives. In this case, the sense-datum terminology is
recommended on the grounds that it is more often appropriate for
talking about our experience than any other vocabulary. It is always
possible to translate a statement about a physical thing into a
statement about sense-data; it is by no means always possible to
translate a statement about sense-data into one about a physical object—
e.g. it is not possible in the famous case of Macbeth's dagger. This
fact about the comprehensive character of the sense-datum terminology
leads phenomenalists to say that it has logical priority over any
alternative terminology.^^
This earlier disagreement among linguistic analysts, about 
whether the sense-datum or the physical-thing language is#ie most 
useful in giving philosophical descriptions of the material world, 
has more recently acquired an issue even less sharp. The question 
now tends to be, which analyses of statements about the material 
world offend least against the canons of Ordinary Language ? The 
assumption made by these contestants is that ordinary language, 
although they urge that it is not a fixed calculus, does provide a 
reliable and sufficiently stable set of criteria to serve as a 
source of tests for the truth of philosophical vi^ws and the value 
of philosophical terminologies.
40. A.J. Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, IvlacmilIan: 1940. 
p. 17
41. ibid., po 48
4 2. See, for example, A.J. Ayer, "The Terminology of Sense-Data", 
mnd, Vol. LIV, 1945, pp. 289-312
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An illustration of this current mode is the reason given by 
Mr. Warnock for his declaration that Locke's theory of Substance is 
"a mistake".
"His mistake, I think, can best be described by saying that 
he interprets as a baffling fact about the world what is 
really a quite straightforward fact about language." 43
Hence Locke's "mistake" is said to consist in an inference he makes
from the linguistic fact that an analysis of a subject-predicate
proposition about a material thing will reveal that "something" emerges
as a substantive, to the conclusion that "there exists some common
subject to be called su bst anc e". War noc k continues: Locke,
"instead of regarding the expression 'something* as a device 
for avoiding explicit reference to anything, construes it 
as if it does have some explicit reference. But then, 
naturally enough, he finds that he cannot say what it refers 
to. " 45
This criticism of Locke implies that Locke's purpose in formulating 
his theory of substance was to describe the logical grammar, or the 
use, in ordinary language, of the word "something", and that he fails 
to give a correct description, and is therefore holding a mistaken 
view. The assumption is that if a metaphysician interprets a simple 
fact about language as if,it were a baffling fact about the world he 
is making a mistake; for his proper job is to stick to studies of 
words for physical objects and statements about them. If a metaphysician 
should think that he is not talking about language, but about the 
ultimate nature of the world, he is v/rong; he is talking about language, 
even if he does not realise this.
My object is now to examine in more detail the two kinds of 
linguistic analysis of which I have given examples above, in an attempt 
to find out:
(1) whether the account of the traditional dispute between Locke 
and Berkeley which is implicit in them is correct
(2) whether the analyses given are, as they claim, "non-metaphysicà 
studies" of ordinary language
43o Warnock, op® cit., p. 107 
44® ibid., p. 10Ô 
45 o "ibid., p. 109
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(3) whether disputes about the physical-object language are 
notably different from the classical dispute about physical objects.
Since the provinces of the questions overlap, the answers to 
them will not be forced into separate sections. I shall consider 
the two main types of linguistic view, rather than the three questions, 
in turn.
(a) The Rival Terminologies View
Professor Ayer, in his early work at least, held that the question 
"Y/hat is the nature of a material thing?" is a demand for a definition, 
whether the questioner knows it or not. The propositions set forth 
in answer are "linguistic propositions", even though they may seem 
f a c t u a l . O n  this view when a philosopher asks about the nature 
of a material thing, he is really asking how 'material thing’ should 
be defined; but a dictionary definition will never satisfy him, he 
is not asking how he should use the phrase in ordinary conversation.
So philosophical theories about the nature of the material world are 
really rival terminologies advocated for the use of philosophers 
who talk about material things philosophically. They provide
definitions, but not synonyms, which enable the philosopher to reveal
philosophical implications of statements with the aid of a set of 
technical terms and rukes. The terminology which most successfully 
performs this function will be the correct one. So, as Dr. Macdonald 
has argued, the linguistic theory
"is on precisely the same logical level as a non-verbal 
traditional theory. It corrects the mistakes of its
predecessors and claims their defeat and its o\vn victory."
I have argued that the traditional metaphysical theories about 
the nature of material things are unverifiable, irrefutable, and designed 
to accommodate all the facts, i.e. to deny none. Now the advocates
46. See A.J. Ayer, Language,Truth and Logic, pp. 64-65
47. ivlargaret ivlacdonald, "Linguistic Philosophy and Perception", 
Philosophy, Vol. XXVIII, 1953. p. 313
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of a technical language like the sense-datum terminology argue 
in its favour because they say it is useful. If we ask, "Useful 
for what?", the answer would probably be: "For doing philosophy".
The analogy seems to be with a choice between English and Chinese 
on the grounds that one of these languages is a better medium than the 
other for expressing a certain thought or sentiment. It may well be 
that some ideas and feelings can be expressed more vividly or succinctly 
in Chinese, and others in English. In this case the choice of a 
language would be made on the grounds that the one selected is more 
suitable for the purpose in hand. The advocate of the sense-datum 
terminology suggests that we shall be able to express some philosophical 
points with greater clarity if we choose his language and not the 
physical-object language or some rival philosophical terminology, 
e.g. the causal language.
Consider the following type of description which is often given 
when philosophers wonder whether or not to choose the sense-datum 
terminology. If a person stares at an electric light bulb and then 
fixes his gaze on a blank wall he will see what the psychologists 
call an after-image. Now, the philosopher asks, does this person see 
something ? If we say he does, we can also say that he is seeing 
something on the wall which is not on the wall, or not there. Then is 
he imagining something ? Not in the sense in which I close my eyes
and imagine the Albert Hall, I do not conjure up and after-image as I 
conjure up a memory image. Seeing an after-image red spot is not the 
same as seeing a red spot * in my mind's eye'. The philosophical 
problem is further embellished by saying that if we decide that a man 
who has an after-image is not seeing anything, we create equal paradox.
I call this a philosophical problem to emphasise that it would not 
arise in ordinary contexts, nor indeed in any non-philosophical context. 
A plain man, or a psychologist, who asked questions about after-images 
would want to know, for example, what produces them, whether they vary 
in kind, how long they last, and not whether having an after-image 
is seeing something which is there.
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These philosophical thoughts leads to the distinction which 
Professor Moore expressed by saying that there were at least two 
senses of "see". The paradox is resolved by saying j^ hat when 
a person sees and after-image and also when he sees a red spot painted 
on the wall he is "having a sense-datum"; but only in the second case 
does he see a physical object.
Now the philosopher advocating a sense-datum terminology will be 
quick to point out that his technical language scores a point in this 
example of philosophical description. The sense-datum terminology 
can be used to describe all perceptual situations whatever, all instances 
of "seeing", while the vocabulary of naive realism, the causal theory, 
or the physical-object language can be used only to describe the red 
spot painted on the wall, and never the red-spot after-image. But the 
philosopher who advocates another sort of language and rejects the 
terminology of sense-data can retort that the sense-datum way of talking 
fails precisely because it is applicable both to the description of 
after-images, dreams, hallucinations, and to the description of physical 
objects. Hence, he will say, it cannot be used to show the important 
difference between what a man sees in Moore's first sense and what he 
sees in his second sense. Translating all sentences about the external 
world into sense-datum terms makes it sound as if there is no difference 
in kind between images and light-bulbs. The person who wishes to use 
both languages, however, is readily accused of confusion, since he is 
at a loss to say which of the rival terminologies is the correct one 
for describing the situation.
The dispute is said to be about which language is the best one to 
use in the circumstances; i.e. which one will provide the least 
paradoxical answer to a philosophical question, or, as it is sometmmes 
put, which one will provide a correct solution of a philosophical 
problem. The facts are agreed; how should they be described? It is 
often assumed that a very complicated and subtle technical language is 
required, and that plain speech is inadequate for the purposes.
Ordinarily, however, we should find no difficulty in saying that
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the after-image is not really on the wall, although it looks as if 
it is next to the painting which hangs there. Consequently we cannot 
suppose that the rivalry here is between conflicting claims that seek tb 
help in ordinary situations; they are strictly claims which seek to 
resolve philosophical impasses. Yet how are we to choose - which 
vocabulary does resolve the philosophical impasse about after-images 
and painted red spots ? We are meant to be able to decide on grounds 
of technical utility, but if we try to do so it turns out that the 
rival ways of speaking each make a philosophical point, and they each 
fail to make a different point.
If we talk about after-images and light-bulbs as "sense-data", 
we make the point that in each case we do see something; but we blur 
the difference between what we see. If we talk about light-bulbs and 
after-images as "physical things", we make the point that seeing either 
is different from seeing something in a dream or imagination; but 
again we blur the difference between what we see® If we talk about the 
after-image as a sense-datum and the light-bulb as a physical thing 
we do make the point that they are different kinds of thing; we point 
out that the after-image lacks many of the features of the light-bulb, 
it behaves erratically, is less permanent, and cannot be handled®
Then we blur the similarity between the cases which the other ways 
of speaking emphasise, i®e® that both seeing a light-bulb and having 
an after-image is seeing something, and not imagining something.
The conclusion may be that a technical language which will blur 
no points about this situation has yet to be invented. It seems more 
probable, however, that no terminology can be designed to cater for 
all the things that philosophers wish to emphasise about perceptual 
experiences and comparisons. I suspect that when we accept one 
terminology and reject another we do so not because it Sworks better", 
but because when statements are translated in accordance with its rules 
we have a means of expressing a view about the nature of the external 
world which we wish to put forward, without seeming, in the current 
derogatory sense of that word, "metaphysical"®
Surely when a modern phenomenalist tells us that his vocabulary
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provides a better means of describing how philosophical problems 
can be resolved, he is telling us that phenomenalism is true.
It is hard to find the point of translating physical-thing sentences 
into the sense-datum terminology unless the aim is to put fonward 
a classical view that a physical thing is a series of sense-data, or 
to deny that there is a causal connection between sense-data and 
something else. The translation does not solve a problem, it makes 
a philosophical point. If we say that statements about material thin^ 
can and should be reduced to statements about sense-data, although 
it is admitted that there is no non-philosophical reason why they 
should be, v/e are agreeing with Berkeley and Russell in a sophisticated 
and roundabout way that it is absurd to talk about a physical thing 
as if it were something distinct from its sensory aspects.
It is claimed that the ordinary English statement, ’’This cheese 
is stale”, already describes all the facts that there are to describe 
in the sense-datum language. Our translation will add nothing to 
the information already conveyed by the ordinary language statement.
The notiom seems to be, however, that the technical translation is 
philosophically preferable to the ordinary language equivalent.
It is ’’more analytic”. It shows what is being asserted by someone 
who says ’’This cheese is stale”. But people who have never heard of 
”sense-data” know perfectly well what they assert when they say this.
They also know how to verify their statement. The sense-datum transition, 
which shows us, for example, that cheese is describable in terms of 
colour, texture, taste, smell, etc,, merely makes explicit what is 
obvious and routine. Yet it is claimed that it shows something special 
and important about our daily comments on cheese*
Compare modern phenomenalism with classical phenomenalism5 both 
seek to lay to rest the ghost of substratum. The traditionalist says: 
’’There is no connection between sense-data and causal substance, since 
a material thing is defined in terms only of sense-data”. The linguistic 
phenoraenalist says: ’’There is no need to connect statements about
sense-data with any assumption about a substance, since statements 
about material things are reducible to statements about sense-data,”
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Both attempt to banish the substratum view rather than to tell us 
something about how we tise "This cheese is stale", and similar statements, 
which we db not already know.
Similarly, a philosopher who wishes to recommend a special causal 
language may have thoughts in common with Locke, and differ only by 
using the fashionable philosophical idiom# This philosopher may argue 
that the correct analysis of "This cheese is stale" is: "Tliere is an 
X which has the properties of being cheese and being stale." But what, 
he will be asked, is ’X*, what is stale but the cheese, and what is 
cheese but a series of sense-data ? He would have his retort:
"X is the logical subject of the description. ’There is an X and X 
is A’ is not reducible to ’There are A,B,C,D,..*(sense-data) which are 
A*, for this reduction produces a false statement, i.e. ’B,C,D,.i, or 
yellow,round,redskinned .. are not stale. It is the cheese which is 
stale. The cheese itsèlffis irreducible in the logical analysis, it 
can be replaced only by an 'X*, which is a symbol for something which 
is ultimate and unanalysable/^
In ordinary language, he will be reminded, (as if he had forgotten), 
’cheese’ is defined. It is defined as "curd of milk coagulated by 
rennet, separated JBrorri whey, and pressed into a hard mass"; or "a food 
with such and such an appearance". But these practical definitions 
are not the sort which interest either dualist or nominalist philosophers. 
When they ask for a definition of something, they do not expect to be 
told how to make it or recognise it. In their minds is a queer query, 
what function does any physical-object word whatever have, whether it 
be "cheese", "skyscraper", or "bubble". The modern substratum 
philosopher will conclude that "cheese" and any other word for a material 
object has a function such that an analysis of a statement describing 
its properties will reveal that it is replaceable only by an X or ’It’.
He will urge that his analysis is correct, and he will mean that there 
are grounds for believing the substratum view and for rejecting 
phbnome nalisra.
No rule is laid dora, in ordinary language or elsewhere,* for 
choosing between rival analyses of material-object statements, any more
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than there is a rule for choosing between rival metaphysical systems. 
Objections can be found to either, and excuses for both. Logical 
grammar, unlike ordinary grammar, provides no maxims for reference.
Shall we say that "This cheese is stale" is best analysed; "I taste 
staleness which I associate with BjCJDJ,.(sense-data)” ? Or shall 
we say rather that it is analysable as: "There is an X which is
cheese and has the property of staleness" ? The first analysis is 
impracticable (we can never complete the list of sense-data), and 
seems to lose sight of the grammatical subject of the sentence it 
analyses. The second analysis is practicable, but seems to make the 
grammatical subject of the original statement lose its reference.
Since there are no criteria for deciding even what a correct philosophical 
analysis would be, we cannot tell which commits the lesser linguistic 
offence, or even that either ^  an offence against plain speech.
To choose one of the analyses in preference to the other may then be 
determined by the chooser’s sympathy with or antipathy to the 
philosophical outlook expressed by the analysis he chooses or rejects.
The phenomenalist analysis is verificationist, it seeks to turn 
assertions about the material world into assertions about our experience 
of it alone. The other analysis rejects this outlook, and seeks to 
malce those assertions signify items of sense-experience plus something 
else.
It is true in a sense that philosophical theories which express 
outlooks on the nature of the material world or our experience are 
rival terminologies. They do offer descriptions which make use of 
different idioms, and they emphasise different aspects of ordinary 
vrays of talking. But their object does not appear to be simply 
the transmutations of syntax and semantics. For philosophical 
analysts, unlike the philologists whose studies they seem to want to _ 
emulate, do hold rival theories about the semantics and syntax of !
language, and it seems that they do this in order to urge rival 
philosophical views about the import of ordinary language grammar 
and word-usage.
The main argument against my description of philosophical analysis
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will come from those who believe that the proper duty of the 
philosopher is to elucidate the meanings of those ordinary terms 
which, they think, produce philosophical muddles. They assume that 
the modern phenomenalist, and others, are attempting to describe 
ordinary language, and not the nature of the material world. Or, 
they will argue, at least this is what they ought to be doing.
I believe neither that they are doing this, nor that they should be 
doing it. I shall give my reasons in the following section.
(b) Philosophical Theories and Ordinary Language
In Chapter Four of this thesis I pointed out how the belief that 
Locke and Berkeley were misguided reporters giving false accounts 
of ordinary language seems plainly false. Locke and Berkeley were 
quite prepared to accept an ordinary word used in a usual way 
provided that it was used with a special philosophical point in mind. 
Locke and Berkeley, I argued, neither misuse ordinary language, 
deliberately or unconsciously, nor do they misdescribe it by mistake 
or on purpose. They have, of course, definite feelings about how 
language should be used in philosophy, but they have no interest in 
advocating linguistic changes in ordinary situations. They do not 
advocate a way of speaking about the material world, but a way of 
thinking about it. Reasons for these statements are set out in 
the chapter referred to above. It is now necessary to say some more 
about why I believe current linguistic philosophy misses an important 
aspect of metaphysical contentions. I also wish to argue further 
that an analytic philosopher who accuses a traditional metaphysician 
of making mistakes as a result of confusion about ordinary usage 
takes sides in the traditional dispute.
First, it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of contemporary 
analytic philosophy which both urge the importance of ordinary 
language, but which exhibit quite different views about the nature 
of metaphysics. These were briefly mentioned in the Introduction 
to this thesis.
(l) There is the kind of analytic philosophy which does not
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concentrate on the notion that there are mistakes about language in
metaphysical reasoning which produces the bizarre conclusions. It
speaks rather of "juggling with words","recombining known words
49in an unfamiliar way",  ^ etc. It recognises that
"poets do mould the use of language to their needs. And so 
philosophical scientists. Metaphysical philosophers do it 
too." 50
This kind of analysis is aware that "It’s not the stuff, it's the
51style that stupefies" , that metaphysicians are not unconsciously bad 
at logical grammar and unknowingly expert at false linguistic descriptinë, 
but do knowingly indulge in a strange manner ofsspeech. These 
philosophers do not hold that a philosophical theory can be refuted 
on the grounds that it misrepresents ordinary language. They see the 
point that a philosophical theory, even if it does misrepresent 
ordinary language, is intended to do so, and so cannot reasonably be 
accused of doing so. We do not condemn a blueprint on the grounds that 
it is not a photograph. Why then should we condemn a metaphysical 
theory on the grounds that it does not use or describe the sort of 
language spoken at teaparties and over the counter in shops and banks ?
(2 ) There is, however, the other kind of current linguistic 
philosophy, with the results of which I disagree. This kind is 
represented by Professor Ryle’s theory of category-mistakes, by the 
articles in which Mr. Norman Malcolm attacks theories on the grounds that
52
they violate ordinary language, and, most relevantly here, by Mr.
Warnock’s belief that Locke’s theory, and certain parts of Berkeley’s, 
are wrong and can be disproved because they misconstrue the ordinary
48. Morris Lazerowitz, "Substratum", loc. cit., p. I89
49. Margaret Macdonald, "The Philosopher’s Use of Analogy", loc. cit.»
p. 82
50. John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis , p. 254
51. John Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity", Proceedings of the Aristobelian 
Society, Vol. XXXVII, 1936-37, p. 73
52. Cf. Norman Malcolm, "Moore and Ordinary Language", The Philosophy
of G.E. Moore , Library of Living Philosophers Vol. 4, Northwestern 
University: 1942. p. 3 68:
"Moore’s great historical rèj.c consists in the fact that he has 
been perhaps the first philosopher to sense that any philosophical 
statement which violates ordinary language is false.."
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vocabulary of perception. These views, although they painstakingly 
reveal many interesting points about habitual English usage, imply 
that a metaphysical theory is false because it uses, or talks about, 
ordinary usage incorrectly - and this seems to be a gross misunderstand­
ing of at least those views studied here.
Since I have no quarrel with (l), but I do with (2), it is the 
latter which will be examined in some detail here.
At the beginning of this section I discussed Mr. Warnock’s statement 
that Locke makes a mistake when he interprets facts about the ordinary 
use of ’something* as if they were facts about the world. I said that 
there are no rules for the philosophical interpretation of linguistic 
facts, as there are for their grammatical interpretation. However, it 
seems that a rule is supposed to exist, in some esoteric Primer of 
Logical Grammar, to the effect that linguistic facts must not be 
imagined to be facts "about the world". We are not told whence this 
supposed rule is derived. Ordinary grammar does not incorporate the 
maxim: ’’Never treat facts about words as if they were facts about
things", on the model of ’’Never split an infinitive", which is a 
stylistic recommendation, nor on the model of ’’Never use ’is’ after 
*1”’, which is a grammatical rule, nor even on the model of ’’’I’ before 
’E* except after *C*", which is a guide to spelling. Nevertheless, 
a fair trial will be given, and a further attempt made to see exactly 
what "linguistic mistakes" or "linguistic confusions" Locke and 
Berkeley may have perpetrated.
Warnock was undoubtedly asserting a linguistic fact when he said 
that ’something’ is a device for avoiding explicit reference to 
anything. But this does not seem to show that Locke’s view is a crude 
and simple-minded linguistic mistake. Presumably Locke’s mistake is 
said to be that he construed ’something’ as though it were the name 
of èomething. It is a fact that ’something’ is a word used for 
referring to indeterminate things or events; it is also a fact that 
it is not a proper name, and not a pronoun but a noun© But whether
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or not it is like a name is surely not a matter of linguistic fact 
at all; but one of philosophical interpretation. Consider the 
different ways in which we might interpret the actual function of 
the word ’something’ in our language, if we are interested not 
merely in semantics and gaammar but in the philosophical import of 
these considerations. Philosophers wishing to urge a substratum 
view can, without denying any truths about the way we ordinarily 
use the word ’something’, say that since it is a word for avoiding 
explicit reference to any observable thing, then, when the word 
turns out to be irreducible as a final subject-term in the analysis 
of statements about physical things, it must make indirect reference 
to an unobservable substratum. On the other hand, philosophers 
denying the substratum view can say, also without denying any 
linguistic truths, that ’something’ is not the sort of word which 
refers to any particular concrete thing, perceptible or imperceptible, 
directly or indirectly. I may indeed have a definite reference in 
mind when I use the word ’something’; e.g. when I say "I met Jones 
and he said something about his overdraft" - then I have in mind 
certain statements made by Jones, to which I refer as ’something’©
But, it will be argued, although it is true in a sense that ’something’ 
here refers to certain statements, it does not refer to them in the 
way in which my report of what those statements were would refer 
to them. Perhaps it is better to say that ’something’ is a way of 
not referring to things. The dualist philosophers can reply that 
the sense in which ’something’ does refer to something is more 
usual than the sense in which the word does not refer to anything©
This in turn will be answered: and so on. The reason why one can
guess with reasonable confidence that this dispute would be interminable 
is that it has ceased to take account of linguistic fact. Each side 
recognises how we use the word ’something’; but each side interprets 
the philosophical implications of how we use the word as they please.
And ordinary language is not the sort of thing which can tell us 
how facts about itself ought to be interpreted.
Yet Warnock believes that Locke does deny a fact about the function 
of the word ’something’. He accuses Locke of thinlcing that it is
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a word which has "explicit reference". To say that it is a word 
which does not have explicit reference is to stress that the whole 
point of using this word is to avoid mentioning any specific thing.
Thus I avoid being precise on purpose when I say "Something tells 
me this is my unlucky day", (compare the relative precision of 
"My horoscope tells me this is my unlucky day*). If this is the fact 
about the use of the word ’something’ which Warnock had in mind, then
quite evidently Locke did not misunderstand the word. As it happens
the lack of explicit reference for the word in ordinary language is 
the very feature which is important for Locke’s own use of it to
refer indirectly to an imperceptible substance. Substance is described
as "something, I know not what". This is an impeccable English phrase. 
We might even argue it brings out a feature of the semantics of that 
word. It is quite correct to say "something, I know not what", but 
quite incorrect to say "an apple, I know not what", or "red, I know 
not what". Where then is Locke’s mistake?
Warnock’s other accusation is that Locke construes this fact about 
the word ’something’ as though it were a fact about the world. Perhaps 
he does, but one still cannot see the point of calling it a mistake 
to do so. Even if Locke’s doctrine of Substance were a heavily 
disguised treatise on the meaning of the word ’something’ in ordinary 
language, (which is very far fetched), I can see nothing in what Locke 
says which denies any fact about the way in which we ordinarily use 
the word. On the contrary, Locke uses the word quite correctly, and 
does not offer any misdescription of it.
I do not deny that metaphysicians do in fact evolve grand theories 
about the nature of the material world partly from simple facts about 
language. For example, Warnock’s account of the excuse for Locke’s 
theory of Substance in the fact about the analysis of subject-predicate 
statements, which always seems to require the retention of a word like 
’something’, or ’it’, is sound. Looking at this fact in a particular 
way, from a particular imaginative angle, results in the metaphysics 
of unknowable substance. This way of looking does involve imagining 
that the results of the semantic analysis of certain statements suggest, 
or even establish, certain metaphysical conclusions about what the
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world is really like. But no error has been committed when this 
interpretation has been made. There are no grounds for saying that 
it is incorrect to make-believe that the pure logical subject of 
a proposition about a material thing is the name of an unknowable 
entity.
Two conditions which do not exist would have to exist before 
we were justified in saying that a metaphysician had made a linguistic 
error: (i) There would i^ ave to be definite rules of usage
implicit in ordinary language for words like ’thing', ’quality’, 
’veridical perception’, ’substance’, ’sensation’, ’sense-datum*, 
’substratum’, etc. Half of these are technical words which do not 
occur in common discourse, and the rest have a multitude of uses in 
ordinary English. (ii) The metaphysician, in order to misuse 
or misdescribe these words, would have to be trying to use them in 
the ordinary way or trying to describe them.
If (i) were the case, then indeed we could point to a definite
rule of speech which the metaphysician misconstrued, and if (ii) 
were the case, we would then be justified in saying that he had given 
a mistaken answer to a question he did in fact ask. But this is an 
ideal situation, which does not exist.
Let us examine these points in the light of a concrete example,
53again from Warnock’s book. Warnock argues that Berkeley claimed
’’It seems to me and to God and it would seem to anyone else that there
is an orange on the sideboard’’ means the same as ’’There is an orange
on the sideboard’’. If this claim were true, he continues, then it 
would be self-contradictory to assert the first proposition and deny 
the second. But in fact this is not self-contradictory. Therefore 
Berkeley made a mistake.
Now it is an empirical fact about the English usage of the word
53o See Warnock, op, cit., pp. I8I-I82
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"seem" that it is quite correct and usual to say "It seems as if 
there is an orange on the sideboard, but there isn’t". Warnock 
draws attention to the fact that we say that X seems to be Y so 
that later we can either affirm or deny that it Y. "There seems 
to be an orange" means either that we are not sure whether there is 
an orange, or that it merely looks as if there is, but there is not - 
e.g. it is a toy orange. Let us now consider what this lecture 
on ordinary usage has to do with the refutation of Berkeley’s view.
Warnock claims that Berkeley asserted; "’There is an orange on 
the sidebeerd* means the same as ’It seems to me and to God and it 
would seem to anyone else that there is an orange on the sideboard”’.
But of course Berkeley would strongly have repudiated the suggestion 
that it could ever seem to God that there is an orange, since the ’ideas’ 
which constitute the orange are ’in God’s mind’ -i.e. God directly 
apprehends the orange, and knows that it ièsthere. Berkeley would 
have said: "An orange on the sideboard exists only in God’s mind
and in the minds of the finite spirits who perceive it." Tliis is 
rather different, and cannot be translated accurately into a statement 
about what seems to be the case without missing the whole point of 
his metaphysics, which was designed, we must remember, to be a theologic­
al proof. It is perfectly clear to an impartial reader of Berkeley’s 
works that he would not mean by "I have ideas which are the orange" 
that it seems to me as if there is an orange.
If Warnock did not seriously think that Berkeley would say this, 
at least he makes it clear that he thinks Berkeley ought to say it.
Yet Berkeley himself most particularly considered that he ought not 
to say it. For if he did say that when a person has ’ideas’ which 
constitute an orange it seems to that person as if there is an orange, 
Berkeley would be advancing that very same sceptical view which his 
metaphysical theory is specifically intended to banish. That is, if 
Berkeley had said what Warnock thinks he ought to have said, or did 
imply, Berkeley would have put fonward the view that sense-evidence 
is not sufficient to establish that there an orange on the side­
board. He Icnew what the ordinary word "seem" means, and because 
of this he avoids using it - it is not a word which would help to
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provide the metaphysical description of this perceptual situation 
which he wants to give. Even so, Warnock accuses him of 
misapprehending the function of the word, and he does so by translating 
what Berkeley did say into a statement vdiich Berkeley did not assert 
and which uses the word "seems" in the way he particularly avoided.
Berkeley did not hold that "It seems to me and to God and it 
would seem to anyone else that there is an orange on the sideboard" 
means the same as "There is an orange on the sideboard". He held that 
"God and finite spirits have ideas of colour and shape etc." means 
the same as "There is an orange on the sideboard". Can we still, 
given the correct translation of what Berkeley asserted, say that it' 
is not self-contradictory to assert the first proposition and deny 
the second, and that consequently Berkeley was v/rong because the 
two statements do not have the same meaning ? If we do say this,
I believe we ignore a very important point, namely that Berkeley 
would never claim that these two statements mean the same within 
the framework of daily and non-philosophical discourse.'
"There is an orange" means, in ordinary language, simply that 
there is a gold citrus fruit with a thick, rough skin, etc. It does 
not mean either something which is, or is not, perceived by God.
Now Berkeley was well aware, as I tried to show in an earlier chapter,
that his metaphysical theory resulted in some ways of speech which are
not ordinary - e.g. in saying "We eat and drinlc ideas". But since his 
self-set task was not to describe common phraseology he merely comments 
that although we speak with the vulgar, we must think with the learned. 
If we say that ordinary assertions about oranges do not amount to 
assertions about God, and so Berkeley was wrong, we forget all his 
emphasis on the irrelevance of ordinary expressions to the truth of 
his metaphysics. He would agree that the vulgar do not ordinarily 
mean by "There’s an orange" that they are receiving certain percepts 
from God. Nevertheless he will insist that the metaphysical truth 
of the matter is that this is what they must mean. In Berkeley’s
language - i.e. according to Berkeley’s definitions - it £S self­
contradictory to assert that God has ideas of the orange and to deny 
that there is an orange, since he has made ’ideas in God’s mind’
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part of the meaning of 'orange* in his system. In his language 
assertions about oranges are assertions about God as well. To complain 
that this is not so in ordinary language, that in comnon parlance 
statements about oranges have nothing to do with statements about God, 
is simply to reiterate that Berkeley’s language is not ordinary, but 
designed for a metaphysical purpose. V^hich everyone knows.
Compare a person who tries to ’refute’ Shelley’s Ode to a Sky1ark 
by saying that its second line is self-contradictory. "Bird thou 
never wert" implies that it is true both that X is a skylark, therefore 
a bird, and also that X is not a bird. This v/ould be absurd for the 
same reason that it is absurd to attempt to ’refute’ Berkeley on the 
grpunds that the two statements which he says mean the same do not mean 
the same in ordinary language. Neither She&ley nor Berkeley were 
concerned with the plain speech of ’the vulgar’.
This kind of attack fails, since the two conditions necessary for i'te 
success which I mentioned do not exist: ordinary language cannot
legislate about the proper use of statements like "God has ideas" 
since the statement is outside its jurisdiction, and metaphysicians 
do not intend to chronicle ordinary uses of words, but have grander 
aims* Berkeley steps outside the province of ordinary language when 
he draws conclusions about an omniscient God \iho directly provides us 
with our sensory world. Earlier in this thesis I made the preliminary 
suggestion that the bizarre features of the views of Locke and Berkeley 
depend upon special interpretations of facts and propositions. They 
also have their own language rules, and to refute the results of 
employing them on the grounds that the theories do not always use 
plain speech would be very like refuting the rules of whist by citing 
those of chess - i.e. no refutation would be made.^^
Although I claim that it is inappropriate to attempt refutations 
of metaphysical theories about the external world by reference to 
comnon speech, I do not, of course, wish to say that ordinary language 
is totally irrelevant in every respect. To compare the theories with 
ordinary language, and especially with the various common beliefs about 
material things inlierent in that language, brings out their queerncss,
54w- (’An €xampl6 w'sed byrT.n. rf.ifloUf iTne voeaBulary ûî .^ 'PeMcan 
Books; 1953- F* 39
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without condemning their eccentricity. More will be said in 
the next chapter about the relation between ordinary language and 
metaphysical views.
For purposes of further illustration, suppose that a linguistic 
analyst turns his attention to Alexander’s view, in much the iray 
that Warnock treats Locke’s. It is a truism about language to say 
that whenever anyone talks about a material object it is always 
appropriate to ask: "IVliere is it?" or "How long has it existed?"
or "I/lien was it made, planted, or when did it appear?" In other 
words, the definition of ’material thing’ would entail that a material 
thing exists in some place or other at some time or other. The analyst 
may complain that Alexander construes the fact that physical-object 
words are so used that it is always appropriate to ask of their 
referents "Where?" and "V/lien?" as if it showed something about the 
constitution of material objects themselves. Alexander’s mistake, 
the argument would continue, is to confuse "A material thing is 
something which exists spatially and temporally", or "Physical-object 
words are applicable to those things for which we can appropriately 
ask a date and a location", with the kind of statement which tells 
us about the constitution of material things, e.g. "Steel is made 
of iron and carbon". He interprets certain facts about the use of 
words for material objects in ordinary language as if they are facts 
about those material objects themselves.
This hypothetical case of a linguistic analytic attack on Alexanderfe 
view Is only roughly sketched. But it serves to bring out in a different 
context the points I hope to make clear. Alexander was not particularly 
interested in \7hat the plain man would have to say about space and time; 
the plain man, of course, would have nothing directly relevant to say 
about them. But suppose for the sake of argument that he did reason 
in this way: "Words for material things are always used in such a
way that we can always ask of their referents ’’V/here?*’ and "IVhen?*; 
therefore material-thing words always refer to objects which consist 
of Space-Time". Even if Alexander did reason like this, we should 
have no grounds for saying that he wqs in error. He has interpreted
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facts about the usage of material-thing words as facts about the 
nature of things, but as ordinary language provides no rule forbidding 
or discouraging Alexander’s interpretation, as he has not made a 
’mistake’ which all competent speakers of English will recognise as 
one, it seems that we can condemn his reasoning only by rejecting it, 
and not by proving it invalid or incorrect#
Sometimes one can detect in an ordinary language advocate’s 
criticism of a metaphysical view a subtle, cunning and disguised claim 
that the opposite traditional metaphysical view is the true one#
For example, Professor Ryle by giving examples of common expressions 
in an attempt to show that it is a linguistic or logical confusion to 
speak of mind and body as separate entities, (in his book The Concept 
of Mind# for example), argues in favour of behavioarism and against 
the psychological substratum view# Yet he would no doubt sternly deny 
that he is entering the arena of metaphysical disputation# Mr# Warnock, 
who would make the same denial, attacks the substratum theory of material 
things with one of Berkeley’s own arguments, that Locke was guilty 
of linguistic confusion and consequently wrong# Yet explicitly he is 
in favour of doing no more than undertaking
"the proper investigation of the immensely complex vocabulary 
of perception in ordinary language" 55
But surely to attack a metaphysical view is not to investigate the
ordinary vocabulary of perception#
It seems to me that the "ordinary language attack" on metaphysical 
views simply denies metaphysicians the right to be metaphysical, while 
there is reason to suspect that those who make it are themselves not 
above engaging in metaphysical dispute themselves# More clearly, 
the advocates of a sense-datum terminology sound very much as if they 
are recommending the classical theory of phenomenalism, and condemning 
the substratum view, in much the way in which Berkeley did# And the 
philosopher who promises an impartial study of the expressions of daily 
discourse, then attacks with some vehemence a metaphysical view about 
the nature of material existence, is surely producing an involved.
55# Warnock, op# cit#, p#p# 246-247
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indirect and complicated contribution to the Locke-Berkeley dispute*
He is not simply studying it or ordinary words* Unless he is aroused 
by the issues which give rise to the metaphysical dispute in the 
first place, it is hard to see the point of devoting ingenuity 
and trouble to showing that one side makes ’mistakes*, when this 
accusation cannot be taken literally in so far as they are meant to 
be mistakes about ordinary language*
It seems that in the modern analytic approach to Locke and Berkeley 
we can detect that the dispute between them is still alive, and still 
irresolvable* There is but one important difference# While Locke 
and Berkeley appealed mostly to facts in order to give their views 
plausibility, their modern successors appeal chiefly to ordinary 
language expressions* Perhaps because the advance of science in the 
intervening period has made it seem a little indecent for philosophers 
whose subject has not progressed at all, but merely changed its idioms, 
to appeal openly to the facts of nature.
CHAPTER NINE
THE GENESIS OF THE DISPUTE
A. The Material for the Dispute
Bo Metaphysical Interpretations and Reasons
"Philosophers reason for and against their 
doctrine and in doing so show us not new 
things but old things anew." 1
John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, p. l8l
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I have argued in previous chapters that the dispute, both as it 
is waged by Berkeley against Locke and as it appears in the conflicting 
views of Alexander and Russell, has three characteristics which 
demand explanation from any meta-philosopher who seeks to reveal its 
mechanism or pattern# These are:
(1) Neither of the opponent views - that the material world 
ultimately consists of something imperceptible or that
it ultimately consists of sense-data - can be conclusively 
confirmed or conclusively rejected on objective grounds; 
i#e# on grounds of material fact, ordinary language usage, 
or logic# To put it briefly, both views are logically 
fortified against refutation#
(2) As a result of this feature, the dispute is not merely 
unresolved, but irresolvable. Yet although it is irresolvable, 
the Locke-Berkeley disagreement persists, and, as I argued
in the last chapter, can even be traced behind the heavy 
disguise of current views expressed in linguistic style#
(3) This study has also indicated that the theories put forward 
by metaphysicians to describe the material world are couched 
in a mixed logical style: their conclusions are formed in
such a way that they rule out even the logical possibility 
of finding a refuting instance, while many of the arguments 
put forward for those conclusions appear to make appeal to 
empirical observation and suggest that by making such an 
appeal it would be possible to refute or to confirm the 
theories# No one type of argument is used in the metaphysical 
argumentation for the views# Some seem to draw upon scientific 
and psychological fact, some upon coramonsense belief and 
ordinary ways of speech, some upon genuine necessary true 
propositions, some upon propositions which are made to
function as if they were necessarily true, and some make
frankly bizarre metaphysical claims#
I hope to account for the irresolvability and persistence of this
dispute, for the irrefutability and mixed logical style of argument
used to establish the rival conclusions which give rise to it# I
hope to do this by expanding some of the inklings which have been
gleaned into full explanations# This will involve further consideration
of how metaphysical interpretations, reasons, attitudes, motives
and what I have been calling ’pictures* might function together to
produce a clash of opinion having the strange characteristics remarked
above#
Any theory purporting to be about the nature of physical objects
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must surely have a ground floor, however high its upper storeys 
may soar into the stratosphere of abstract speculation. In 
mapping the architecture of metaphysical theories I shall begin by 
asking about their foundations in ordinary beliefs, familiar facts, 
and common expressions about these beliefs and facts. It should 
then be easier to see how the mundane material of a metaphysical 
view comes to be moulded into something more extraordinary than 
plain fact; and how the uncontroversial elements of experience 
which we normally take for granted come to be used as evidence for 
two conflicting but equally irrefutable general conclusions about 
the nature of all that exists in the physical world.
In the final chapter I shall discuss the cause of the dispute 
in attitudes, motives, and 'pictures*. This chapter will be 
divided into a consideration of the material for the dispute, and 
some suggestions about its metaphysical treatment by special 
interpretations.
A. The Material for the Dispute
"A dispute about the ultimate nature of material things" is a 
phrase which sounds as if it must refer to a disagreement in which 
rival theories give literal descriptions which are either true or 
false accounts of material things. Many philosophers have held that 
it not only sounds like this, but that the dispute is in fact 
an empirical disagreement about the nature of the external world 
conducted by super—physicists. While I do not believe that the
metaphysical theories studied in this thesis can be called, in any 
determinate sense, *true* or ’false*, it is clear that they have 
been, are, and will continue to be judged or termed wither right 
or wrong, correct or misguided, and, by many, true or false.
One consideration will be to decide how the facts and common beliefs 
^ ic h  seem relevant to the theories relate to those metaphysical 
conclusions which are sometimes said to be descriptions of them.
This involves a study of what those facts and beliefs are.
Other philosophers, unable to discover what it is logically 
impossible they should discover, namely some sort of factual or
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linguistic test which will show either that the theories deny or 
conform with the facts and common beliefs, have concluded that although 
metaphysical theories are not factually true or false, they are 
linguistically correct or incorrect; they do not give right or 
wrong descriptions of the material world but they do exhibit confusion 
or misunderstanding of the terms in which that world is normally 
described# Again, while I do not believe that these theories are 
either successful or unsmccessful attempts to show the workings 
of ordinary statements, or refutable by a painstaking semantic and 
syntactical study, it is nevertheless clear that they do involve some 
verbal contortions and linguistic tricks# Another consideration here, 
then, will be to decide what some of the linguistic material of the 
dispute is, what sort of statements and terms provide the cards with 
which metaphysicians perform their tricks#
We might say that the material for the dispute consists of three 
main types of data - empirical facts, (e.g# that we hear bugles and 
noises), common beliefs, (e.g. that the penny is round even when it 
looks elliptical), and ways of talking ( e.g. we say "the snow is 
white", and "I shall believe it when I see it"). Yet as soon as 
such classification is attempted, it is apparent that we are dealing 
with a slippery question when we try to state what exactly the 
original data for a metaphysical theory are. For example, although it 
is a fact about experience that we hear bugles and noises, it might 
be retorted that it is better to call this a common belief, or a way 
of talking. To decide whether it is a fact, a belief, or a way of 
speech to say we hear bugles and noises is itself a metaphysical 
question. There are no ways of making sharp distinctions between 
facts, common beliefs and ways of speech until the metaphysician 
makes ways, and here the aim is to isolate what the metaphysician 
considers from what happens to it as a result of his consideration.
An attempt needs to be made to describe the original data for 
a metaphysical theory completely non-philosophically. That is, in 
order to see clearly vdiat the non-metaphysical basis for a metaphysical 
dispute is, it is important to avoid importing technical classifications
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which produce metaphysics and not plain description. If this attempt 
succeeds, it should make it evident that the data for a metaphysical 
theory are in themselves completely uncontroversial*
Since ordinarily we do not generalise about our experience in 
the philosophical manner, (e.g# we do not think about ’physical 
objects’ but about pens, cars, mountains, etc.), the best way to 
bring out what the data from experience are before they are given 
a philosophical description is to list some concrete examples of 
the sort of points which seem to be considered relevant by those who 
seek to answer the comprehensive question about the ultimate nature 
of the material world.
(i) In the world there are many things, like buses, trees, 
rivers, snowstorms, sunshine, grass and saucepans
(ii) All these things have various shades of colour, shapes, 
sizes, smells, tastes, textures, odours, and many of them 
make noises
(iii) People have many experiences: besides seeing trees and 
hearing bugles and buses, they sometimes imagine that they 
do, or dream that they do, or occasionally seem to see 
and hear these things when the things are not there to be 
seen or heard
(iv) It would be odd of someone to say: "I heard, touched, smelled, 
and saw the bus, I was awake, I was not imagining that I
did all this, I was in a normal state (not drunk or psychotic 
etc.), but no bus was there.’’ If someone said this, we 
would think either that there must have been a bus there, 
or that he didn’t really see, hear, touch or smell it, or 
that he was not really awake, or not really in a normal state. 
Alternatively we might dismiss him as a humourist.
(v) Similarly it would be odd of someone to say: "When that bus 
disappears round the corner, out of my sight and hearing, 
it will cease to exist". If it were clear that this person 
did not mean that the bus was a phantom, or that it was going 
to crash round the corner, we should dismiss him as eccentric 
or his remark as a joke.
"We", it must be remembered, know nothing of philosophy.
It is evident that (i) -(ti) state quite uncontroversial truths 
which no one bothers to state in non-phiIseophical contexts. They are 
in themselves boring matters, uninteresting statements about things 
which most people take for granted. Statements and facts about buses
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or snowstorms and their characteristics might be provocative or 
interesting, but statements about all things, about fog as much as 
about saucepans, which claim no more than the truism that they exist, 
are hardly likely to arouse argument. A man who gave a lecture on 
all material objects whatever, who wanted to tell us as little about 
mountains and the moon as he did about brushes and prunes, would not 
hold his audience# That is, he would not be interesting unless 
he happened to have a scientific theory to explain or a metaphysical 
view to propound# For the point about the vacuously general truth 
that many things and many characteristics of things exist in the 
world is that it can arouse interest and controversy when it is given 
a certain interpretation - either scientific or metaphysical# Although 
no layman would deny that things as different as buses and cabbages 
exist, no layman would think anything of it# At the commonsense level 
this truth is trivial#
Point (iii) describes occurrences which are familiar to eveyyone# 
But ordinarily the fact that sometimes people see what is not there 
to see, usually when they are asleep, but in rarer cases when they are 
awake, and the fact that we can if we choose imagine the Albert Hall 
while we are looking at St# Paul’s, do not seem in need of explanation# 
We just can; we just do; and that is the end of the matter# It is 
true that psychologists and physiologists have an interest in giving 
causal explanations of these phenomena, but even they have no interest 
in making inferences from them about the nature of the world, only 
about a limited aspect of the nature of people# Commonsense thinking 
takes hallucinations, illusions, dreams and memories far more for 
granted than many philosophical writers would imply# Some people are 
fascinated by dreams; but their fascination would not normally involve 
a question of whether they are really distinguishable from real life# 
Others are fascinated by the power of the imagination, for example 
by the fact that there are people who can look at a printed page and 
read it from a mental image they have formed while the book is closed# 
Yet normally no question about the eidetic image and the printed page 
would be raised, unless it was one seeking a causal explanation in 
terms of some scientific hypotheses# The point is that this kind of
-183-
phenomenon in any non—philosophical context is considered quite 
unsuggestive of theories about the material world.
(iv) and (v) made points about common beliefs or natural 
assumptions which are taken so much for granted by commonsense and 
by science that there is something bizarre in stating them at all#
The statements about buses which I made to illustrate what seem to 
be the relevant common assumptions are statements which would probably 
never be made at all in an ordinary context, and if they were they 
would not be made seriously# The assumptions which they illustrate 
are not the kind which are consciously adopted# For example, the 
assumption that when the bus disappears out of sight and sound, and 
does not crash, and is not a phantom, it continues to exist, is very 
different from the assumption that its driver will continue driving 
it until he reaches the terminus# The first iÈ&something which we 
assume without question or thought; the second we might well question 
and ponder, especially during a period of industrial unrest# This 
is another way of saying that the common beliefs or assumptions that 
provide part of the data for a metaphysical dispute are not normally 
considered questionable, and indeed not normally considered at all# 
They are singly taken for granted, and anyone who in an ordinary 
context did not take them for granted would be considered most 
eccentric or witty# It is very important to remember this, for it 
contributes a point about the nature of a metaphysical dispute, as 
I shall endeavour to explain later on#
Before considering what some of the linguistic truths and 
scientific notions are that provide data for metaphysics, I wish to 
establish that the unexciting truisms discussed above are in fact 
data for the metaphysical dispute studied in this thesis# The simple 
points stated in (i) -(v) are difficult to separate from metaphysical 
interpretations placed upon them. This is because in non-metaphysical 
contexts they would hardly be dignified with the titles ’facts’ or 
’beliefs’ at all# They are neglected commonplaces. To speak of them 
as facts and beliefs is already to lose some of our normal 
conmnonsensical indifference towards them; it makes them sound more 
inq>ortant than they are in daily thought, speech and practice# I
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shall try to show that the relation of a metaphysical conclusion to 
them is one which involves a loss of indifference and the introduction 
of various technical classifications and interpretations which 
change the commonplaces into controversial arguments.
Let us consider in turn the trivial truths listed under (i)-(v) 
above, and try to see how they are transformed in the metaphysical 
theories, which do take account of them, but in such a way that appeal 
to these original data does not serve to refute or confirm these 
theories. I shall partially restate the points as headings.
(i) and (ii) In the world there are buses, trees, etc.. and all these 
things have various shades of colour, shapes, etc.
In the first place, metaphysicians draw attention to these two 
points by io^osing technical headings on their items in such a way 
that (i) and (ii) are sharply distinguished from each other. As soon 
as this happens the truisms begin to look less commonplace, (i) becomes 
?!Material Objects or Physical Things exist"; (ii) becomes, variously, 
"Simple ideas of sensation, sensory qualities, or sense-data, etc., 
exist".
Now although metaphysicians introduce these technical terms to 
describe commonplaces (i) and (ii), the result of the introduction is 
hot just description, though of course neither is it misdescription.
If we were to ask what material things are, we should be told that they 
are things like buses and trees. And yet by calling things like buses 
and trees "material objects" or "physical things" the haphazard and 
enormous class of objects gains a certain coherence and importance 
which it does not have while it is simply a list of all the things there 
are in the world, an indiscriminate collection of widely differing 
objects. The indefinitely long list of things like tables which 
always has to end with ’etc.* is now replaced by a phrase which seems 
to refer to a definite class of objects,membership of which is never 
in doubt. The differences between physical events like thunderclaps 
and fog and physical things like tables and soap-bubbles are blurred 
when we use one expression to refer to the lot - "Material Objects" 
or "Physical Things".
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The metaphysical transformation of point (ii) is even greater#
Without it I d o u b t t h e  question about the ontological status 
of colours and sizes etc. would ever arise. Normally there is no 
need to decide whether such items, like beauty, exist only in the 
mind of the beholder. But when all the qualities which things have 
are called "sensory qualities", or "simple ideas of sensation", or 
"sense-data", we are immediately forced by the terminology, (which varies 
according to the interpretation the philosopher puts upon colours 
and shapes), to look at things like colour from a new angle, and to 
distinguish them more sharply than laymen do from material things: 
even if we finally choose to say that the two are identical.
The metaphysicians etch in a distinction which is very blurred 
in ordinary contexts. All four of them do this, Locke, Berkeley, 
Alexander and Russell. Compare the commonplace points with their 
metaphysical interpretations: instead of saying "There are buses
of various sizes and colours", we now say in the more general but 
also less commonplace manner, "There are material objects and there 
are sense-data, or sensory qualities, according to the specific 
metaphysical interpretation given." Although the distinction between 
a thing and its characteristics, between a bus and its colour, does 
exist in ordinary thinking, it never becomes an issue about the nature 
of those things. For example, no layman would bother his head about 
whether the red and the height is part of, or different from, the 73 
bus he catches to work. But he might, of course, think about the bus 
without thinking about its colour, or vice versa. The distinction made 
by the "introduction of metaphysical terms like "material object" and 
"sensory quality", however, is not like this. It is more definite and 
more comprehensive. As soon as it has been made, we begin to think 
of the world as if it contains two different types of thing - objects 
and sensible appearances. As soon as we do this, we start to think 
metaphysically.
2. I do not mean that these terms are synonymous. Only that they are 
all given application to what commonsense would call colours, etc*
3. Cf. J.F. Thomson, "Symposium -Reducibility", Proceddings of the 
Aristotelian Society. Suppl. Vol. XXVI, 1952. p. 103
"if philosophers had not wantonly introduced the category-word ’material 
object’ would it still seem that something needed to be made clear..?’
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The technical terms give a new look to the facts which suggested 
them# An unnaturally rigid distinction is made between what begins 
to sound like two different types of entity in the world - things 
and the characteristics of things# The imposed distinction raises 
a question which would not have seemed at all appropriate if it had 
not been made. As it is, it appears that an explanation is needed 
of the relation between things and the cha^racteristics of things.
"What is the relation of Material Things to Sensory Qualities, for 
example?" sounds much more reasonable, and also more important, than 
"What is the relation of the bus to its redness?"
The Locke-Berkeley dispute arises partly because different answers 
are given to this special question, which is the result of a special 
distinction. '»Ÿhen Locke said that the relation between material objects 
and simple ideas of sensation was a causal one, he underlined the 
distinction by making buses and their colours sound even more like 
completely different sorts of thing, for he concludes that real buses 
are in themselves imperceptible and their perceptible qualities, e.g. 
the redness which we see, is the result of them. Berkeley reacted against 
this, and against the distinction which gives rise to Locke’s conclusion. 
But he does recognise the distinction in the first place in order to 
deny that one of its headings has any items to list under it. Berkeley 
answers the question about the relation between things and ideas (or 
sensory qualities) by saying that there are no material things which 
are not identical with collections of ideas. Alexander, unlike 
Locke, did not underline the distinction in order to make out that 
material things are even more different than the classification suggests 
from their sensory attributes. He insisted, for example, that sensory 
qualities were not ideas. i.e. not dependent for their existence on 
the percipient, any more than material things are. He nevertheless 
makes use of the metaphysical distinction in order to say that the 
relation of a material object to its sensory qualities can be explained 
only in terms of a contour of Space-Time which unites them. Without 
the distinction, no such explanation would seem necessary. Russell too, 
like Berkeley, made a distinction between things and their aspects or 
appearances in order to deny that material objects were any more than
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a series of sensory aspects. One reason why the dispute arises is 
that the metaphysical theories all share a presupposition, i.e* 
that this distinction between things and their appearances should be 
made, in view of certain ordinary facts like (i) and (ii), and 
then interpret the implications of that presupposition in conflicting 
ways.
Now whether "simple ideas of sensation", or, for that matter, 
sensory qualities or "sense-data", (which are not given precisely 
the same significance as each other, but which all seem to be phrases 
used to describe certain philosophical interpretations of the simple 
fact that there are colours which we see and sounds which we hear, etc\ 
are or are not identical with material things is a question which is 
asked by those who have lost their indifference to the plain truths, 
that the world contains things like houses and trees, smells and 
colours. We might even say that the plain facts are irrelevant to the 
metaphysical interpretations; there is a temptation to say so since 
the facts cannot serve as tests for the truth-value of the metaphysical 
answers. Yet trees and houses are examples of material objects, 
and smells and colours are examples, interpreted in the appropriate 
way, of sensory qualities, sense-data, or simple ideas of sensation* 
There is a sense, surely, in which these things are very relevant to 
metaphysical conclusions about the relation of material things to 
sensory qualities, etc. I shall try to say to what I think that 
relevance amounts*
I said that one reason why the Locke-Berkeley dispute arises is 
that metaphysicians play a trick with the une ont rovers ial and simple 
facts that the world contains things like trees and also like colours 
and noises. This trick consists of substituting "The world contains 
physical objects and also sense-data, or also sensory qualities" for 
the pointless list of examples of things and their characteristics.
The introduction of impressive generic terms forces us to take a 
different attitude to the boring truisms* By doing all this, the 
trick imposes an artificial distinction between those truisms, and 
succeeds in raising a very odd question, now familiar to philosophers
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but none the less odd for that, which seems both to refer back to the 
commonplace facts but also to refer to their transformation* Locke, 
Berkeley, Alexander and Russell all accept a distinction, in some 
form or other, between material things and their sensory appearances* 
Berkeley and Russell accept it in order to argue that the two are 
identical. Locke and Alexander accept it in order to argue that 
material things are different from their appearances in such and such 
a way* Now on the surface it may look as if these arguments might 
be understood by looking at the data from which they first arose.
It looks as if at least they could be translated back into ordinary 
contexts of daily life without losing their point or flavour.
Suppose then we say that Locke and Alexander are pointing out 
that we do distinguish buses from their colours, while Berkeley and 
Russell are pointing out that we do not* Might we then say that Locke 
and Alexander claim that buses are not coloured, udiile Berkeley and 
Russell claim that they are ? This clearly will not do, since in 
this very ordinary and normal sense Locke and Alexander would no more 
deny that buses have colours than Berkeley and Russell would waste 
their time saying that they do have colours. Yet, at the level of 
commonsense facts which some people think are being described by 
metaphysicians, what else could it mean to say that material things 
are, or are not, distinguishable from their sensory appearances ?
We might try stating that Locke and Alexander think that buses 
are things which cause the colour we see them to have, while Berkeley 
and Russell believe that the colour we see is part of the bus. But 
this just serves to bring out even more the eccentricity of the 
metaphysical views* For in ordinary situations there is no occasion 
to say either that buses cause us to see red or that the red, like 
the wheel, is part of the bus* The bus is coloured, or red, and there 
the matter ends as far as that commonsense which is so often evoked to 
add plausibility to strange conclusions is concerned* It is impossible 
to make sense of metaphysical interpretations if we look only at the 
commonplaces a# not at the interpretations of them.
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Now suppose on the other hand that we say the metaphysicians 
are not directly interested in things like buses and things like 
people’s experience of their colours, or in those ordinary assumptions 
and actions which belong to the mundane world of catching buses to 
work, but in the relation between metaphysical entities like 
material objects and sense-data* But we have to remember that 
buses are material objects, and when we see them we ^  have sense-data* 
In this sense, metaphysicians must be interested in such matters*
But I have tried to show that there is subtle dissimilarity between 
saying, for example, "That’s a bus" and "That’s a majrerial object"; 
betweenssaying, "Look, it’s red", and "I have a sense-datum of red" 
or, (on a different metaphysical interpretation), "Look, red the 
sensory quality"* The technical terms make the facts they are 
used to describe more provoking than they normally are* Although it 
sounds eccentric to ask questions about the relation of the red I 
see to the bus itself, it sounds less so to ask about the relation of 
sense-data to material things* This is surely because the introduction 
of the technical classification seems to create a problem, where 
no problem ordinarily exists or arises* And just because the question 
about the relation of sensory characteristics, or however the red 
I see is to be interpreted, to material objects seems so out of place 
in commonsense thinking, a metaphysician has a free hand to solve 
’the problem’ he has created in his own way without fear of 
misrepresenting facts or commonsense belief*
At the risk of labouring the point, I shall try to put it another 
way, since it seems to me important*
Locke, in his metaphysics of the material world, denied that 
the colours we see are real* If it were true that a metaphysical 
account describes in a straightforward manner the commonplaces from 
which it arises, we would not be unjust to Locke to imagine him 
insulting a hostess at a garden party by telling her in all sincerity 
that her grass is not really green, although very plainly it looks 
green* But of course this story would be grossly unfair to Locke’s
theory* It ignores a distinction upon which he insists, between
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perceived patches of colour, or sense-data, and things-in-themselves, 
or material objects. Locke would not deny that in a non-metaphysical 
sense the grass, which looks green, is green# It is only in a 
metaphysical sense that he denies it really has a colour* This 
sort of consideration makes one want to say again that the ordinary 
facts are irrelevant to metaphysical theories, because Locke cannot 
be refuted by the only sort of evidence that could refute him - 
evidence of the senses* Yet the statement that the grass is not 
really coloured, although it is a bizarre metaphysical statement 
which we cannot refute by studying grass, would not have the effect 
it does, would not arouse us, unless it looked as if it reported a 
strange discovery about grass or about colour*
To take a final example, Berkeley denied the existence of material 
things. If his metaphysics were simply a description of ordinary 
facts, this would mean that he denied fact (i) above, namely that there 
are in the world things like buses and trees* But of course he did 
not* He did not deny that there are things in the world, but that 
those things are distinguishable from our experience of their 
colours, shapes, sounds, etc.; he only denied that there afe material 
things in Locke’s sense of ’material things’, i.e* things-in-themselves 
which are imperceptible* Consider, for example, how Berkeley would not 
use the terra ’material object’ as he would use the term ’tree’; for 
the term ’material object’ in his theory has no meaning, while the 
term ’tree’ refers to a group of ideas* He did not say that trees 
do not exist; he said that material substances do not exist* Similarly 
Russell does not say that wallpaper does not exist; he says that 
the wallpaper is not a single material object, but a series of sensory 
aspects* These points help to bring out, I think, the relation 
of metaphysical reasoning to the commonplace facts* They are 
accommodated, never denied* Yet sometimes they seem to be undermined* 
This illusion is created by the use of technical terms and an artificial 
distinction which results from their use* The technical terms are 
terms for ordinary things and their ordinary characteristics, terms 
to cover grass and its length, oranges and their taste, and so on*
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But they are also terras which make these things much more distinctive 
than they would normally be considered to be. Berkeley so uses his 
technical terms that we are led to wonder seriously what happens 
to the taste of the orange when we are not eating it, a puzzle which 
is entirely alien to any normal discussion of oranges. But we are led 
to wonder this if we are shown a way of tliinking about the taste of 
oranges as we would think about a dream of oranges; if we start calling 
a taste an ’idea* and an orange a group of ’ideas’. This way of 
thinking, of course, is neither suggested nor denied to us by the 
facts about oranges and their flavours, which are simply that there 
are oranges which have various flavours* Nor is it suggested or denied 
to us by the facts about dreams, which are simply that we have dreams 
and sometimes they are of oranges. Yet, if we bring together by a 
special imaginative process of thought the orang^nd the dream, which 
would not be done by the plain man or the scientist, we can make out 
a case either for saying that it must be an imperceptible substance, 
or for saying that it must be apprehended by God, or logically constructed 
by us, or made of Space-Time.
Berkeley’s answer, that God ’causes’ the orange I eat, and I 
myself the one X dream I eat, is an interpretation of an interpretation 
of the commonplaces facts, and in no way a description of them.
The facts are: I eat oranges and sometimes I dream I do. The first
interpretation is: in both cases I ’have ideas’; this interpretation
results from Berkeley’s form of the distinction between things and 
their sensory appearances, denying that either are anything but ideas.
The second interpretation is: therefore, the difference between the
orange I eat and the one I dream I eat, since in both cases 1 have 
ideas, must be that the first is a group of ideas in the divine mind, 
while the second is a group of ideas in my mind alone. Other metaphysic­
ians, however, starting with the same facts and the same presupposition, 
find no difficulty in making quite different interpretations.
This is just one way in which the material for metaphysics becomes 
so transformed that commonsense barely recognises it.
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(i ü ) Besides seeing drees and hearing bugles, people imagine, dream 
or believe that they do when the things are not there
Normally we have no difficulty in distinguishing dreams and 
illusions from real things, and if we do on occasion have difficulty, 
this is not usually considered a good reason for setting up a list 
of criteria for future use# We have criteria, but they are not the 
sort which can be set up in a definite way. We know roughly how to 
distinguish dreams from waking life, and this is all that is needed 
for practical purposes.
But metaphysical thinking is a very different matter# The 
existence of two kinds of things, material things and sense-data for 
example, is suggested by the metaphysical classification. The question 
is then generated about how sense-data are related to material things 
when experience makes it true to say that sometimes what I experience 
with my senses is not an experience of a physical thing, but a dream, 
illusion, hallucination, etc#
Berkeley, as stated above, makes hay out of the necessity to 
explain veridical and illusory perception by using it as an excuse 
to give a metaphysical reason for the existence of a certain kind of 
God^ Locke makes use of the need to conform with the facts about 
these phenomena by using them as a metaphysical reason for asserting 
the existence of an unknown causal substance. Russell tried to give 
an explanation of the difference in terms of logical construction# 
Alexander, anxious to deny the mind-dependence of any sense-data, 
even illusory ones (i.e. those which lead us to believe that there 
is a material object present when there is not), speaks of the mind’s 
miscalculations in cases of illusory perception, (e.g. bent sticks 
in water), and of the reality of the images in dreams or memories.
The last are said to be distinguishable from material objects since ttey 
are not united in the same way in Space-Time.
The distinction between material things and sense-data, together 
with the need to accommodate facts about veridical and illusory 
perception, are transformed by Locke into ’reasons’ for asserting thd: 
material things are not identical with sense-data, and that their
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relation is causal. Thus when I dream I bang my fist on a table, 
and have all the sense-data I would have if I behaved in this manner 
when I was awake, I am not banging one material thing on another, 
however much I may seem to be doing so at the time. For, Locke^ says, 
my sense-data in the dream are not caused by material substance, the 
fist and the table I seem to sense are not real, but mental creations. 
When they are real they are still mental creations, but created by 
an external agency, unknown substance, and not by iï\y mind.
Russell, like Berkeley, refuses to accommodate the facts of illusim 
in this way; he avoids the assumption of material substance by 
explaining them in terms of the tests we would normally make to see 
if we are awake, or sober , or not deluded by our senses, i.e. tests 
to establish whether the phenomena we sense are occuring in the 
ordered pattern we expect - whether both the candle flames we see can 
also be touched, whether the pink mouse also squeaks, etc. This type 
of explanation lends further credence to his view that the material 
world consists of logical constructions from sense-data; illusions 
are those sense-data which do not comply with the logical constructions 
and their relationship to each other.
In the case of these data for metaphysical views the conclusions 
drawn from them are not straight descriptions suggested by the facts 
alone. The conclusions u^e the facts to add plausibility to the 
theories, rather than report them. Locke and Alexander seize upon 
the need to recognise the distinction between veridical and illusory 
perception as an opportunity for urging that sense-experience is valid 
when it is caused not by our own mental processes, but by an imperceptible 
and ultimate substance outside us. Berkeley makes it an opportunity 
to urge the existence of a divine percipient, for example. None of the 
metaphysical conclusions which are made partly as a result of considering 
dreams, memories and hallucinations, are either directly suggested or 
plainly falsified by the facts about the psychological experience to 
which we are prone. But those facts considered together with the 
metaphysical classification and interpretation already made in each 
case, do without any doubt lend a certain plausibility to the conclusions
j
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startlingly drawn from them*
(iv) It would be odd of someone to say that when the bus disappears 
out of sight and hearing, etc., it ceases to exist
I said before that this common assumption or belief is taken 
so much for granted that there is never occasion in a non-philosophical 
context to state it. When, during a philosophical controversy, 
a philosopher pronounces that the plain man believes material objects 
can, and do, frequently exist unperceived, we can hardly fail to 
agree with him. Yet our agreement seems somehow artificial. While 
it is obvious that a vast number of our ordinary statements, (like 
"I locked the passport in the safe), do exhibit our constant assumption 
that things like passports or buses d£ sometimes exist unperceived 
and can always do so; while it is also obvious that a non-philosopher, 
once the question had been explained, would answer "Yes" to "Can 
material things exist when no one is perceiving them?"; there is 
nevertheless something most extraordinary about the question. From 
the commonplace point of view "Yes" is the right answer, but it is 
the right answer to an eccentric’s question. Someone might ask,
"Are there tigers in Africa?" or "Are eight sixes forty-nine?" and 
we answer "No". But in these cases we can go on to explain why we 
answer in the negative - because the only reports of tigers in Africa 
have been made by an unreliable source of information on the master - 
e.g. Hollywood films - and because eight fives are forty so eight 
sixes cannot be forty-nine, etc. We refer to material evidence 
or to a multiplication system. The questions reveal ignorance, but 
not eccentricity. Now compare the question, "Does that bus cease 
to exist when it is locked in the garage for the night?"
Suppose the questioner makes it clear that he wants to know 
whether the bus ceases to exist in these conditions, and not, for 
example, whether it is real or a ghost vehicle, etc. We should, of 
course, say "No". Yet how are we to go on ? If the questioner 
says "Why not?", what possible explanation can we find in material 
evidence or well-ordered systems to establish that we were right to 
say "Ho" ? Only philosophical speculation can give rise to the
1
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strange question; only philosophical theory can back up our answer.
It is not enough (philosophically) to say that the bus will go on 
existing in the garage because people always believe that it does.
While it is not a reply which satisfies chronic metaphysicians, it is 
the only thing there is to say at the commonsense level. At one time 
people always believed that the sun revolved around the earth, but they 
were wrong. Yet we cannot even use this sort of analogy here, for what 
would it be to discover that we have been wrong in assuming unthinkingly 
that buses go on existing when locked in their garages ? The question 
draws a blank.
I stress this point, because the practice of philosophical speculation 
makes it easy to forget how monstrous its questions sound in the realm 
of ordinary discourse. If they are asked, plain answers can be given 
without hesitation; yet the plain answers are not altogether plain 
once they are given to these questions, which force upon commonsense 
considerations which are entirely alien to it.
When (iv) stated above is said to exhibit a common belief or 
assumption, what is meant is that it exhibits a habit of thought which 
ordinarily raises no puzzles since we ask no questions about it. Some 
philosophers may feel inclined to say that it is a fact that buses 
can exist unperceived. This would be acceptable if they were not 
philosophers. As they are, the use of the word ’fact* by them arouses 
the suspicion that they are calling something a fact which by definition 
we can never observe, and that consequently they are grinding some 
metaphysical axe. Since I hope to make it clear that I have no 
metaphysical axe to grind, I shall say that the fact in question is 
that certain ways of thought and talking exhibit a common belief, usually 
an unconsciously held one, that things like buses can and do exist when 
nobody is perceiving them. This fact can be interpreted ii^ number 
of metaphysical ways, none of which are either true or false. It becomes 
transformed by the alchemy of the speculative argument applied to it.
It turns out that the common belief, e.g. that buses in their 
garages do not suffer a sort of extra-sensory annihilation, is given 
special treatment by the metaphysicians not unlike that accorded to
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the fact that we sometimes dream*
The treatment does not involve destroying the common belief, but 
changing its point, making it have new repercussions. Locke, in 
the first place, had generated a puzzle about the relation of millions 
of discrete and disconnected "simple ideas of sensation" which he 
imagined sense-experience to be, and the ordered world of buses and 
trees, which, as a partially plain man, he knew must not be denied.
One aspect of this problem which he created was that if the buses 
we see consist of simple ideas in our minds, it must follow that th^ 
cannot exist when the garage door is bolted upon them at night. Then 
they must cease to be simple ideas; yet simple ideas is all that 
they are. Locke chose to develop the dilemma into a theory which 
denies the second affirmation. Buses are more than simple ideas.
All that ceases to exist in the garage is our direct knowledge of them, 
or our simple ideas. The bus itself does not cease to exist. It is 
an imperceptible causal substance. (l oversimplify one of Locke’s 
involved argumentations on purpose, to try to show what he does to 
a common belief. I have oversimplified but not, I think, distorted 
his description of the continuity of material objects). The common 
belief, for example about buses in their garages, gives Locke no less 
than a good excuse for talking about imperceptible causal substance*
Now Locke himself, of course, does not regard his argument from 
commonsense assumption as an excuse, but as a reason for his 
conclusion. The transformation of excuse into reason is a topic 
for the next section of this chapter. Here I wish to emphasise that 
the ordinary habit of thought, which never gets stated or considered 
in non-philosophical contexts, is turned by Locke into a reason 
for believing in an eccentric view about things like buses. The fact 
that, if asked, the plain man would reply that a thing like a bus 
does not depend for its existence upon being seen, touched, etc., 
does not itself suggest the conclusion that a thing like a bus is 
essentially imperceptible, or for that matter that it is essentially 
a group of percepts. But it can be made to suggest such conclusions 
if we are forced to look at it with certain unusual problems in mind.
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e.g* the problem about the relation of Material Objects to Simple 
Ideas of Sensation#
Consider further the following examples for the sake of 
comparison and contrast:
(a) "Do tigers exist in India?" — "Yes, but they might not have
done, for example if India had a different climate, and 
they might not in the future, for example they might all 
be shot."
(b) "Do tigers exist unmolested by gunfire?" - "Some do, some
don’t."
(c) "Do squares without four sides exist?" - "No. Squares are
four-sided".
"Do tigers exist unperceived?" - Yes. "Might they not, or might 
they not have done in the past?" - No, if tigers ever failed to 
exist unperceived, this would mean that they were not then tigers, 
but hallucinations , or something like that. The same applied to 
the suggestion that one day tigers might only exist when they are 
perceived. When we say "Yes" here, we cannot go on to explain 
why in the way in which we did after saying "Yes" to "Do tigers 
exist in India?" Nor can we reply as we reply to "Do tigers 
exist unmolested by gunfire?" Although it is commonsense to say 
that some tigers exist unperceived, in the least accessible parts 
of the forest, others "get perceived quite often", this misses the 
point of what philosophers ask. Philosophers, of course, do not 
want a factual reply about whether there are some tigers which 
no one ever sees or hears etc. They want to know whether there 
can be tigers like this, or whether when we say that there are, we 
are talking about a different kind of animal from the one which 
growls and waves its tail in the sight and sound of people.
Suppose then we say, "Yesy tigers exist unperceived; tigers 
are imperceptible", or "No, tigers cannot exist unperceived, 
tigers are groups of percepts". This reply is analogous to 
"No, squares without four sides don’t exist, squares are four-sided? 
It is analogous, but with a difference; squares are four-sided, 
that is how they are defined, how everyone defines them, that 
is how they are correctly defined. But tigers are defined neither
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as imperceptible nor as groups of percepts, but as striped and 
fierce feline quadrupeds, slightly smaller than lions, etc. This 
definition gives no backing to either metaphysical view.
Berkeley, like Locke, feels that the common belief that tigers 
do exist unperceived must be accommodated. It also seems to provide 
a useful excuse for the development of his theory. Casual readers 
of Berkeley would think, perhaps, that Berkeley undermined the common 
belief, for he almost denies what it asserts. The heart of his view 
is that no thing whatsoever can exist unperceived. This he insists 
upon. Then what about the ordinary belief which we all share that 
tigers in the depths of the forest exist when nobody is perceiving 
them ? This consideration seems to Berkeley to provide a reason for 
believing that there is a divine percipient. Nothing can exist 
unperceived; yet we believe things do eHist unperceived by, as he 
puts it, finite sentient beings; and so they do, for these things 
are directly apprehended and created by God. Without destroying it, 
Berkeley gives our ordinary implicit assumption a strange twist. As 
commonsense itself does not suggest that tigers are directly 
apprehended by God, or, for that matter, that they are not, Berkeley 
is able to give this significance to the ordinary belief without 
raisreporting it. Out of the commonplace material he creates an 
outrageously uncommonsensical view. He appears to deny, in the face 
of the plain man, that any thing can exist unperceived; but he grants 
the plain man his only point in saying that things do exist unperceived 
by finite beings. By granting commonsense its point, he transforms 
the plain man’s belief into an unusual theological theory. That 
belief is not described, but changed - not recorded, but used for an 
unusual purpose, namely to prove the existence of a divine mind.
Russell, whose arguments are so often Berkleian although no 
religious motive can be attributed to him, plays a similar trick with 
our ordinary habit of thought. Material things on the one hand, 
sense-data on the other: the distinction is enforced in order to make
sense of the denial that material things are anything other than sense- 
data. The plain man is now expected to object: "But if my books are
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no more than series of sense-data, does this mean that they cease to 
exist when I cover them with a dustcloth ?" (No really plain man, 
we must bear in mind, would say this unless prompted; but he is 
often made a philosophical mouthpiece, so important do his beliefs 
seem to those plain men who are also philosophers.) The absurdity 
involved in thinking that books disappear from the world when they are 
hidden from sight and touch provides Russell with the chance to develop 
his view that a material thing is not a series of actual sense-data, 
but a series of both actual and potential sense-data, all of which 
items are so related that the series can be logically constructed.
A material thing is a set of both perceived and unperceived perspectives. 
Hence the books behind the dustsheet continue to exist - in the form 
of series of unperceived perspectives or possible sense-data. This 
view is an extraordinary interpretation of the commonsense thought that 
books do not vanish from the world because they are unperceived. But 
it does affirm that thought, or at least avoids denying it.
We can observe the same kind of treatment of our common assumption 
in the work of Alexander. The orange, locked in a dark larder, 
surely not only still exists but is also, for example, still yellow, 
sweet, juicy, etc. Locke accounted for this usual belief by saying 
that the orange, and its secondary qualities, ultimately consist of 
imperceptible substance. Alexander presents an account which is a 
strange mixture of Locke’s and Russell’s arguments. The orange continues 
to exist in the dark because it is a portion of Space-Time, its 
secondary qualities continue to exist as potential qualities - the 
colour waits in abeyance for light to call it forth. The need to give 
an account of an ordinary belief again provides a metaphysician with 
a chance to transform it into a reason for a metaphysical claim, which 
he gives in preference to a straighforward description.
The remarkable conviction of these metaphysicians is that their 
speculative arguments serve to explain matters which the ordinary man 
assumes, but never analyses. The truth seems to be that their accounts 
transform these ordinary matters into theories which serve to influence 
our philosophical outlook, rather than to explain our ordinary outlook.
For example, Berkeley’s treatment of the common belief does not help us
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to understand why we talk about areas of the Amazon in which no man 
has been known to set foot, it serves to force upon our attention ' 
the speculation that the whole world may be a direct result of divine 
mental activity. The basic material for a metaphysical theory is 
barely recognisable in its end product.
(v) It would be odd of someone to say that although he was awake, 
etc., and had ample sense-evidence that a bus was there. in 
fact no bus was there
It is perfectly true that we know a bus has come by using our 
five senses, or more usually by using three or four of them* If the 
possibility of delusion is ruled out, someone who had the usual 
amount of sense-evidence for saying "Here’s the bus", yet felt that 
his claim must be false, would be suffering from what Russell called 
pathological doubt© Indeed, the reaction to someone like this would 
probably be to recommend a psychiatrist. "Here’s the bus" is a 
statement which we can confirm only by using our eyes, ears, etc*
If someone rejects the evidence resulting from this procedure, there 
is no other possible sort of evidence to offer. He would consequently 
be considered highly unreasonable.
Although we can say all this about the way in which we ordinarily 
know when a bus has come, without having to import philosophical 
distinction or speculation, the plain facts of the matter do not in 
themselves suggest the inferences drawn from them by, for example, 
Locke, Berkeley and Russell* How we usually directly find out about 
physical things does not suggest the possibility that those things 
are groups of "sensible things". For example, I find out that a bus 
is passing the window by looking at it and hearing it. If I want to 
discover whether a bus is passing this is the only direct way of 
finding out* Yet this in itself does not suggest anything about what 
sort of thing the bus is - whether it is a bundle of sights and sounds 
and smells or whether it is something which causes these. It only 
suggests that the bus is a visible, tangible, and audible thing, not, 
without metaphysical treatment, that it is, or is not, a collection of 
visibilities, tangibilities, and audibilities*
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Yet Locke, Berkeley, and Russell conclude from a study of how 
we find out about material things that the material world mtself 
is a collection of sensa, or ways of finding out. I discussed this 
point in Chapter Four, where I tried to show how artificial the 
sense-data picture of the material world is© I discover the bus has 
come by seeing it, etc® If someone said "It?s come", and we said 
"What has ?", he may, instead of answering "The bus", point at the 
large red shape emitting petrol fumes and grinding noises® But from 
this procedure no non-philosopher would think of concluding anything 
about the nature of the bus, i.e® whether it is a group of sense- 
impressionso We always think of buses as things with certain 
characteristics, and the question of whether when we perceive those 
characteristics it is as though our mind contained them as a mirror 
contains its images never arises, nor does the question about the 
relation of the thing to its characteristics. From the commonsense 
point of view these considerations are highly artificial; for, as 
I tried to show earlier, the clearcut distinction which metaphysicians 
make between things and what is sensed, which helps to produce the 
sense-datum and the substratum picture of the world, is not usually 
made at all*
A cherry is something we find by seeing, tasting, or feeling.
It has a certain characteristic look, taste and feel. It would be
mad of someone eating a cherry, and knowing its name, to say that he 
was not sure whether he was eating a cherry. But this does not imply 
that the cherry is made of a look, a feel, and a taste, though neither 
does it imply the contrary® "What is a cherry ?" - the answer is 
"A small bright red stone-fruit, with such and such characteristics". 
Berkeley and Russell, and Locke in so far as he talks about nominal 
essences, reply "A cherry is a set of sensa -juiciness, redness, etc." 
Now both the commonsense and the metaphysical reply take account only 
of what we perceive in describing the cherry - but with an important 
difference® The first tells us how to recognise a cherry; the 
second gives us a highly imaginative picture of how we might bring 
ourselves to think about the cherry® In the second case it is quite 
impossible, even by the minutest examination, to tell whether the
I
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way of thinking about a cherry recommended is true or false, correct 
or incorrect®
Sense-evidence, evidence of sight, hearing, smell, touch and 
taste, is the only kind of conclusive evidence for the confirmation 
or rejection of statements about material things. This is why we 
should look askance at a person who was given all this possible kind 
of evidence, but still denied the statement it supported# The 
simple truth that a bus is a visible, tangible, audible and odouroHs 
thing, which I can only perceive by seeing, touching,hearing and 
smelling, is turned, for example by Berkeley, into the metaphysical 
claim that it is a cluster of looks, fee% sounds, and smells, which 
exist only as a result of someone seeing, touching, smelling and 
hearing them. Commonsense, which provides the material for the 
development of this view, can provide no comments on its validity®
For commonsense does not think of the constitution of things like 
buses in this way at all, and becomes irrelevant to the metaphysical 
quarrel#
Alexander partly shared the picture of the world as a kaleidoscope 
of discrete sensory events, developed from contrasting things with 
how we recognise them® He stressed the incompatibility of this 
notion with the ordinary one that the material world contains single 
objects. Like Locke, he stressed the created dilemma in order to 
resolve it by the production of a strange view - that an imperceptible 
principle, Space-Time, unifies the discrete sensory qualities to 
present familiar objects. The intellectual construction of the 
bus from ways of recognising it - the bus as a set of looks, feels, etc# 
suggests to Locke euid Alexander the opposite sort of conclusion 
from that suggested by the same preliminary interpretation to Berkeley 
and Russell# It suggests to Locke and Alexander that the looks and 
feels which are said to constitute the bus must be caused by something 
which is not itself perceived by sense# Alexander, however, goes 
further than Locke and claims that the looks and feels themselves 
(as they look and feel to us) exist externally in the imperceptible 
causal agent, Space-Time. Once again, these claims do not result from
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straight description of common belief and fact. They result from 
interpretative treatment, not from reporting, from speculation, and 
not from fact-finding®
The material for the metaphysical dispute does not consist wholly 
of plain fact and common belief, like examples (i) -(v) above®
I shall now point out some of its other elements.
(vi) Data from scientific theory
Chapter Six was devoted to an attempt to show how Russell and 
Alexander, who claimed that their metaphysics was ’scientific’*, can 
only be said to have produced views at all comparable with the 
hypotheses of natural science in the sense that they borrow some 
scientific ideas. These seeds from science, however, as soon as they 
are transplanted into metaphysical soil, produce hothouse blooms 
quite different from the flowers they grow in their natural habitat®
We can say that the notions which Locke incorporated into the theory 
of Substance also cease to be scientific in anything but name. Yet 
they lend to the metaphysical conclusions of all these philosophers 
some of the prestige which since Locke’s time has been accorded to 
scientific endeavour with its spectacular practical results. Locke 
used the notions of particle physics, Alexander the notions of 
relativity theory, and Russell the method of Occam’s Razor, to give 
the main examples, in order to produce an apparently empirical line 
of argumentation which nevertheless leads to a priori conclusions®
All this has been discussed in previous chapters, and only a brief 
memorandum is intended here.
It seems that in addition to ordinary facts, beliefs and procedures, 
the basic material for a metaphysical theory includes scientific and 
mathhmatical notions. But like the uncontrovers£ài facts and beliefs 
of the plain man, the more controversial notions of science, as soon 
as they become part of a metaphysical theory, take on significance 
and meaning which would be quite beside the point in their appropriate 
contexts.
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(vii) Necessary propositions and linguistic data
The material from which a metaphysician spins his theory, as I 
have argued previously, includes some familiar necessarily true 
propositions. I have also argued that the conclusions of a metaphysial 
theory are couched in an a priori style. That is, they assert 
propositions which would not ordinarily be considered necessarily 
true, but which become necessarily true if we accept the definitions 
laid down by the system. It seems that Berkeley, at least, recognised 
this, when he noted:
"Wherever my reader finds me talk very positively I desire 
he’d not take it ill. I see no reason why certainty should 
be confined to the Mathematicians."4
Necessary propositions, then, seem to enter into metaphysical dispute 
in two ways: they provide arguments, and they are used as models
for metaphysical conclusions.
The immediate objection one anticipates to this is that it is not 
at all clear to philosophers what a necessary proposition is - whether, 
for example, it isjklways analytic, or sometimes a priori synthetic, 
whether it is certifiable by empirical fact or linguistic rule - and 
that consideration of these propositions is in itself richly productive 
of metaphysical dispute. The accusation may be made that in holding 
any theory about the nature of necessary propositions I am indulging 
in metaphysical quarrel idiile trying to explain it. The best way of 
countering this move is perhaps to state what it is I do assume about 
the nature of necessary propositions, which I believe coincides with 
what everyone would recognise as their unique characteristic. No analysis 
of this characteristic is offered here, since for my present purposes 
all I need to do is make clear that another kind of statement, besides 
simple statement of fact, is utilised in a metaphysical dispute.
I take it that no one would seriously deny that there is a difference
4. Berkeley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 58. (Philosophical Commentaries, 
entry no. 468)
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between true statements the denial of which yield false statements, 
and true statements the denial of which yield self-contradictions 
or inconsistencies. It is surely evident to commonsense that when we 
say a square must have four sides we mean that we cannot, in any 
circumstances, truly say that it has three or five, whereas we can say 
that if a square is big, it happens as a matter of fact to be big, 
and might have been small without ceasing to be a square. Self­
contradictory statements, it would be generally admitted outside the 
context of philosophy, cannot in any circumstances whatever be true.
Now in order to make them express a truth we have to change the meaning 
of their terms. No shift in the facts will serve this purpose®
But a shift in the facts might well make an empirical statement, 
previously false, true, without any change being made in the meaning 
of its terms® This is all that I assume or take for granted about 
necessary propositions.
Consider the following examples of statements:
(a) Everything is somewhere at some time
(b) You can’t touch anything which is intangible
(c) You can’t observe anything without observing it
(d) There cannot be an itch unless someone feels it, and there 
cannot be an idea unless someone has it.
These statements may be dull, but they would ordinarily be considered
to be the kind which are undeniable, in the sense that to deny them
is to utter self-contradictions, e.g. "I can touch the intangible".
It would be senseless to say that I have a pen which is nowhere, will
be nowhere, and has been nowhere; or that I have an itch which I never
feel. It is inconceivable that I should be able to observe something
without observing it. The statements (a) - (d) are irrefutable, unless
we ct^ bnge the ordinary meanings of their main terms.
Consider now how these statements, with their genuine air of 
unalterable certainty, are used by the metaphysicians. For example, 
three metaphysical statements involved in the Locke-Berkeley dispute 
are : .
(a ) The existence of a sensory idea consists in someone’s having 
it
(B) a material thing is no more than a group of ideas
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(c) A material thing is an imperceptible substance
I hope I have sho^m that these statements, like genuine necessarily 
true statements, are irrefutable, i.e. they cannot be refuted by 
facts, only by insisting on a change in the meanings of their central 
terms. I now wish to see what the relation is between such 
metaphysical statements and ordinary necessary truths.
Locke and Berkeley both accepted (A) as a necessary truth. Yet 
from it Locke concluded (C) and Berkeley concluded (B). But (A), of 
course, is neither equivalent to nor deducible from statements 
which we should normally consider to be necessarily true, since the 
technical term ’idea* covers many more kinds of thing than the 
ordinary term ’idea’. So that a consequence of (A) is, for example, 
that it is self-contradictory to speak of a noise existing unperceived, 
which, of course, ordinarily it is not. "There cannot be an itch 
unless someone feels it and there cannot be an idea unless someone 
has it" provides a model for "There cannot be an idea (philosophical 
sense) unless someone has it", but it does not imply these metaphysical 
conclusions. Whereas from the metaphysical proposition (A) we can 
derive statements like "The existence of a smell consists in its being 
perceived", we cannot derive anything like this about our percepts from 
the ordinary truth that the existence of an idea - e.g. a thought - 
depends for its existence upon e.g. a thinker. Where an unfelt 
itch would normally be at least a suspect item of experience, an 
unseen colour is normally considered to be a reputable concept. Yet 
Locke and Berkeley class colours and shapes with itches and aches, 
using ’ideas’ to describe a vast medley of qualities and sensations.
Yet (a ) has some relation to ordinary truths like (d) . Locke 
and Berkeley trade upon the respectable credentials of (d) in order 
to invest the same certainty into (A). If we take "There cannot be 
an idea unless someone has it", and give a new and wider meaning to the 
word ’idea’, we have manufactured a new a priori truth, and with it 
a new class of self-contradictions. If we makebelieve that colours 
and sounds, textures and smells, are like thoughts, opinions and 
beliefs, and also like aches and pains, we can use the technical term
-207-
’idea* for them all, and the transformed necessary truth now makes 
it self-contradictory to speak of unseen colours or unfelt textures, 
just as it is self-contradictory to speak of thoughts existing in 
the absence of thinkers or of unfelt pains. This is a typical use 
which metaphysicians make of necessary truths, chhnging the meanings 
of the terms which ordinarily serve to express them, or employing 
special technical terms, in order to give the ordinary necessarily 
true statements a wider set of implications without upsetting their 
a priori feature of irrefutability by fact.
Now consider how Locke and Berkeley came to their point of 
divergence. We have the necessarily true proposition, (which they 
have made necessarily true), (A) established in both their systems.
From it Locke derives (C), while Berkeley derives (B) and denies (C) 
which he considers to be self-contradictory. Both may have had 
somewhere in their minds ordinary necessary truths like (b) or (c), 
you can’t touch the intangible or you can’t observe anything without 
seeing it. In themselves these truths convey nothing about the nature 
of the material world except the trivial points that if we say 
something is intangible we mean we can’t touch it, and if we say we 
observe something, we must also mean we see it. Locke and Berkeley, 
however, produce imaginative interpretations of what such truths imply. 
The truth that we cannot touch the intangible ( or see the invisible) 
seemed to Berkeley to be a reason for saying that as we do touch and 
see houses, they can never be intangible and invisible; Locke hr 
believed, who held that we do touch and see houses but houses are 
intangible and invisible, uttered self-contradictions. But Locke, in 
hAs own terms, did not contradict himself. He held that we do not 
really touch or see houses, since they are really intangible and 
invisible. The metaphysical trick of distinguishing Appearance from 
Reality saves him from the self-contradiction of which Berkeley 
accused him. Now it is as though Locke and Berkeley, when they thought 
about the trivial tautologies of common language, saw in them different 
and equally eccentric significance. It is as if Locke said, for 
example, "We can’t see the invisible ( i.e. there is something invisible 
which we can’t see)"; while Berkeley said, "We can’t see the
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invisible (i.e. there is nothing invisible since this could not be 
seen)”. Locke’s interest is in what cannot be seen, the hidden and 
unknowable, Berkeley’s is in what can be seen, the apparent and 
familiar. Different interests naturally lasad to different interpretation; 
of a common truism®
Let us consider again Alexander’s view that things must be made 
of Space-Time, or must be Space-Time. I suggested previously that the tAne 
of authority in which he makes this pronouncement is partly derived 
from the undeniable truth that material things, pens or cars, must, 
if they exist, be somewhere now, or, if they have existed, have been 
somewhere in the past, etc. It is unthinkable that a real house 
should exist nowhhee at no time® It is unthinkable because it is 
senseless. To rewrite Berkeley’s comment, anyone who attends to the 
meaning of ’exists* when applied to material things will know that 
”A material thing exists" means "A material thing exists now in some 
place". Consequently Alexander, had he rested content with 
substituting the abstract nouns "Time" and "Space" for the use of 
different tenses and spatio-temporal adverbs, and said simply "Material 
things must be in Space and Time", would have said something obviously 
true but exceedingly dull® (Although to some extent the introduction 
of abstract nouns with capital letters alone promotes to a higher rank 
a proposition which could equally well be expressed without them)®
The dull truism itself, however, is kept in the background, as an 
implicit sponsor for the remarkable but somehow similar claim that 
material things are Space-Time®
"Material things must be in Space and Time" - "Undeniable".
"Then they must be Space-Time" .® Compare: "Those buildings must be
in London" - "Undeniable". "Then they must be London" «. The claims 
preceding the comment "Undeniable" in each case are truly undenèable 
unless we monkey with our ordinary language. The claims following 
the comment leave us with an uncomfortable feeling. They are not, 
strictly speaking, true. Things are not Space-Time any more than 
buildings are London. Yet if we are prepared to extend the province 
of a verbal rule - e.g. to make one set of things to which the word 
"London" is correctly applicable the only set of things for which the
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word can be used - we can be persuaded that a given bizarre proposition 
is necessarily true, e.g. that certain buildings are London.
Alexander tries to do tÿis with Space-Time. "X is a material thing 
means for one thing that x is spatially and temporally located" 
results in the irrefutability of "There cannot be a material things 
which is not temporally and spatially located". This becomes transformed, 
with the help of various arguments discussed previously, into 
"There cannot be a material thing which is not Space-Time". While 
the metaphysical claim is not made necessarily true by any rule of 
ordinary language, it does seem to borrow plausibility from the 
genuine necessary truth about material things in order to establish 
a new a priori connection between things and the necessary conditions 
for their existence - i.e. the connection of identity between things 
and Space-Time.
The metaphysicians make use of ordinary necessary truths, in 
themselves trivial, obvious, and quite unprovocative, as indirect 
certifiers for their own manufactured ^  priori claims. They remould 
statements which none of us would deny into statements which most of 
us would deny, yet cannot by denying refute, for they retain the 
irrefutability characteristic of the originals. Just as there is no 
way of refuting "You can’t see what is hidden and therefore invisible" 
while there is a way of freeing ourselves from its logical necessity 
by changing the meaning of ’see’ or ’the hidden invisible’, so there 
is no way of showing that a material thing is not imperceptible while 
there is a way of freeing ourselves from the necessity to say it is.
For example, we can decide to count what we see through a microscope 
but not with our naked eyes as an instance of "seeing what is hidden 
and invisible", so freeing ourselves from the first necessity. And 
we can refuse to accept Locke’s verbal rules, for example the rule that 
’thing’ is to have two meanings - ’perceived thing’ and ’real thing’ - 
in order to free ourselves from the necessity to say that material 
things are imperceptible.
It is, of course, much easier to ignore Locke’s special verbal rules 
than to ignore those of our ordinary language. This makes us prone to
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accept "You can’t see the invisible" more readily as a necessary 
truth than "Material things are imperceptible substances". But the 
point is that we need not accept either if we change the meanings of the 
terms, and we have to accept both if we accept both the verbal 
legislations which back the statements. The fact that most of us do 
not accept Locke’s distinction between ’thing’ and ’real thing’ 
in his sense in no way shows that Locke’s conclusion is not necessarily 
true if that distinction is accepted. We may prefer to say that 
’group of ideas’ counts as ’a thing-in-itself’, as Berkeley did; or 
we may prefer to say that ’material thing’ refers neither to a group^ 
of ideas nor to an imperceptible substance, but to something else, 
e.g. simplj^  something like a tree or a mountain. It does not matter 
what we say, but it is important to realise that in offering alternatives 
to Locke’s conclusion, or to any other metaphysician’s conclusion, 
we are not thereby refuting it, for in its own terms it cannot be 
refuted, and the terms of its own system are the only relevant ones.
In the last chapter and throughout this thesis I have disagreed 
with the current philosophical view that a metaphysical theory either 
describes or misdescribes, uses or misuses ordinary expressions.
It uses some ordinary expressions, of course, but we must remember 
that many of the central terms are technical. It never describes, 
misdescribes or misuses plain speech. The question arose, what then 
is the relation between a metaphysical contention and ordinary language ? 
This has already been partly answered. I said that ordinary language 
cannot legislate about, for example, the proper meaning of a statement 
like "Ideas are in God’s mind," or even about answers to questions 
like "What are material objects ?", asked, as Professor Wisdom would 
say, with a frown and not for information. We cannot refute 
metaphysical contentions by appealing to ordinary ways of talking.
We cannot reasonably pretend that these metaphysic isms had no idea 
of what ordinary speech was like. The relation of common expressions 
to metaphysical theory seemed to be one of assimilation by technical 
translation. I shall now develop this point.
A good example of explicit attention paid by metaphysicians to 
ordinary language was found in the Locke-Berkeley dispute about abstract
—211—
ideas, and fully discussed in Chapter Two. I tried to show that 
Berkeley only manages to make "Abstract ideas exist" into a self­
contradictory claim by substituting his own definition of ’idea’ for 
Locke’s. Neither definition of ’idea’, we must remember, is an 
ordinary language one. The issue concerns two alternative technical 
uses of a word. Now since the dispute is ostensibly about abstract 
ideas, ^ich in turn is about the function of general words, it is 
only too easy for the linguistic analyst to leap to the conclusion 
that ordinary language or ’logical grammar’ will decide the dispute.
But I think I showed in Chapter Two that this is not the case. The 
way in which general words in fact function in ordinary speech fails 
to tell us whether general words stand directly or indirectly 
for particular things, whether abstract ideas in Locke’s sense do or 
do not exist. The function of general words provides excuses for both 
views, or at least we can understand equally weèl, if we remain 
impartial, how our ordinary usage suggested Locke’s view and also 
how itA suggested Berkeley’s. We can defend either view by considering 
semantics and syttax; but we cannot conclusively confirm or refute 
either.
The relation between metaphysical argumentation and ordinary 
expressions, like that between it and ordinary necessary truths, 
might be called one of interpretation, since "I see a tree", "That’s afaouëe 
"I’m thinking of triangularity", are ordinary expressions which are 
not denied, misdescribed, or misused by Locke or Berkeley, but given 
unusual sigmificance* They are accounted for by all the views.
Yet, as soon as they become subjects of metaphysical treatment, they 
are expressible in technical terms - "I have ideas", "That’s an 
imperceptible substance", "I have an abstract idea of triangle". This, 
however, does not mean that lovers of plain speech have reason to 
feel outraged. By all means go on talking about trees and houses in 
the way you do, say Locke and Berkeley, but I am giving you an account 
of what you really must mean when you do so. Perhaps we do not mean 
what we are told we really must mean. But then neither do we mean, 
by our dull and daily statements about the material world, anything 
which any metaphysical theory denies we mean. The metaphysical theories
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take account of what we say, and if the result is transformation of it,
nevertheless we are not told to say something different in our daily
rounds of conversation. We are forced, perhaps, to look at what we 
do normally say from a fresh viewpoint - a metaphysical one - but
not to stop saying it. The dispute about abstract ideas may make us
wonder about the philosophical implications of our ordinary usage of 
general terms, but it will not prevent us from using those terms in the 
usual way, nor will it cause us to speak better or worse English.
Similarly, grammatical distinctions between nouns and adjectives
seem to provide linguistic data for metaphysical theories, which do
not deny the grammatical facts, but look at them in a certain way which
leads to giving them implications they normally would not be considered
to have. This point has been made by Professor Morris Lazerowitz who
interprets the dispute about Substance partly in terms of different
constructions which the phenomenalists and the substratum philosophers
put upon the fact that our language contains both nouns and adjectives.
It is as though the substratum philosophers argues
"* See, the difference between general nouns and adjectives 
is mainly a difference in the way they function syntactically 
in sentences. By comparison with their semantic similarity, 
this difference is trivial, but it hides their similarity'*
And to correct this state of affairs and bring out what is 
hidden by the structure of subject-predicate language, general 
nouns are reduced to adjectival status. The syntactical function 
nouns is turned over to a new symbol, and in this way the 
structure of subject-predicate sentences using general names as 
subjects is preserved and also the mystifying illusion of a 
deep theory about the structure of reality is created.” 5
Professor Lazerowitz goes on to account for the phenomenalist analysis
in this way:
"Metaphysicians who find the substratum theory unacceptable 
also feel the importance of the semantic similarity which 
grammar tends to conceal, and are dissatisfied with the 
grammar that conceals it ••• They see the possibility of 
assimilating adjectives to the class of substantive words.
5o Morris Lazerowitz, "Substratum", loc. cit., p. 193
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Instead of reducing general names to complex adjectives 
they change adjectives into abstract nouns, 'red* into 
'redness*, 'round' into 'roundness', and so on, and dispense 
altogether with the subject-predicate form of sentence." 6
While I do not believe, any more than Lazerowitz probably does,
that metaphysicians consciously set about changing nouns into adjectives
or adjectives into nouns, simply for the sake of doing so, it does
seem most plausible that one element in the enormously complex structure
of a metaphysical theory involves certain interpretations of grammatical
functions in ordinary speech. These interpretations would be made
in order to lend further plausibility to the views which are propounded,
in order to express certain attitudes or fulfil certain motives. For
example, Locke explicitly appeals to the subject-predicate grammar of
statements ascribing properties to things, as I have stated before,
and by doing so believes that he has produced an argument for asserting
the existence of 'some substratum'« It is only strictly speaking an
argument for this conclusion if we share Locke's interpretation, or
the metaphysical outlook in the service of which it is made.
Ordinary truths, expressions, facts, beliefs, together with some 
notions from science and mathematics, provide the basic material for 
the theories involved in the Locke-Berkeley dispute. In this section 
I have tried to show some of the threads in this material, but this 
study alone has made it evident that there are many of them, and to 
list them all here would not only be physically impossible, but tiresome 
for the reader. The main conclusion to be drawn is that the data are 
varied, complex, and considered non-philosophically most unprovocative.
A metaphysical theory is provocative because it does not describe its 
data, but interprets them. Just as rough-hewn marble looks quite 
different once it is sculpted into a statue, so the data of metaphysics 
are barely recognisable when they are transformed into a theory. Two 
sculptors using the same marble,, aiming to portray the same Greek hero, 
produce dissimilar and we might on occasion say incompatible effects.
Similarly, two metaphysicians using the same data, aiming to portray 
the same material world, produce incompatible theories about it. The
6. ibid., pp. 193-194
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theories, nor more than the statues can be said to conflict with 
the material from which they are developed.
Having tried to describe the material, I shall now discuss in 
more detail how metaphysicians treat it.
B. Metaphysical Interpretations and Reasons
The treatment of the material by metaphysical argument and 
conclusion purporting to be about it is complex, but its common 
characteristic seems to be what I have been calling - for want of a 
better word - "interpretation". It is now necessary to show more 
clearly what this word is intended to signify.
"Interpretation" is used here in the sense in which an actor is 
said to interpret a part, or in which a critic is said to interpret 
a novel, or in which a novel is said to interpret a character, an epoch, 
or human relationships. I do not intend the word to be taken more 
literally, e.g. in the sense in which we are said to be interpreting 
when we translate sentences of one natural language into sentences of 
another; or in the sense in which causal judgments like "Those clouds 
mean rain" are sometimes called interpretations of the significance 
of phenomena. Like dramatic or literary interpretation, metaphysical 
interpretation provides a wide scope for individual expression, and is 
not bound, like translation or causal interpretation, by already set 
rules of procedure. The psycho-analytic interpretation of Shakespearefe 
presentation of Hamlet by ERnest Jones differs from that made by 
Bradley or Johnson. It is in sharp contrast to the more traditional 
interpretations, and we might say incompatible with some of them.
The very same text gives rise to widely different descriptions of what its 
tragic hero is really like. Hamlet is called variously a man who 
could not make up his mind, a man with an Oedipus complex, a sensitive 
intellectual, an inhibited man of action, etc. The very same text 
continues to arouse critics in such a way that they go on giving 
different interpretations of it, and sometimes dispute about which 
interpretation is the most convincing.
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Here, I think, we have a situation very similar to that which we 
notice in the Locke-Berkeley dispute. The same basic data give rise 
to different interpretations of it. These interpretations conflict*
A dispute arises* A dispute can arise because the different 
interpretations are made of the same data, so the different theories 
are not merely unconnected pieces of imaginative fiction. Yet because 
they are different interpretations, the theories make conflicting 
claims* Ernest Jones makes a different interpretation of Hamlet's 
character from the traditional critics because his interests are 
different, his motive is different, and, in short, his attitude to the 
text is different. His aim is to interpret according to the thinking 
of Freud,
Some kinds of interpretation can appropriately be called true or 
false, correct or incorrect, probable or improbable. Translations are 
either correct or incorrect, causal judgments are either true or false, 
probable or improbable. The sort of interpretation which I believe 
to be characteristic of metaphysical method, however, is not the kind 
to which these epithets are correctly applicable. This might also 
be said of literary or artistic interpretation* Although people pftei 
do say "What X thinks about Jane Austen's novels is convincing, or 
plausible", for example, in these contexts the use of words like 
"convincing", "plausible" is not similar to the use of words like "tr*e", 
etc* , and the words are used in the absence of objective criteria for 
their correct application.
If someone says that it is true (or correct) that Jane Austen's 
novels fail to be great because they portray mediocre people living 
uneventful lives, our hackles may rise and we may think "How false!"
But we cannot point out anything about the novels which will conclusively 
refute the critic's view, although we could point out things which 
would serve to justify our own convictions that the critic was wrong.
If two people dispute about the merit of a novel,' there is no 
conclusive way of deciding the issue - for the same novel can be read 
from different imaginative viewpoints and there is no fixed and 
generally accepted criterion for dubbing one point of view correct and
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the other incorrect. Words like 'true* used in these contexts 
appear to convey only that their users are agreeing with a certain 
interpretation of a certain kind of character, for example, or 
sympathising with a judgment which emphasises a personal reaction 
similar to the one they themselves experienced on reading the novel*
Similarly, metaphysical interpretations are such that an impartial 
examination of the data which they claim to explain will not smffice 
to convince us either that they are 'true' or 'false', 'correct* or 
'incorrect** Of course some interpretations of other metaphysical 
theories which are made by rival metaphysicians may, in a straight­
forward sense, be misinterpretations* Locke did not mean by an 
abstract idea what Berkeley said he meant. Yet even in this case, 
as I tried to show, Berkeley is not exactly making a mistake, advancing 
an incorrect description of Locke's doctrine, since his primary aim is 
not to describe Locke's view at all, but to demolish it and advance 
his own* In order to agree with the critic of Jane Austen's novels, 
or with Berkeley, we have to share an imaginative outlook on the data, 
it is not enough to make an unbiased or disinterested study of the 
novels or of Locke's Essay* Yet in order to check a causal 
interpretation - "Those clouds mean rain" - the epithets 'true' etc* 
are easily applied with general agreement once it is known whether in 
fact rain does follow the appearance of the clouds* It would be 
singularly inappropriate to say to the meteorologist, (unless, perhaps, 
one were a poet like Wordsworth), "I don't share your attitude, those 
clouds signify something different to me". The comparative irrelevance 
of attitude or bias to causal interpretation contrasts sharply with 
the dependence upon attitude of metaphysical interpretation.
A metaphysical interpretation is made in the service of a special 
imaginative attitude which the author has towards the data, of an 
imaginative design in terms of which he feels the material world ought 
to be described*
We might say, straining for precision, ÿhat "A metaphysically 
interprets P as PI" means that A concludes Pi from P in accordance 
with the presuppositions of metaphysical interpretation, where P
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ordinarily implies neither Pi nor not-Pi. If someone else
metaphysically interprets P as P2, although P2 would then seem to imply 
Not-PI, it is not strictly true to say that Pi and P2 are conflicting 
interpretations, as for example P and not-P are conflicting 
interpretations, for in the metaphysical case it is not the 
interpretations which are incompatible - since neither is true 
or false - but the attitudes which promote them.
For example, partly from the fact that we have both veridical 
and illusory sense-experiences, (and partly from e.g. his definition 
of 'idea'), Berkeley concludes that God perceives the former but not 
the latter. We shall call this concluding PI from P. Locke, on the 
other hemd, concludes from P that an imperceptible substance is 
responsible for the former but not the latter. We shall call this 
concluding P2 from P. Now the assertion of Pi and P2 together does 
not result in a contradiction of the form P and not-P. There is 
nothing inherently self-contradictory about "God perceives my 
veridical ideas, and these are the ones caused by an imperceptible 
substance". But this conjunction can, of course, be made into a 
self-contradiction, for example by defining "veridical ideas" as those 
percepts which God shares and causes, and by making clear that "God" 
cannot refer to any material substance - e.g. by talking about "He". 
Since it is inappropriate to call either PI or P2 true or false, 
we can never check either, before we can believe that they conflict with 
each other we should have to agree to play the Berkeleian or the 
Lockeian game - to accept certain significations which they attach 
to the words they use. And in order to do this we should have to share 
one or other attitude, and so be provoked into dispute.
A metaphysical theory of the material world is not, however, the 
direct result of one single and simple interpretation put upon the 
facts, beliefs, propositions and scientific notions which provide its 
material. It is obviously more complex than that. It involves a great 
many interpretations and reinterpretations, as I hope I have already 
indicated in this thesis. Here I hope only to point out how the 
hypothesis that the dispute is irresolvable and persistent because it
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is a clash of interpretation and attitude rather than a factual 
disagreement about the actual nature of the material world seems to 
fit at least several important issues of the dispute.
First; it is clear that the quarrel between substratum philosophers 
and phenomenalists only arises, as I tried to show, when both sides 
agree to think in terms of a very general and technical classification 
of the data into Material Objects on the one hand and sensory qualities 
and sense-data on the other. To this extent the disputants hhare a 
presupposition. If we give "What is the nature of a material thing?" 
a purely commonsense form, e.g. "What is the nature of a mountain?", 
there is no provocation to either side, and a factual answer replaces 
metaphysical speculations. To start the dispute, it is necessary to 
rule out unadorned fact and commonsense and substitute that which has 
been given a new significance. We must, for example, ask the question 
"What is the nature of a material thing ?" at a very abstract level, it 
must be about any material thing whatever, and no specific worry should 
arise about whether steam and air, soap-bubbles and electric flashes, 
qualify as recipients for the title. We must also agree to ask what 
the relation is between a thing and its qualities, or between a thing 
and our experience of it, etc. We must avoid the more humdrum question 
often preferred by linguistic analysts, "What do we usually mean by 
'material thing'?" This being so, it is not surprising that serious 
metaphysicians find bland and sensible replies and reassurances, e.g. 
some of Moore's statements, beside the point. It is in^ortant to bear 
this in mind to avoid a facmle oversimplified account of metaphysical 
dispute and the relation to it of the cult of ordinary language.
Once the four metaphysicians, while apparently considering ordinary 
and unprovocative facts and beliefs about things and their colours, etc., 
transform those facts and beliefs by applying to them the )4aterial Object / 
Sense-Datum dichotomy, we are forced to look at the data in a new light.
We begin to think of the material scene as consisting of distinct 
species of thing - e.g. objects and sense-data. When we begin to thinkm 
in this wa$, we are interpreting our experience and not describing it.
We are interpreting a relation between it and the once familiar things.
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We are classifying in a way which is not demanded for any practical 
purpose, and we are not describing a difference which is warranted 
by an actual sharp distinction between types of item in the material 
world. To say that there are material objects and also sense-data 
is not like saying that there are goats and also sheep, or mountains 
and also hills, or even like saying that there are flowers and also 
flower scents, although we have this sort of fact in the back of our 
minds when we make our interpretation about objects and percepts. As 
soon as we begin to think generally of things and percepts, and cease 
to think specifically of trees and smells, we begin to think in terms 
of interpretation and justification , and cease to think descriptively.
This shared interpretation provides opportunities for reinterpretations. 
The important differences between phenomenalists and substratum 
philosophers arise when different renderings are given of the relation 
between the two kinds of entity which occupy the material scene as a 
result of their tecliààcal distinction. The phenomenal ists are anxious 
to dispel the impression created that things are sharply distinct from 
sensory qualities, or 'ideas', or 'sense-data', and argue that things 
are identical with groups of these. The substratum philosophers, on 
the other hand, re-emphasise the distinction which has been imposed, 
by arguing that things are quite distinct from sensory attributes, 
and that the relation between the two is one of cause and effect. The 
dissimilar reinterpretations are reinforced on both sides by a number 
of varied arguments which we might call reasons, remembering that it 
has been evident in this study that reasons in metaphysics are only 
likely to be considered grounds for believing the conclusions which 
they are meant to imply if we agree with the author's own interpret at ians 
of the data, and his redefinitions of the words he uses in order to 
make them.
Locke's reason for insisting that we must suppose that 'some 
substratum* accounts for the recurring patterns of our simple ideas of 
sensation was that unless we say this, we cannot explain how physical 
objects differ from dream objects, mental images, etc, do not depend 
for their existence on our perceiving organisms, and have a continuity 
and permanence although their characteristics change. The Heraclitean
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stream of percepts seemed to misrepresent the reliably ordered material 
world we know. Sensory qualities must therefore inhere in an unknown 
substance. Locke's reasons are given for a belief which cannot with 
any accuracy be called a commonsense one. Yet the reasons themselves 
are commonsense reasons. In fact commonsense - belief in the difference 
between dreams and waking experience, etc. - is enlisted on the side 
of a fantastic conclusion, that things are really unknowable. The 
eccentric conclusion is given as a way of saving us from eccentricity, 
from a denial of the obvious differences between veridical and illusory 
experiences, for example. Yet while we would not deny the statements 
which are given as reasons, we normally would deny that they arc 
reasons for holding the substratum theory. On the other hand, once 
we decide to urge the substratum theory, they become good reasons for 
doing so. Such considerations become good reasons if we have to 
reconcile, as Locke and Berkeley did as a result of their presuppositions, 
the sense-datura picture of the world with our set of commonsense 
assumptions; and if we wish to do it by expressing a certain 
imaginative outlook - e.g. a feeling that there is a mystery responsible 
for the familiar sensory scene, that there is more than meets the 
senses, and more even than science can ever show, about the ultimate 
nature of a table or a flower - or, alternatively, that there is nothing 
more. In such a frame of mind, and only then, would it be possible 
to subscribe without reservations to the opinion that Locke's reasons 
imply his conclusions, or that Berkeley's imply his.
It is surely because a philosopher puts a certain interpretation 
on his data that he seems to have a reason foo drawing his conclusion.
For example, as I tried to show in some detail before, it is because 
Berkeley gives a new signification to the necessarily true statement 
"Immediate sense-perception involves having 'ideas'", and to the fact 
that sense-evidence is the only kind of evidence which we can possibly 
have for asserting the existence of a material thing, that he believes 
he has reasons for concluding that a material thing is a group of 'ideas*. 
Philosophical reasoning involves a certain way of looking at facts and 
propositions. Sometimes the very same reasons are given in the course 
of the Locke-Berkeley dispute for opposite conclusions. In the imaginary
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dialogue between Locke and Berkeley constructed in Chapter Four 
I tried to show, among other things, that the appeals to commonsense 
beliefs made by Locke in favour of asserting the existence of Substance 
are those made by Berkeley as arguments in favour of asserting the 
existence of an omnipercipient deity. I attempted to elaborate this 
point in the first section of this chapter. Appeal to our ordinary 
faith in the unity and continuity of physical things is also used 
by Alexander and Russell, by the former as €in argument in favour of 
the unification of sensory qualities by Space-Time, by the latter as 
an argument in favour of the construction of sense-data into unities 
by logic. In view of this, it becomes evident that a given fact, 
proposition, or ordinary belief can be used in metaphysics as a reason 
for any conclusion about the nature of a material thing. This is 
because every metaphysician concerned with holding a theory about the 
nature of the material world wishes to contend with the same data 
and accommodate the same undeniable beliefs of the plain man. I 
have tried to show throughout this thesis that no fact, ordinary 
proposition, ordinary way of speaking, usual belief or common assumption 
is ever denied, although it becomes transformed for metaphysical 
purposes. It can only be transformed by being given new signification, 
and when this happens it becomes a reason for a metaphysical conclusion.
For example, Locke gave as a reason for his conclusion the fact 
that most of our propositions about material things are expressed by 
sentences which have subject-predicate form. In talking about things 
we usually do so by attributing qualities to subjects. Locke 
interpreted this fact, we might say, imaginatively, he suggested that 
when we say "The snow is white" for example we identify the white 
which we see as a property belonging to something which is not itself 
a property - and hence not itself a whiteness - to an undifferentiated 
subject. It is rather as if we meant "The whiteness belongs to 
something called snow", or "there is something called snow which has 
the colour white"; which indeed Tfe may mean, but whether or not we 
do we should not normally wonder. Now the mere fact that sentences 
used to describe things often have a subject-predicate grammar does 
not itself imply either that when we use them we ascribe a sensory
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quality to an unknown substance or that we do not. But it is easy to 
see how, extending the significance of grammatical form, we might come 
to see the fact in a new light, where it does seem to imply the 
metaphysical conclusion, and be a good reason for holding it. This 
surely is what Locke did.
Now Berkeley, and a number of modern philosophers, insist that the 
grammatical form of these sentences misled Locke. They themselves are 
misled if they think this seriously, for plainly Locke was not misled 
in using a fact about grammar, which fails to imply the contrary of 
the view just as it fails to imply that view itself, as a reason for 
his theory. Since, outside the sphere of philosophy, grammatical truths 
do not imply anything whatever about the nature of material things, or 
how statements about them should be 'logically analysed*, there is 
ample room for different interpretations of their significance which 
an examination of sentence structure cannot possibly serve to check.
This freedom of choice, unhampered by rules for interpretation, makes 
it possible to argue, as Berkeley and many others do, that the grammatical 
structure of certain sentences in no way shows that material things are
unknown substances, but rather tÿat they are groups of sense-data, since
the subject of subject-predicate sentences is plainly a shorthand 
symbol for a group of characteristics by which we recognise the thing 
in question. The gficmmatical facts themselves, like other data for 
metaphysics, and as they do in the abstract ideas dispute, preserve 
neutrality, and support no philosophical theory any more than they 
confute it. They need to be interpreted as reasons for a metaphysical 
conclusion before we can see them as provoking facts, suggesting something 
about the ultimate nature of things.
I hope I have made as clear as the complexity of the material and 
the tentative nature of iny suggestions permit the following points which 
are being claimed in this thesis:
The material for the dispute itself implies no metaphysical
conclusions, but it is made to imply them when it is interpreted by 
metaphysicians. Their interpretations in the first instance involve 
the imposition of very general and very abstract classifications which
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are not demanded by the plain facts themselves; i.e. they start 
from a comprehensive question about the facts. These are then 
reinterpreted by dualists and phenomenalists in the service of their 
attitudes towards the way in which they feel the material world ought 
to be described. Finally, individual metaphysicians malce further 
reinterpretations which reveal their particular motives -e.g. Alexander 
substitutes the idea of Space-Time for the Lockeian idea of Substance. 
To take sides in the dispute it is necessary to share one or other 
general outlook, or this plus a specific motive for expressing it, 
and hence be prepared to make one or other set of interpretations and 
reinterpretations9 For unless we do this, we can only reiterate 
that P implies P, and neither conclude Pi nor P2, and this would 
simply mean that we could not ,talce the metaphysical dispute seriously, 
and prefer the dicta of commonsense to imaginative speculation*
The purpose of the next and final chapter will be to say something 
more about the function of attitudes and outlooks in metaphysical 
dispute, and to complete the presentation of the hypothesis designed 
to explain its more puzzling characteristics*
CHAPTER TEN
AN EXPLANATION OF METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATION
"Does not metaphysics sometimes 
emerge as the attempt to convert 
poetry into the logically 
admissable ?" 1
D.M. MacKinnon, "Metaphysical and Religious 
Language", Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Vol. LIV, 1953-1954, p. 117
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(A) METAPHYSICAL MOTIVES AND ATTITUDES
The metaphysical dispute originates from two outlooks, and two 
different ways of multiplying the import of given facts and 
propositions. The question which these metaphysicians claim to 
answer , "What is the ultimate nature of a material thing ?", is 
asked in such a state of mind that plain commonsense is beside the 
point, and only commonsense which has been given a new significance 
can be considered relevant. As Professor Wisdom has said:
"'What is water?' asked with a profound look and in 
the philosophic manner, has a confusing verbal 
similarity with 'What is water?' asked briskly and 
in the scientific manner. But these two requests 
differ in kind, not merely in degree." 2
I want now to put forward some suggestions which might serve to
explain further what a 'philosophic manner' is, and why philosophers
with apparent eccentricity prefer evaluation, justification and
interpretation of facts and propositions to straightforward description
of them.
So far the tentative hypothesis which I have offered as a possibfc 
explanation of the peculiar irresolvability and persistence of the 
Locke-Berkeley dispute leaves several important questions unanswered, 
the main one being why metaphysicians trouble to interpret facts 
and propositions which are themselves unexciting and unsuggestive of 
theories about ultimate natures. First, I want to repeat Wiat I 
said in the Introduction, that it seems to me an answer to this 
question in terms of unconscious wishes or psychological needs is 
unhelpful. Such an answer fails to explain why some people fulfil 
their inner yearnings through the construction of a metaphysical 
theory rather than by some more usual and less didfficult method.
Even less does such an answer explain why a metaphysician should 
choose the theory which he puts forward rather than some other. ^
2* John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, p. 13 
3. See Introduction to this thesis, pp. 2-3
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Secondly, it seems clear to me that an answer in terms of the 
metaphysician's alleged advocation of linguistic changes is 
inadequate. This has been fully discussed, e.g. in Chapter Eight* 
Metaphysicians certainly redefine and reinterpret the applicability 
of our ordinary words, and also introduce technical terms, but this 
is not to say that they advocate linguistic changes for the sake of 
doing soo They use language in a way which best serves their non- 
linguistic purposes, and continue to be as satisfied as anyone else 
with ordinary language outside the sphere of metaphysical discussion, 
and in so far as it suits their purposes in metaphysical discussion*
I stated that perhaps we shall arrive much nearer the truth about 
the nature of metaphysical dispute if we pay more attention than 
is now common to the statements made by the contestants themselves.
This statement will now be reconsidered in an attempt to show Tidiat 
sort of things metaphysical motives and attitudes are.
There are, I believe, different general outlooks, or attitudes, 
which are expressed in metaphysical dispute, There are also different 
motives, which appear to be used as a sort of justification for the 
attitudes. Berkeley and Russell, I would say, share a general outlmk 
for different reasons, or with different motives for expressing it.
The general attitude of a metaphysician determines the type of theory 
he will propound, the philosophical school to which he will have 
allegiance, while his specific motive will determine the details of 
the theory peculiar to him. Let us see how this suggestion appertains 
to the theories which illustrate this thesis.
In this dispute, we can distinguish two general outlooks. One, 
shared by Locke and Alexander, wishes to see the world as something 
which is what it is irrespective of the presence of percipients*
It lays emphasis, we might say, on the supposed need for a material 
stability which it cannot attribute to the shifting sensory scene.
It is also what we might call a desire to synthesise rather than to 
analyse, to think in broad general terms of a single undifferentiated 
material reality which is responsible for the great variety of 
sense-experience. It is an intellectual search for a universal
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character istico In ancient terms, it is a preference for a One 
rather than a Many. It is naturally given to the creation of 
inferences from the known to the unknown, i.e. from what is experienced 
to what is not experienced* The other attitude shared by Berkeley 
and Russell, and, I believe, by some contemporary philosophers, 
is primarily a belligerent revolt against the expressions of the 
first outlook. It insists upon seeing the material world in terms 
only of sense-experience. It emphasises the senory scene, and the 
value of sense-evidence. It is analytic rather than synthetic, 
in the sense that it shuns synoptic thinking in terms of the One, and 
favours concrete thinking in terms of the Many. It shuns the 
suggestion that there are things in the material world which are 
beyond the reach of sense-experience, and feels a lack of respectability 
in inferences made from sense-evidence to something for which it is 
logically impossible that there should ever be sense-evidence.
These outlooks are doubtless caused by a very complicated set of 
psychological factors which determine imaginative sympathy or antipathy 
to cerÂàin general points of view. It is not my business to enquire 
itÈo this , since such an enquiry would not help to explain any 
further the metaphysical dispute which the attitudes generate. My 
contention that different outlooks give rise to different theories 
about the real nature of the material world depends upon the fact that 
people do see things in different lights, emphasise different thoughts 
and experiences, and this is the only psychological claim that need 
be made# It also seems to be a psychological claim which can easily 
be seen to be true. Since Western Philosophy first began in Ancient 
Greece, different philosophers have had natural or instinctive 
preferences for thinking about the material world as a unit or as a 
multiplicity. Since Parmenides and Heraclitus there have always 
been monists and pluraliste. This repetition of different general 
outlooks is not confined to the history of metaphysical speculation, 
or of philosophy. Political and religious opinion exhibits personal 
preferences for one sort of general outlook rather than another.
Tories and Radicals, Liberals and Fascists, Communists and Roman 
Catholics seem to have basic personal preferences for one kind ef
-217-
political rule rather than another, or for one kind of assessment 
of the relation of the ruled to the rulers rather than another, or 
for one interpretation of the relative rights of the individual and 
society rather than another. They express these general outlooks 
by advancing political arguments, moral judgments, economic theories, 
etc., but in many cases it seems evident tÿat the emotional impulse 
which a person has makes him a Conservative or a member of the Labour 
Party, rather than any logical weight of the justifications he 
proceeds to give for his outlook. A person who has no strong feelings 
about how society ought to be organised is inclined to be a person 
with no definite political allegiance.
Similarly in art and literature, taste, which may be argued for by 
appeal to aesthetic criteria and the latest canons of criticism, 
nevertheless seems to be determined by the sort of attitude which I 
am calling a personal preference which results in a general outlook 
of one sort rather than another. An example would be the dichotomy 
between Classicists and Romantics, or Representationalists and 
Impressionists. In all these examples, the theories which tend to 
result from the expression of such attitudes are, I think, very much 
like the "must-be" theories of metaphysics.
A metaphysical motive is determined usually by non-philosophical 
interests, where a metaphysical attitude is determined by imaginative 
and general emotional outlook. Locke, perhaps horrified by 
seventeenth-century religious bigotry, leading to persecutions and 
wars, by the faith he witnessed in the divine right of kings, was 
interested throughout his life in preaching toleration. It may be 
that his interest in the value of tolerance determined his motive for 
his metaphysics - to advocate intellectual humility, to prove that 
there is a limit to hmman thinking beyond which it cannot advance one 
jot. However this may be, we can undoubtedly say that he had an 
interest in replacing the dogmatic scholasticism or Aristotelianism 
rampant in the Oxford of his day with a cautious approach to knowledge. 
One way to advocate caution is to attempt a proof that there are 
matters into which the human mind cannot pry, since they lie forever 
beyond the scope of its faculties. Locke's scientific interests, it
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seems, suggested rather the type of picture he would paint, and not his 
reason for painting it. He chose to express his outlook that the world 
is something basically undifferentiated and insensible, by setting out 
to prove that the human mind can never discover its true nature, hence 
that speculation about it should be curbed by a proper humility in the 
face of this cognitive inadequacy.
Alexander shared the feeling that the world is basically something 
undifferentiated and unrevealed by sense-experience. His motive for 
expressing this feeling is in a way similar to Locke's and in another 
way most dissimilar. Alexander wished to find the a priori feature which 
appertains to all things, a pervasive feature which is neither variable 
nor contingent* In other words, he wished to prove that the material 
world is what it is irrespective of pprcipiiemts, to do away with what 
he called a "disproportionate respect for mind".^ Perhaps he felt 
distaste for a certain arrogance of the Hegelian idealists corresponding 
to Locke's distaste for the arrogance of the sects of his time* Minds, 
Alexander set out to show, are but the most gifted members 6f a democracy
5
of things. In this way he too expresses the outlook which he shares
with Locke by a design to curb respect for mind and encourage, we might 
say, respect for matter. But of course, where Locke set out to prove 
the inadequacies of thought, Alexander set out to prove that thought and 
sensing have no influence whatever on what is thought about and sensed* 
This difference may be due to the difference in the form of what Locke 
and Alexander were reacting against.
Locke and Alexander both thought that the true nature of the material 
world must be separable from our experience of it. They both felt that 
an imperceptible causal power produced the sensory scene. In Chapter 
Seven more precise similarities between the two theories were stated, and 
it seemed difficult to say just why "Material things are imperceptible 
substance" and "Material things are intuitable Space-Time" appear to 
make different claims.
4. See Alexander, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. iyi
5. ibid.. Vol. I, p. 237
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I suggested then that the difference might simply be one of 
different scientific period, explicable because Locke borrowed his 
term from Newtonian physics and Alexander borrowed his from Einsteinian 
theory. Now, I thinlc, a better explanation of the difference can 
be given in terms of the hypothesis that metaphysicians justify 
their attitudes through specific motives, and while Locke and Alexander 
were both 'realists', they did not have the same motive for expressing 
the realistic outlook.
Let us consider how Locke and Alexander, sharing the same outlook, 
seeking a material stability in the external world which they felt 
unable to attribute to the sensory scene, had different reasons for 
expressing it. Locke's motive was to instil intellectual humility, 
to draw a limit to human thinking; for this reason he developed 
arguments for the existence of an imperceptible causal substance. 
Alexander's motive was to purge us of a disproportionate respect for 
mind, hence to find a non-mental pervasive invarihble characteristic 
running through the material world; for this reason he developed 
arguments for the existence of an intuitable Space-Time from which all 
things are made. While Locke stresses, at the expense of sense-evidenœ, 
the limitations of the human mind, Alexander stresses, also at the 
expense of sense-evidence, the function of the imagination or 'intuitiorf© 
The outlooks of both philosophers demand that sense-experience should 
be deemed an inadequate form of knowledge of the material world, but 
one expresses this by seeking to prove that the material world is 
unknowable, and the other by seeking to prove that it is knowable 
only by intuition. Now in order to prove in metaphysical terms that 
the real nature of the material world is unknowable, and its apparent 
natvre is produced by something unknowable, and exists "in the mind", 
the imagination is more attuned to think of the unknowable substratum 
in terms of the "billiard ball" theory of matter, of substance acting 
"briskly" upon us to produce our experience of it. But in order to 
prove that the world is imperceptible but intuitable, and its apparent 
nature is part of the basic imperceptible substratum, it is more 
appropriate to avoid the analogy with old scientific substance, and 
replace it by the analogy with new scientific "Space-Time"; which
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concept, however little we may know of its scientific use, does 
not suggest a power acting briskly on our senses to produce "ideas". 
That is. Substance is the sort of abstraction we should easily 
imagine to be separable from experience, while Space-Time is not.
And if we want to prove our permanent ignorance of substratum, 
we want to prove its complete separability from experience; while if 
we want to prove our intuition of it, we want to prove that in some 
sense at least it is part of experience. It is clear, I think, that 
Alexander does want to prove that Space-Time, the material from 
which things are made, is part of experience. Although he suggests 
by his view that sensory qualities have primary counterparts which 
are motions in Space-Time, that Space-Time is the cause of experience, 
he suggests even more strongly, e.g. by his view that sensory qualities 
are identical with their primary counterparts, (identical therefore 
with Space-Time), that where and when a thing is, or where and when 
we have an experience, is not distinct from what the thing or the 
experience is.
In this way, I think the hypothesis that Locke and Alexander had 
the same outlook, but different interests or motives in expressing it, 
does explain the strange similarity yet difference between their 
views. The curtain of sense-experience which, in Locke's version of 
the substratum picture, can never be drawn to reveal the nature of 
what lies behind it, is depicted, in Alexander's, as saturated with 
Space-Time, made from the material of Space-Time although different 
from it. For Alexander, unlike Locke, had no motive which demanded 
that substratum should be depicted as unknowable and mysterious.
Both, however, had outlooks demand^ing expression in terms of the 
notion of a substratum, and this accounts for the striking similarity 
of their views as their motives account for the differences between 
them. Alexander's picture we might say, ( and I shall say more of 
what I mean by this recurrent term soon), belongs to the Lockeian 
school of metaphysical painting but his interests in painting it 
produce difference of stylistic detail.
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Berkeley and Russell shared the attitude which generates a strong 
reaction against the expressions of the Locke-Alexander type of 
outlook. Sense-evidence to them is sacred, and any slur apparently 
cast upon its worth arouses strong animosity* I think we can say 
that their attitude is primarily an antagonism to the distinction 
between appearance and reality made by advocates of substratum views, 
and it is rather their motives which supply the reason for the 
constructive character of their theories*
To Berkeley Locke's portrayal of the external world seemed not 
merely incorrect, but abhorrent. We noticed how he spoke of it in 
the strongest terms - it is a "thorn in the side". Matter must be 
"expelled out of nature", it is "unthinking" and "inert" and "stupid", 
all of which phrases suggest that the issue meant a little more to 
him than a desire to point out that Locke's theory was merely incorrect* 
Professor Luce, whose imaginative affinity with this outlook is 
so close because he also seems to share Berkeley's motive in expressing 
it, has said that Berkeley denied
"an external world which no experience can reach; he denied 
an external world in the outer darkness, unseen, unknovm, 
uncared for.." 6
This statement from an eminent authority on Berkeley indicates how
much attitude plays a part in his metaphysical theory. Mr. W^rnock
has made the same point:
"He (Berkeley) is clearly made most uncomfortable by the 
view that what there really £S in the world is, as Locke 
held, an inert, featureless, 'stupid' something, of which 
we know nothing except that it exists and is called 'matter** 
Ber^keley would detest so brutish a world as this, even if 
the assertion of its existence had not appeared to him to 
bristle with gross mistakes and disastrous consequences*" 7
While it would probably be admitted that Berkeley's reaction 
against Locke's view had much to do with emotional attitude, it is often
6. Luce, op* cit.g p* 27
7. Warnock, op. cit., p. 93
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said that Russell's rebellion against the concept of "a material 
thing" was justified on grounds of logic. IVhile I think it is true 
that his motive was to exhibit the usefulness of applying principles 
of other disciplines, e.g. formal logic, to metaphysical questions,
I also think it is evident that by rebelling against the concept of 
"a material thing" he was fighting the substratum view which it 
harbours, and expressing the very distaste which Berkeley expressed.
An effort to show this was made in Chapter Seven®
g
I ventured to say in Chapter Eight that more contemporary 
discussions, for example those about which terminology is best suited 
for the description of the material world, and those about which 
theories offend least against the supposed canons of ordinary language, 
seem to involve the expression of a general attitude of the type I 
have described. For example, it seemed that the only point in 
advocating the terminology of sense-data for philosophical problem­
solving is that it is a way of taking sides in the Locke-Berkeley 
dispute. Modern logical positivists, and other linguistic analysts, 
have shown strong preferences for Berkeley's theory, viz® phenomenalism, 
(with the religious part of the picture erased), over Locke's. The 
reason for this commonly given is that 'logical analysis' shows that 
it is more correct or convenient to analyse statements about material 
things into statements about sense-data than into statements about 
substrata. But this reason seems to be as much an interpretation 
of what logical analysis shows as Berkeley's and Locke's reasons 
for their conclusions, and as little a description of any semantic 
or syntactic fact* The facts of logic and grammar can be interpreted 
as excuses for saying something like Berkeley, but also for saying 
something like Locke. They cannot determine what we should say, any 
more than the facts of experience can determine whether we should say 
that buses exist unperceived or that they do not®
8. Section B of that Chapter
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If this is so, it suggests that Professor Ayer and Mr. Warnock, 
for example, although they would be disgusted to be told that they 
have metaphysical attitudes, have definite outlooks on what the 
material world must really be like, expressed by views about how 
it really ought to be described. While it may seem queer on this 
hypothesis that Professors Ayer and Luce share an outlook which 
encourages them to sympathise with Berkeley rather than Locke, this 
is not so if we add that they, like Locke and Alexander, share an 
attitude but have different motives for expressing it®
Let us then consider the motives of Berkeley, Russell, and 
contemporary analysts for expressing the feeling that the material 
world is essentially sensory, and attempt to see how the similarity 
and the differences between them arise, as we did in the case of 
Locke and Alexander.
Berkeley's explicit motive, and there is no reason to doubt that 
it was his actual motive, was to 'prove* the "existence and
9
immateriality of God" , to refute atheists and sceptics, to justify
his favourite biblical texts, for example about "the supreme and wise
spirit, in whom we live, move, and have our b e i n g . H e  went so
far as to state that if he could not inspire his readers with a
pious sense of the presence of God he would consider his labours
ineffectual.^^ Locke, he feels, turned the "visible beauty of
12the creation" into "a false imaginary glare". His aim is to
"attain conviction without all scruple, 'that the eyes 
of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and 
the good; that he is with us and keepeth us in all places 
whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat, and raiment to 
put on..'" etc. 13
9. Berkeley, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 23 (The Preface to the 1st Edition 
of the Principles)
10. ibid., p. 70 (PRINCIPLES, para. 66)
11. ibid*, p. 113 (PRINCIPLES, para. 156)
12. ibid., p. 211 (Second Dialogue Between Hylas and Philonous)
13. ibid., pp. 112-113 {raiNCIPLES, para. 1551
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Berkeley's motive, we might add, was to give a literal meaning and 
some sort of logical admissability to a certain appeal which these 
biblical texts might make to our imaginations. He wanted to give the 
appeal the force of deductive argument, to prove the existence of the 
sort of deity the texts suggest. Consequently his general attitude 
that the world of sense-experience must be the real world, that there 
is no mystery lurking behind the scenes, is expressed in order to 
probe the existence of a divine percipient, to give literal meaning 
to 'the eyes of the Lord are in every place'. It is expressed by 
argumentation which makes it seem that the only way to avoid self- 
contradiction is to postulate such a God. Ideas imply a percipient, 
things are collections of ideas, but they sometimes exist in the 
absence of human percipients, and sometimes we have collections of 
ideas which turn out not to be real things; therefore a non-human, 
divine mind must cause those ideas which constitute real things, v^hich 
can exist in the absence of human percipients. Therefore God exists, 
and directly apprehends our ideas, which form a divine language.
Where Berkeley's motive was to inspire his readers with a pious 
sense of the presence of God, I suggested that Russell's might be 
described as a wish to inspire his readers with a pious sense of the 
advent of "scientific p h i l o s o p h y " . T h e  strange thing about 
Russell's motive is that the objective 'scientific' spirit which he 
aims to bring into his philosophy is notably absent from it# In 
Chapter Seven I argued that this use of the word 'scientific' is either 
trivial # i.e. to indicate that Russell borrows some mathematical and 
methodological notions from other disciplines - or for prestige value, 
and not literal. We might consequently re-read Russell's motive as 
a desire to employ the concepts which he had found so useful in logic 
and the foundations of mathematics in order to establish a certain 
Leibnitzian picture of the world which will leave no room for the 
substratum*picture against which he so violently reacted. Russell's
14. i.e. in Chapter Six og this thesis.
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fondness for Heraclitus, and his surprising but plainly sincere 
belief that a bit of mysticism or poetic imagination added to 
scientific or logical enquiry produces "the highest eminence in the 
world of t h o u g h t c e r t a i n l y  seems to cancel out the claims he 
made for his own theory, that, unlike the traditional metaphysics 
of the past, it would be more than an embodiment of "personal 
idiosyncrasies".
The similarity of the views of Berkeley and Russell, which at 
first seems surprising since ®ne claims to be a logico-scientific 
hypothesis and the other a proof for the existence of a divine 
mind, is explicable if we think in terms of the general outlook which 
produced both. The differences relate to the different motives.
In both theories the world is portrayed as a network of discrete 
percepts united by mental activity into physical things. But in 
one the mental activity concerned is attributed to a divine mind, 
since the motive is religious, and in the other it is attributed to 
human minds, since the motive is to show the applicability of 
principles of mathematical logic to the description of the material 
world. The two motives are related in turn to different interests - 
theological and scientifico-mathematical respectively.
Motives of contemporary linguistic analysts, like Mr. Warnock, 
for defending a type of phenomenalist outlook, are usually determined 
by a strong interest in ordinary language, which appears to them to 
be less misrepresented by Berkeley's type of theory than by Locke's. 
They often give as an explicit aim the promise that they will attempt 
to "clarify" something about material-object statements with ordinary 
language as their guide. We must not forget, however, that there 
appears to be nothing in ordinary language itself which demands 
clarification - that is, for the practical purposes with which 
ordinary language is concerned. As I tried to show, the kind of 
analysis undertaken by I^tr. Warnock is not called for at all by the
15. Russell, "Mysticism and Logic", loc. cit., p. 11
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semantic or grammatical facts themselves. Normally we all know 
what we mean when we talk of chairs and tables, and if we miss 
someone*s meaning, the thing is to appeal to grammar or the dictionary, 
or to ask for an ordinary paraphrase, and certainly not to consult 
a linguistic philosopher.
Motives of contemporary linguistic analysts like Professor Ayer 
on the other hand are rather different - if we can take Language,
Truth and Logic as containing representative statements at least 
of what he once believed. They are not determined so much by a 
strong interest in ordinary language, as by a strong determination 
to show that metaphysical problems can be resolved by the introduction 
of special terminologies. Phenomenalism attracts them because the 
terminology of sense-data seems to be the one in which problems of 
perception can be most fully "analysed", or "clarified", and so by 
this substitute for ordinary language they cein claim to show that 
problems of perception disappear when linguistic conjuring tricks 
are performed. But again, there are no 'problems of perception', 
or lack of clarity in the ordinary vocabulary of perception, udukil 
philosophers introduce them by making certain technical classification; 
which were discussed in the last chapter. I submit, then, that
these kinds of motive are as much justifications resulting from 
non-philosophical interests in language, of a metaphysical point 
of view about what the material world must really be like, in terms 
of what is required by a certain kind of linguistic construction, 
as the motives of Locke, Berkeley, Alexander and Russell.
It remains to be described how attitudes and motives are connected 
with what I have been calling, variously, metaphysical pictures, 
imaginative models of the material world, portrayals, etc. I realise 
that these metaphorical expressions lack precision, but they do seem 
to convey what kind of thing a metaphysical conclusion is, and at 
present I ean think of no-way of indicating this without the aid of 
analogy. The attempt to gain greater precision will therefore be 
made by developing the analogy, and pointing out where it fits and 
where it does not#
-237-
The an^ogy, of course, is with works of art. I do not mean 
to push it too far. A metaphysical theory is unlike a painting or 
a piece of music or sculpture, for its ostensible object is to 
prove something, which is not usual with a work of art. It is even 
unlike a poem or a novel, because its medium involves deductive 
argumentation of a kind quite alien to sonnets or sagas. It replaces 
poetic imagery and idiom by the logical treatment of facts and 
propositions, by interpretations of the implication of the data, 
and by a comprehensive theory about all that exists in the material 
world, all that ever has and ever will exist. Yet I believe that 
metaphysical views expressed in prose are more like Lucretius'
De Rerum Natura than might appear at first; they treat a vast 
subject-matter by trying, like poetry, to evoke an imaginative 
response.
The final effect of a metaphysical theory is to give us a certain 
impression of what the material world could be like, a way of 
looking at old things anew, in a very general and abstract way.
All four metaphysicians whose theories illustrate this thesis intend 
to tell us what the world is really like. A poet or a painter 
might claim that his work showed what a mountain was really like, 
and so contrast his presentation of the mountain with what the 
mountain appears to be like to the casual observer. He might express 
something by introducing empathy which would not normally occur 
to us - and he might make us see the mountain as a cruel crag or 
a soaring spire. Wordsworth enlivened mountains with a spiritual 
agency as Berkeley did, although the difference between poetry and 
metaphysics makes the comparison of poetical with metaphysical 
statements about mountains a thin one. For, of course, Wordsworth 
did not express his 'feeling for mountains' by deductive argument 
leading to quasi a priori proofs.
Although a metaphysical theory does give an impression of what 
the world might be like, this impression does not bear verification.
I hope I have shown that the facts about the world and its normal 
description (from which it is developed) cannot possibly serve to 
refute or confirm the impression conveyed of their implications.
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We accept, reject, or remain impartial to a metaphysical view 
according to whether we have an attitude which is expressed by it, 
conflicts with it, or no attitude of this type at all. To accept 
or reject a metaphysical conclusion we have to feel that it expresses 
something about the material world which must be true, or cannot 
possibly be true, and by this we subscribe to the appropriate point 
of view. Now this sort of point has often led philosophers to declare 
that metaphysical theories, since they are not refutable or verifiable, 
must be meaningless. Hereeagain the analogy with works of art does,
I think, help. Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn is not the sort of thing 
anyone in their senses would judge by making a study of a Grecian urn, 
for in that way it is not literally about a Grecian urn at all, nor even 
literally about the figures on it, although these provide the data 
for Keats's imaginative interpretations. Even if we could look at 
the urn which Keats looked at, if there were one, it would be singularly 
inappropriate to test his Ode by comparing it with its subject-matter. 
None of the sentences in his poem would be suitable as a catalogue 
entry for an exhibition of Grecian urns; none of them are simply true 
or false descriptions of urns. Yet Keats's Ode is far from being a 
meaningless or even unclear combination of words. Similarly 
metaphysical theories, although strictly speaking they are not about 
the material world which provides the data for their interpretations, 
are not appropriately tested by observation; yet they do give an 
unmistakable impression of a way of thinking about it.
The general outlooks, or attitudes, which are expressed in 
metaphysical theory are, I think, more poetic than rational, involving 
an imaginative point of view rather than the spjrit of impartial 
intellectual enquiry. It is noticeable that a metaphysician will 
often say at the beginning of a work that he is going to make an 
enquiry into something, and before the enquiry can be made prove to 
us by deductive argument that the result of that enquiry will be X. 
Metaphysicians know what they wish to express before they work out the 
argumentation with which to express it. For what they wish to express 
is determined by attitude and justified by motive - the argumentation
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which follows is a matter of interpreting the data in accordance with 
their attitudes and motives. Where a scientist reaches his conclusion 
by working through series of empirical examinations and rational 
arguments, it seems to me that a metaphysician reaches his arguments 
by using his conclusion as a blueprint for his arguments in the first 
place.
The impulse to speculate about the ultimate nature of the material 
world is akin to the poetic impulse, but the form in which it is 
expressed is different - i.e. deductive argument. The view that 
metaphysical theories are a kind of poetry expressed in terms of abstract 
argumentation may startle when stated so bluntly, but it is strongly 
suggested by statements which philosophers themselves have made about 
them. In addition to Mr. MacKinnon's remark quoted at the head of 
this chapter, he also said that metaphysics had a "curious poetic 
c h a r a c t e r " . Professor^ÿisdom has suggested the mixture of intellect 
and heart in metaphysics , and Dr. Macdonald has suggested in a question 
that metaphysical 'belief*, if we can call it such, is a very different
18kind of belief from that in empirical hypotheses. Clearly philosophers
frequently find grounds for suspecting that metaphysical conclusion, 
and probably theological and aesthetic conclusion, has more to do with 
imaginative outlook and interest than with impartial enquiry, or 
dispassionate weighing of the evidence. The evidence for this sort 
of conclusion is never weighed dispassionately, since before it can be 
judged it has to be created by an interpretation of the facts, which in 
themselves provide no evidence for or against the conclusion.
16. D.M. MacKinnon, "Metaphysical and Religious Language", loc. cit.,
Po 117
17. See John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, p. 18I:
"Chance and Necessity, Freedom and Deity, Mind and Matter, Space and 
Time, - these words have in them the detachment of the intellect but 
also echoes from the heart,.."
18® See Margaret Macdonald, "Ethics and the Ceremonial Use of Language", 
loc. cit., p. 226. "Newton was a great scientist; he was also
a devout Christian. Did he believe the law of gravitation as he 
believed the Apostles' Creed ?"
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I shall summarise my suggestion about the nature of metaphysical 
theories, before going on in the final section to explain how it 
fits those characteristics of the Locke-Berkeley dispute which have 
appeared the most puzzling in this study.
Briefly, I suggest that the data for a metaphysical theory about 
the material world is itself unprovocative, and does not naturally 
evoke or require any metaphysical description or explanation# Since 
metaphysicians approach it, however, from a certain point of view, 
they interpret this data in the service of their general attitudes 
or outlooks; reinterpretations are then made in accordance with 
specific motives. The result is that we are presented with imaginative 
models of material reality which express the attitudes, result from 
the interpretations, and fulfil specific motives. They are related 
to the material world because they are the result of interpretations 
of the material world; they are not related to it as descriptions of 
mountains are related to mountains. A metaphysical picture, like a 
work of art, expresses something about its subject-matter, but does 
not photograph it.
As I tried to show in the last chapter, the interpretations which
metaphysicians make of data are by no means all of the same type.
They are as varied as the arguments into which they are transformed.
In this way any summary of the hypothesis about metaphysical dispute 
is oversimplified. In what follows I shall try to give a detailed 
account of what seems to be the pattern of the dispute, and this way 
questions still unanswered - e.g. why metaphysical conclusions are 
couched in a priori terms - can be faced.
(B) THE EXPRESSION OF MOTIVES AND ATTITUDES IN 
METAPHYSICAL DISPUTE
The chief reason why the otherwise helpful analogy between
metaphysical theories and works of art breaks down is that the former
are expressed in a medium which is alien to the latter - deductive
argumentation. It is now necessary to make a brief reference to 
the relation between this argumentation and what I have called
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metaphysical motives, attitudes, interpretations and imaginative 
models.
In Chapter Nine I pointed out that the same ordinary fact, belief 
or statement is sometimes interpreted by two metaphysicians as a 
reason for different conclusions. Several examples have been given.
One of them was the way in which Locke and Berkeley pointed to the 
need to account for the ordinary belief in the continuity and unity of 
physical objects in order to make most dissimilar claims. Locke 
turned this common belief into one of his reasons for supposing that 
things are "some substratum" by which "ideas" are caused. Berkeley 
turned it into part of his argument for believing that God directly 
apprehends our veridical "ideas". This hitherto puzzling feature of 
the metaphysical dispute, that A can conclude that P implies Pi while 
B is free to conclude that it implies P2 - (where ordinarily P implies 
neither Pi nor P2, nor the denial of them, nor any other metaphysical 
conclusion) - can now be explained as the result of interpretation 
made in the service of attitùdéeand motive. The point of making 
metaphysical interpretations of the facts is to establish imaginative 
models for the external world which will express and attitude and 
fulfil a motive*
Yet the expression "to establish an imaginative model for the 
external world" is justly suspect. For the analogy it suggests seems 
to crash when we remember how absurd it would be to talk of establishing 
or proving a picture, demonstrating a poem, or showing that the 
conclusion of a symphony follows from its movements* It has been clear 
that metaphysics differs from art in having deductive argumentation as 
its medium.
If that deductive argumentation were indeed like the theorems of 
geometry or the inferences from mathematical equations, there would 
be small excuse for pursuing the analogy with works of art any further. 
But the "deductive argumentation" of metaphysics does not seem to me 
to be like that of the formal systems of mathematics and logic, nor 
like that gaining its power from the common use of language - e.g.
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"If an animal has four legs it is a quadruped". Throughout this 
thesis I have tried to give examples of how metaphysicians claim to 
"establish" their conclusions "a priori". It seemed that the conclusions 
are never empirically testable, and are logically binding upon us if 
and only if we accept the redefinitions and presuppositions of the 
system to which they belong. For example, "abstract ideas cannot exist" 
is necessarily true if and only if we retain the ordinary meaning of 
îidea* so that an idea entails that some person has it, but also extend 
the ordinary meaning so that 'idea' is applicable to colours and shapes 
as well as thoughts and images. It is necessarily true that real thin^ 
are imperceptible if and only if we agree that 'thing' has two 
incompatible meanings - "real things" and "perceptible things". Of 
course, in each case we have to agree to more presuppositions in order 
to accept the specially created a priori conclusion; in the interests 
of brevity I quote the main redefinitions in these examples, and refer 
the reader to previous chapters for fuller accounts.
The method of metaphysical dispute is to establish one's own 
conclusions in this sort of way, and exhibit the unwanted conclusions 
of rivals as "nonsense", "self-contradictory", "absurd", etc.
"It is not uncommon for philosophers to take scornful 
attitudes to each other's views and to dismiss them
as ridiculous and an outrage to our intelligence.
Indeed, one is tempted to think that an important 
technique of refutation in philosophy is scorn and 
ridicule, a technique, tJiat is to say, of intellectual 
intimidation." 19
Berkeley seeks to establish the self-contradictory absurdity of Locke's
view and the a priori certainty of his own. Locke seeks to prove that
it is logically impossible to know the nature of substance, which
nevertheless must exist. Alexander asserts that Space-Time is a
necessary feature of all things. Russell says that it is an outrageous
fiction to suppose that a material thing is other than a series of sense-
data. Indeed, the conclasions advanced by all four are irrefutable by
reference to fact, language, ordinary belief, or an agreed logical
system. If we accept the interpretations and definitions which render
19. Morris Lazerowitz, "Negative Terms", Philosophy and Analysis,
po  7 0
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them necessarily true in terms of the system in which they figure, 
there is no possible argument which will shake our conviction that 
they are conclusively established. In this sense alone, all 
metaphysical conclusions are necessarily true; in another sense, 
no metaphysical conclusion is 'true* or 'false' in any way, for it 
is not a description, but an expression of personal outlook made to 
appear as if it is about material reality.
It would be impossible to explain, as far as I can see, why it 
is that some philosophers accept some systems and reject others 
unless we think in terms of attitudes, and the appeal to the imagination 
by certain models of the world. In order to accept metaphysical 
conclusions, it is necessary to accept certain definitions and 
interpretations, or ways of looking at facts and propositions; in 
order to do this, it is necessary to have a certain attitude, of a 
kind which can be expressed in a broad and general picture of what the 
material world is like.
Now we are in a better position to see that a metaphysical 
conclusion is not necessarily true as a theorem is necessarily true, 
although both follow from a process of deduction. This is because 
each metaphysician provides his own axioms - there is no generally 
accepted set, and there is no obvious criterion for judging their 
worth. A metaphysical conclusion is a necessary truth which has been 
especially created, and is not one which is certified by any generally 
accepted rule. It has been created tlirough interpretation in order 
to say that the material world must be such-and-such. The choice 
between rival conclusions is made on purely subjective grounds, in 
other words, we have to feel that the material world must be X and 
cannot possibly be Y, or not-X.
I do not think that the analogy with works of art b breaks down 
as completely as it seemed to do. For while a painètr's skill
lies in the manipulation of paints and brushes, we can say that a 
metaphysician's skill lies in his manipulation of words and their
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meanings* This might also be said, of course, oi a poet; so we 
can qualify the statement about the metaphysician by adding that 
bis manipulation of words and their meanings is made in accordance 
with logical patterns, where the poet's is made in accordance with 
patterns designed to evoke not primarily rational or intellectual 
responses, but emotional or imaginative ones. Like all generalisations, 
this must be qualified. But it does seem to be true that the 
metaphysician creates, like the poet, an imaginative impression, but, 
unlike the poet, aims to make his work of art convincing by investing 
his conclusion with a compelling logical force - that of necessary 
truth. However, if we recall the obsession of poets with "poetic 
truth", or "imaginative truth", this difference between them and 
metaphysicians does not seem very clear.
Mr. MacKinnon's comment that metaphysics sometimes emerges as 
the attempt to convert poetry into the logically admissable is no 
exaggeration. The basic attitude giving rise to a metaphysical
theory is like a poetic impulse or attitude. It is expressed through 
logical argument, created especially to impose a certain imaginative 
design on the external world, and the impression that the design 
must (logically) be the real pattern. A poetic outlook is expressed 
to create a metaphysical impression of what the world is really like; 
but this is done by making the impression seem to be, not merely 
logically admissable, but logically binding upon us, and fortified 
against refutation. Metaphysical theories, I have argued, are 
"must-be"theories.
If this suggestion is correct, or nearly correct, we can reject 
for good the frequent comment, already discussed, that metaphysics 
offends against ordinary language. In order to express an imaginative 
outlook in terms of formal argumentation leading to a priori 
conclusions, the ordinary application of terms has to be extended 
or restricted or added to by technical terms. A special vocabulary 
is needed for the purpose. Then to say that a metaphysician misuses 
language is surely just like saying that T.S. Eliot misuses language, 
or contradicts himself, when he speaks of "paralysed force and gesture
20. Quoted under this chapter heading
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without motion". And, as a logician has insisted in another 
connection,
"To say a language fails to come up to certain specifications 
when it was not constructed according to them is simply 
nonsense." 21
If metaphysical views are so autonomous, it is easy to see why 
they are irrefutable, but it may seem odd that they are disputed.
The Locke-Berkeley dispute is persistent as well as irresolvable. 
Philosophers still think that they can refute Berkeley or Locke, 
Alexander or Russell. I believe they still think this, and the 
dispute is persistent, because attitudes and motives are the impetus. 
The attitude expressed in the phenomenalist design is an antagonistic 
one. It rebels against the portrayal of material reality as something 
separable from experience. If someone feels very strongly that he 
cannot have imaginative sympathy with the substratum picture, the 
obvious metaphysical reaction is to attack it by using the medium 
of abstract argumentation, to seek to establish that it is plain 
nonsense, or irrational, or utterly ridiculous. Although substratum 
theories are irrefutable in terms of their native interpretations, 
they can be attacked in terras of different interpretations. This is 
what happens. V^hile substratum theories cannot be refuted, they can 
be replaced. They are in fact replaced by those philosophers who 
have a different outlook to express. The philosophers who attack 
a rival theory, we noticed, do so with missionary zeal, and their 
attacks are not over even when they have "demonstrated" that the 
opponent is talking rubbish. Berkeley, for example, having provided 
an a priori demonstration that since abstract ideas are contradictions- 
in-tcrms, and Substance is an abstract idea, then Substance is 
self-contradictory, goes on to devote endless and detailed argument to 
showing that Substance cannot exist. A notable feature of the 
metaphysical dispute is the ability of the contestants to take what
21. Alice Ambrose, "The Problem of Linguistic Inadequacy", Philosophical 
Analysis, ed. Max Black, Cornell University: 1950. p. 34
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they call "nonsense" sufficiently seriously to spend time and 
trouble on its "refutation". They half recognise that "nonsense" 
has been given a special sense in their theories, which needs constant 
elucidation. From their procedure we can recognise that a strong 
attitude and motive drives them to take the trouble.
Many philosophers have believed that there is mn most metaphysiceil 
views "an element of truth", although in none is there the whole 
truth, and in none nothing but the truth. This is reminiscent of 
those popular theologians who argue that all religious paths lead 
by different routes to the same God. It assumes that there is an 
ultimate set of truths about the real nature of the material world, 
which only metaphysical thought can reveal, and which it is so 
difficult to reveal that thousands of years of metaphysical speculation 
have not yet produced fruit comparable to one year of scientific 
endeavour. This seems in itself a half-built metaphysical view.
The plain facts just do not warrant the belief that there is something 
about the real nature of the material world which can be revealed by 
abstract speculation divorced from the methods of enquiry and testing 
which have proved successful in science. People who express this 
outlook are likely to be thwarted metaphysicians who subscribe to no 
system, own no metaphysical picture, but cannot help feeling that there 
is more to the nature of a flower or a tree than can be revealed by 
the senses, commonsense, botany, physics, chemistry, or etc. This is 
because they accept the presupposition of all metaphysics, that the 
question to be answered is one about the ultimate, comprehensive, 
nature of Material Objects. Since they have no specific motive, §nd 
no metaphysical preference, they express the feeling that there is an 
ultimate nature of the world which philosophy could discover by speaking 
of grains of truth in different theories.
Other philosophers, for example, if I understand him properly. 
Professor Wisdom, believe that metaphysical theories emphasise certain 
ordinary truths ate the expense of others, and in this sense they all 
contain grains of truth. There is no objection to this description,
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which does indeed point out a feature of metaphysical theories which 
is particularly interesting, as long as it does not imply, what 
I think it is sometimes intended to signify, that metaphysicians 
deny or ignore those ordinary truths which they do not emphasise.
For the point which I have tried hard to make, and which seems 
important, is that metaphysicians take pains to acconraodate all the 
facts that need to be accounted for, and deny or ignore none of them.
I am convinced that unless we introduce into our explanation 
of metaphysical dispute some such concept as attitude, or outlook, 
or imaginative point of view, and also some such concept as motive, 
or interest, or reason for expressing the attitude in terms of 
argumentation, we are at a loss to explain its irresolvability ahd 
persistence. Consider once again the Locke-Berkeley dispute about 
abstract ideas. It is a form of the age-old dispute about universais, 
and it has been going on since Plato, and shows no signs of dying 
today. Yet regarded impartially it seems a useless sort of talk 
at cross purposes. One side stresses that general terms have connotation;, 
the other that they have denotations. They do, of course, have both, 
and there is no obvious reason for stressing either. But some 
philosophers talce it that if 'colour* connotes something, it must 
be an abstract idea, or a universal, or some other metaphysical 
interpretation is made. While others keep pointing out that 'colour' 
denotes particular instances of colour - yellow,red,white,etc. -
which are sensory qualities, or sense-data, or individuals, or some
other results of metaphysical classification. Then some philosophers 
go on to say that general words cannot be replaced by lists of
particular words, and others retort that in principle there is no
reason why they should not be. By this time the simple fact that 
general terms connote and also denote has been transformed in 
mutually incompatible ways, so that it is made to seem an argument 
for abstract ideas, etc., and also an argument for the rebellion 
against abstract ideas, etc. Now since the simple fact naturally, 
in its native habitat of ordinary semantics and grammar, suggests
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nothing either for or against theories about universale or abstract 
ideas, appeal to it serves neither to refute nor to confirm either 
theory. It seems that the dispute, irreso^able but continued, is 
futile* In fact, it would seem like the dispute in the Irish pub 
about whether a zebra is a white animal with black stripes, or a 
black animal with white stripes* Yet since some of the most clever 
people throughout a large portion of European History and a growing 
portion of American History have spent time in perpetuating the dispute, 
the conclusion that it is deliberate futility must miss a point.
The point, I believe, is that a metaphysical theory, like a work of 
art, expresses an outlook and is built with a motive.
On this hypothesis, the man who interprets the fact that general 
terms have connotations to signify that there are abstract ideas, etc., 
does so because of his desire to synthesise rather than analyse, to 
insist that there are non-sensory entities, to portray what exists 
not merely in terras of what we experience. The rebellion comes because 
others desire to analyse, to "think in the concrete", to emphasise the 
importance of sense-experience, and ultimately the "silliness" of 
non-seesory entities. This leads these other philosophers to interpret 
the fact that general words have denotations as indicative of the 
absurdity they see in the postulation of abstract ideas, universais, 
and what Russell would call metaphysical monsters, for general words 
on their interpretation are convenient symbols for making general 
reference to particular sensory experiences.
The dispute continues unresolved, irresolvably. Different 
painters and art critics, and members of the general public, may 
disagree violently about the merits of two stylistically opposed
paintings of Sir Winston Churchill. They would have no difficulty
in agreeing that a clear photograph showed what he is like. The
painters who have made a study of his appearance see, in a literal
sense, the same man. But, they say, a painting is meant to show what 
he is really like, e.g. an aspect of him considered to be important 
is emphasised. So a closer study of the man will not help to resolve 
the argument about which painting shows what he is really like. To
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resolve this dispute, the contestants would have to come to share 
each other's point of view, to have the same imaginative impression, 
to agree what he is really like, i.e. to agree to emphasise the same 
aspects of his personality and so of his appearance.
Once more this analogy seems helpful. For when a metaphysician 
abandons a view he once held, I believe it is true to say of what 
has happened that he has come to see certain facts or propositions 
in a new light, from an angle he did not have before. Russell, for 
example, in his later work, as quoted in Chapter Five, admitted that 
a material object, which he had previously regarded as no more than a 
series of sense-data, might have a "substance at the centre",J 
This seems to me to show, more than anything, that he had a change 
of attitude leading to a change of interpretation. For in his earlier 
work Russell described such a thought as "gratuitous metaphysical 
speculation", and regarded Substance as one of the metaphysical 
monsters which he was pledged to kill. To come to comtemplate even 
its possibility, where no new facts had meanwhile emerged to change 
his mind, indicates a fresh imaginative outlook.
By explaining metaphysical dispute in these terras, there is a 
danger of giving the impression that metaphysics is neater and more 
ordered than it is. Without intending to be mystical or obscurantist, 
one can remember that a part of a pattern is what it is because it is 
part of a pattern, while the pattern is what it is because it has those 
parts. The point of saying this here is that in speaking of the parts 
of a metaphysical pattern separately it may be suggested that those 
parts arc strictly separable. Probably much linguistic analysis of 
metaphysics fails to convey a plausible account of what metaphysics 
is like simply because it concentrates on the verbal tricks that are 
played, without wondering why they are played, or how it is that they 
arouse animosity in those who play different tricks. To discuss 
attitudes, motives, interpretations, or imaginative models, and the 
parts they seem to play in metaphysics, is like discussing the purpose, 
the symbols, and the appearance of a map. It suggests that these 
elements are more discrete than they are, that there is no overlapping.
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However, since my purpose has been to say what the elements in the 
Locke-Berkeley dispute are which give rise to certain features, it 
was necessary to talk about them separately, and now it is tiye to 
admit that I do not believe they are neatly separable. If someone, 
for example, prefers to say that attitudes are indistinguishable 
from interpretations in metaphysics, or that imaginative models are 
indistinguishable from interpretations, I shall feel that I have gained 
my point. For at least it would then have been agreed that these 
elements are involved, and probably it would have been more apparent 
to the critic how they coalesce in the pattern than it has been in my 
attempts to make an analytic study©
I hope I have shown why I believe this hypothesis about the nature 
of the metaphysical dispute explains its irresolvability and persistence» 
Now I wish to claim that it also explains the mixed logical style 
of the theories involved. It seemed odd that metaphysicians should 
so often inform us that a statement is necessarily true, then go on 
to ask us to examine some fact or common belief in order to verify it, 
when in any case the fact or common belief concerned could neither 
serve to verify or refute the statement concerned. Berkeley, for 
example, asks us to try to think of something existing unperceived, 
having already told us that according to his definitions it is self­
contradictory to speak of such a thing. For thinking of something, on 
his terms, logically entails perceiving it. We are asked to conduct 
experiments which it is logically impossible should turn out to refute 
the metaphysical statement we are supposed to be testing.
I tried to show in Chapter Nine that the data for the metaphysical 
dispute is varied. One reason why metaphysical theories are couched 
in a mixed a priori/empirical style is quite simply because their data 
include both genuine necessarily true propositions and ordinary 
empirical statements and beliefs© But I think one can be more informative 
on this question by reflecting upon the logical status of the 
metaphysical interpretations of the data. These do not fit comfortably 
either into the category "necessary statements" nor into the category 
"contingent statements", although, with a squeeze this way or that, they 
could be made to fit under either heading. A metaphysical interpretation
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is empirical in so far as it is an interpretation of a fact or 
a proposition about some item or items in the world. It is not 
empirical in so far as it is untestable by the fact. We cannot 
refute a metaphysical interpretation, and this suggests that we should 
call it necessarily/ true. Yet it relates to a fact, and is the 
result of an attitude, and this suggests that we should call it 
contingent. The way in which a metaphysical interpretation plays 
a two-faced logical role - that is, the way in which it is possible 
to regard it as contingent or necessary, dependnibg on the point of 
view - enables metaphysicians to endow their special renderings of 
the facts both with the apparent relevance to the world of contingent 
statements and with the logical certainty of a priori statements.
The framework is provided for asserting that the material world is, 
as a matter of fact, such-and-such, and further that it could not 
possibly be, as a matter of logic, anything but such-and-such.
I believe it is true to say that the strength of a metaphysical 
picture depends upon this characteristic of the interpretations 
which are the arguments designed to persuade us to accept it© This 
is seldom recognised. Mr© Warnock, for instance, spoke of Berkeley's 
interpretations this way:
"Berkeley would have saved himself and us from much 
labour, if he had not so often disguised the necessary 
truths of his theory as seemingly dbtious falsehoods 
in ordinary language." 22
He had in mind in particular that while "sensible things are sensations"
is a necessary truth, "sensible qualities are sensations" is just
plain false. But of course Berkeley himself over and over again
made the point that in his terms sensible things and sensible qualities ,
and images and mountains alike, are all sensations - all mind-
dependent. The fact that he interprets a genuine necessary truth
in order to make it cover items which in ordinary language it does
not cover, explains the provocative character of esse est percipi,
gives us the reason why philosophers have never ceased to be delighted
or plagued by Berkeley's theory© If, as Mr. Warnock suggests, perhaps
as a joke, Berkeley had confined himself to uttering ordinary
tautologies, without playing metaphysical tricks with them, we should
22. Warnock, op. citTl p7 l62
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indeed have been saved much labour, for there would have been no 
point left in reading his works. We should not, in fact, have 
been provided by him with any metaphysical theory at all. For I 
hope I have indicated that metaphysical speculation is impossible 
unless facts and propositions are interpreted rather than described, 
and rather than analysed in accordance with a predetermined set 
of supposed ordinary language criteria.
Professor Luce, for example, has said, (speaking for himself 
and Berkeley), that "the metaphysical deductions" - for example the 
deduction that God imprints veridical ideas upon our senses -
"are, to the immaterialist, inevitable deductions 
from the psychological facts" 23
This seems a clear statement of the situation. To the 'immaterialist*
the facts, for example that there is a distinction between oranges
and images of oranges, seem to entail the conclusion that God
imprints some ideas on our minds and not others. If we accept the
terms, for example of the Berkleian system, they ^  entail those
conclusions. They do, because the conclusions follow after certain
interpretations have been made. No such conclusions would be
entailed by those facts unless they had been freely interpreted in
the service of an attitude and special motive.
We adopt the metaphysics which pleases us most and suits our 
interests best. To complain that metaphysicians disguise their 
data is to complain that they are metaphysicians. I hope I have 
shown that metaphysics is unique, and to pretend that it does 
something less well that some other subject does better is to 
overlook the possibility that its purposes and results may be 
incomparable with those of other endeavours. It is because of this 
that I do not wish my analogy between metaphysics and art to be 
taken too liéérally. It just seemed to be a helpful device for 
bringing out some of the ways in which metaphysics is ^  unlike 
purely descriptive or empirical studies.
23. Luce, op. cit., p. 108
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I do not believe that the suggestions made here in an attempt 
to explain the irresolvability, persistence, and mixed logical 
idiom of metaphysical dispute (in particular of the Locke-Berkeley 
dispute) do more than provide the tentative and probably incorrect 
outlines of a map for further exploration. Hie nature of 
metaphysics is largely uncharted country* Scholars and historians 
have made and travelled many roads, but a vast hinterland, as I 
intimated in the Introduction, seems to me to remain virtually 
unexplored*
A few philosophers have hacked their way through some of the 
jungle, and the light they have let in has made this study possible 
The hypothesis I offer as a map may not have correct outlines, 
but it seems to reflect the points which demand explanation in 
^ny study of the function of metaphysical statements*
First, that metaphysical assertions, though not testable, based 
on subjective attitudes and inspired by personal motives, are 
neither nonsense, unprovocative, nor mistaken. .Secondly, that 
their conclusions are a priori true in the sense that they have to 
be accepted if the interpretations which back them and the attitude; 
they express are accepted. Thirdly, that however often philosophers 
wash their hands of metaphysical speculation, it continues to 
colour their work, it has a fascination we cannot escape, for it 
is one way of expressing basic outlooks and personal preferences, 
and perhaps the most thoughtful way. Finally, however hard we 
try to refute a metaphysical view, our hands are tied by its own 
logical rules© It is autonomous, like a work of art.
My hope is that I have helped to show that the jungle is not 
unexciting, yet that its exotic blooms are not without a natural 
explanation.
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